Russia and Ukraine

[Anomalocaris]

no, the german started losing before that.   They lost big at stalingrad at the end of 1942, recovered somewhat in spring of 1943, got nowhere at kursk despite of near numerical parity at kursk in mid 1943,  got beaten back several times, largely kicked out of ukraine and barely avoided a smaller repeat of stalingrad at Kursun pocket in early 1944,  this was all during the period when deployed tank wise the two sides were either roughly at parity or when German quantitative superiority still balanced russian numerical superiority.  so it is not true that the Russians could not learn from their tactical mistakes and relied on big numbers of wonder tanks instead.  

remember you wanted to bring up T34, nor me.  so who is being up the red herring?

we don’t know exactly why the russian tank factories stoped production,  we also don’t know for sure they did, at least no follow up confirmation. we have no idea if the bottle neck is a part or parts for which there are substitutes,    We also know Russia has enormous inventory or older models of T72 Lineage tanks in storage, and we don’t know how many of these can be easily or effectively modernized to supplement the production of new tanks.

as to applying the operational art,  as i said before, that was in my opinion their initial plan to apply deep battle doctrine by leading off with Moskirovka and multi-axis attack.    That failed.  At the moment they lack the capability to try again on the same ukraine wide scale..   So it is my opinion they will attempt to draw out the war, while limiting the exposures created by the defects on their forces so far revealed, with the aim to cripple Ukraine demographically by driving out urban population of ukraine as refugees instead of making big bold deep battle style attacks in the near future.   

But that is in response to the particular circumstances that arose in ukraine.   it does not imply to me that going forward, they would abandon deep battle as their core doctrine for future wars.

[Thumpalumpacus]

remember you wanted to bring up T34, nor me.  so who is being up the red herring?

My point, since you've obviously missed it again, is that in WWII the Soviets had numbers to beat back the invasion and then go in for the kill. Thousands of tanks, thousands of attack aircraft, in order to apply the concept of deep battle.

They don't have those numbers nowadays. That's why advocating WWII strategies for this modern battle is slipshod. The idea of applying deep battle with these paltry numbers seems pretty silly, with these poorly-trained conscripts and shanghaied Ukrainians thrown into battle with no training at all. Sorry, but that's an act of desperation, not genius.

Going down the qualities of WWII tanks as you're doing is mos' def a red herring. How about you address the modern issues? If you want multiple probing attacks before deciding on an attack vector, and then funneling reserves there, explain how you'll get those reserves there when the Russians cannot seem to pass up a grocery store for want of food? Logistics, logistics, logistics.

And how are you going to maintain multiple axes of advance when your manpower is 1/4 of that needed to pursue the operations you're advocating?

Sorry, your argument is entirely unconvincing. The Russians are concentrating in another obvious point, while their regrouping is allowing Ukrainians breathing space and time to redeploy as well