Free Will Debate

[The Grand Nudger]

He may be, but if he is, there is no free will. Dennet’s compatibilism rests on the necessity to redefine free will in light of hard determinism.

[Jehanne]

Sam Harris has a book on free will; he reads it himself on the Audible version.

[polymath257]

He may be, but if he is, there is no free will.  Dennet’s compatibilism rests on the necessity to redefine free will in light of hard determinism.

Is it really a redefinition if the original concept is so vague that nothing can really be said about it?

Exactly what does the term 'free will' mean?

Does it require that there is more than one possible future whenever a choice is made? If so, what about physics suggests that is a real possibility?

---

I think it is helpful in talking about free will to have some examples where we would definitely say that there is no free will and other cases where we are more likely to say that there is. Since free will seems to be about making choices, I will focus on that aspect of things.

As a first example, suppose that I step/am pushed/or otherwise exit a flying airplane well above the ground. At that point I do NOT have the 'choice' to not fall. Even if I *really* want to not fall, the inevitable fact will be that I will fall. I simply do not have 'free will' to choose to not fall.

On the other hand, taking the example above, if I am in a grocery store, I can choose to but one brand of OJ over another. But what does it mean to say that choice is 'free'? does it mean that in spite of all my experiences, preferences, and all other variables, I *could* choose the other brand? But why would I? If my experiences, preferences, and tastes are not enough to make a free choice in line with them, what is the value of 'free will'? At that point, it doesn't sound, to me, like a 'free' choice, but rather that it is an arbitrary choice.

Going further, I would say that the choice is *mine* if the primary determiners of the outcome are, in fact, my preferences, my experiences, my emotions, and my internal state as opposed to something external to me being the primary causal factor for the following events (as it would be for falling from a plane). And having 'free will' would mean that the choice was *mine* in that sense.

What bothers people about this notion of free will is that those preferences, emotions, and experiences might be determined in ways that 'don't involve me'. but, of course, the fact that I have certain preferences is, at least partially, determined by my past experiences and my reactions to those past experiences. That also seems perfectly good and reasonable. I would not want to have my preferences NOT determined by my past experiences and reactions! That would seem to be very 'un-free'!

Ultimately, this seems to be compatible with determinism and materialism. The choices are *mine*: they happen in my brain, based on my experiences, my memories, and my preferences. Those preferences are determined my my previous experiences and how I reacted to them. Even in a deterministic system, I *am* the one 'making choices', even if those choices are determined: they are determined by who I am and how I see the world.

Unless, of course, I jump out of an airplane without a parachute.

But your preferences, your emotions, your experiences and your internal states all didn’t exist until you did, and all of them only exist in the manner they do solely because of factors with are all ultimates external to you.   so how are these “internal” processes in any way whatsoever ultimately less external than any of what you would call “external” factors?

They are internal because they are *in me*. In the same sense that the fusion reactions that power the sun are in the sun, not external to it. Sure, the hydrogen in the sun ultimately came from outside of the sun, but that doesn't seem very relevant.

The point is that very minor changes to the internal state would lead to large differences in the results. That means that the 'causal nexus', if you will, is within my brain and body. That is distinct from what happens if, say, the wind blows slightly differently. That *won't* mean that the actions I take will be substantially different.

This ultimately relies on chaotic dynamics: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The conditions that determine which brand of milk I choose depend mostly on events happening in my brain. Those are part of my interaction with my environment, as it should be. And what happens in my brain *is me*. I am not something distinct from the processes in my brain. At least, my psychology isn't.

---

I think there is a general confusion between unpredictable Will and free will.   Most argument for existence of free will seem to boils down to the formulation of Will may involve processes whose outcome can not even in theory to predicted a priori. 

But how does that make the resulting will free?

It doesn’t. We have no way to tell if any event - from tying a shoelace to dropping atomic bombs - is a willed event or a pre-determined one.

Boru

What makes you think those are exclusive possibilities? Why cannot something be both willed and pre-determined?

[The Grand Nudger]

I can’t add anything more than the example of the sun. A deterministic free will is that we own our actions like the sun owns its reactions.

To say this is absolutely not what the term is taken to mean in common use and for a long time is an understatement.

A hammer owns its strikes this way. A switch owns its effects this way. Water owns its wetness, so on and so forth, all things ever believed to lack free will turn out to have it. In fact….all things, full stop , have this sort of free will.

It was the contention that we were somehow outside of a causal chain. That our choices were a pull yourself up by your bootstraps kind of thing.

[Anomalocaris]

They are internal because they are *in me*. In the same sense that the fusion reactions that power the sun are in the sun, not external to it. Sure, the hydrogen in the sun ultimately came from outside of the sun, but that doesn't seem very relevant.

The point is that very minor changes to the internal state would lead to large differences in the results. That means that the 'causal nexus', if you will, is within my brain and body. That is distinct from what happens if, say, the wind blows slightly differently. That *won't* mean that the actions I take will be substantially different.

This ultimately relies on chaotic dynamics: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The conditions that determine which brand of milk I choose depend mostly on events happening in my brain. Those are part of my interaction with my environment, as it should be. And what happens in my brain *is me*. I am not something distinct from the processes in my brain. At least, my psychology isn't.

---

If the conditions in your brain that determined which brand of milk you choose ultimately depends largely on the totality of your external experience and the genes which were passed externally to the first cell that would become you,  is there still really a causal nexus is within you, or your “mind” simply become a convenient accounting bucket in which to place not the cause, but a collection of intermediate processes somewhere in the middle between cause and the effect in question, that so happen to occur within a particular durable configuration of molecules to which we attach particular emotive significance?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

He may be, but if he is, there is no free will.  Dennet’s compatibilism rests on the necessity to redefine free will in light of hard determinism.

Is it really a redefinition if the original concept is so vague that nothing can really be said about it?

Exactly what does the term 'free will' mean?

Does it require that there is more than one possible future whenever a choice is made? If so, what about physics suggests that is a real possibility?

---

But your preferences, your emotions, your experiences and your internal states all didn’t exist until you did, and all of them only exist in the manner they do solely because of factors with are all ultimates external to you.   so how are these “internal” processes in any way whatsoever ultimately less external than any of what you would call “external” factors?

They are internal because they are *in me*. In the same sense that the fusion reactions that power the sun are in the sun, not external to it. Sure, the hydrogen in the sun ultimately came from outside of the sun, but that doesn't seem very relevant.

The point is that very minor changes to the internal state would lead to large differences in the results. That means that the 'causal nexus', if you will, is within my brain and body. That is distinct from what happens if, say, the wind blows slightly differently. That *won't* mean that the actions I take will be substantially different.

This ultimately relies on chaotic dynamics: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The conditions that determine which brand of milk I choose depend mostly on events happening in my brain. Those are part of my interaction with my environment, as it should be. And what happens in my brain *is me*. I am not something distinct from the processes in my brain. At least, my psychology isn't.

---

It doesn’t. We have no way to tell if any event - from tying a shoelace to dropping atomic bombs - is a willed event or a pre-determined one.

Boru

What makes you think those are exclusive possibilities? Why cannot something be both willed and pre-determined?

Because there are no married bachelors.

Boru

[Jehanne]

The central idea from the Wikipedia article that I posted above, which Dr. Harris appeals to all throughout this book, is the experimental fact that researchers, using fMRI and other neuroimaging techniques, can determine, by a better than chance ratio, the choices that an individual is going to make before that person is conscious of that choice.

Can free will exist in the realm of unconscious choices?  Can I, as a human being, make a unconscious choice?  If so, in what sense can that choice be said to be "free"?

[polymath257]

Is it really a redefinition if the original concept is so vague that nothing can really be said about it?

Exactly what does the term 'free will' mean?

Does it require that there is more than one possible future whenever a choice is made? If so, what about physics suggests that is a real possibility?

---

They are internal because they are *in me*. In the same sense that the fusion reactions that power the sun are in the sun, not external to it. Sure, the hydrogen in the sun ultimately came from outside of the sun, but that doesn't seem very relevant.

The point is that very minor changes to the internal state would lead to large differences in the results. That means that the 'causal nexus', if you will, is within my brain and body. That is distinct from what happens if, say, the wind blows slightly differently. That *won't* mean that the actions I take will be substantially different.

This ultimately relies on chaotic dynamics: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The conditions that determine which brand of milk I choose depend mostly on events happening in my brain. Those are part of my interaction with my environment, as it should be. And what happens in my brain *is me*. I am not something distinct from the processes in my brain. At least, my psychology isn't.

---

What makes you think those are exclusive possibilities? Why cannot something be both willed and pre-determined?

Because there are no married bachelors.

Boru

If I will something, it doesn't stop being willed simply because it was pre-determined.

---

They are internal because they are *in me*. In the same sense that the fusion reactions that power the sun are in the sun, not external to it. Sure, the hydrogen in the sun ultimately came from outside of the sun, but that doesn't seem very relevant.

The point is that very minor changes to the internal state would lead to large differences in the results. That means that the 'causal nexus', if you will, is within my brain and body. That is distinct from what happens if, say, the wind blows slightly differently. That *won't* mean that the actions I take will be substantially different.

This ultimately relies on chaotic dynamics: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The conditions that determine which brand of milk I choose depend mostly on events happening in my brain. Those are part of my interaction with my environment, as it should be. And what happens in my brain *is me*. I am not something distinct from the processes in my brain. At least, my psychology isn't.

---

If the conditions in your brain that determined which brand of milk you choose ultimately depends largely on the totality of your external experience and the genes which were passed externally to the first cell that would become you,  is there still really a causal nexus is within you, or your “mind” simply become a convenient accounting bucket in which to place not the cause, but a collection of intermediate processes somewhere in the middle between cause and the effect in question, that so happen to occur within a particular durable configuration of molecules to which we attach particular emotive significance?

Yes, there is. if something had been slightly different within my brain, then I would have made a different decision. If, instead, something in that first cell had been slightly different, I would not have been at the store at all.

Yes, the mind (and will) are intermediate stages in a process going back billions of years. So? that doesn't change the fact that my mind is where the 'decision' was made.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's locality, not freedom. No one doubts that we have a will. There's no need for a qualifier like free if we're discussing will. If we insist on a qualifier, we're talking local will. It may be about as free as the reactions going on in a star.

[polymath257]

That's locality, not freedom.  No one doubts that we have a will.  There's no need for a qualifier like free if we're discussing will.  If we insist on a qualifier, we're talking local will.  It may be about as free as the reactions going on in a star.

So what does that modifier mean in this context? What make a will 'free'?

If I had 'chosen' a different brand, I would have bought that other brand. If I had desired a different brand, I would have chosen it.  if I had a different preference, I would have a different desire and I would have chosen differently.

In each case, *I* am the one that 'chooses', even if the conditions of that choice are in a causal stream.

Is the desire that the choice I make *not* be dependent on my preferences and desires? Or even that my preferences and desires NOT be based on my previous experiences?

What, precisely, does it mean to have 'free' will? What would it look like?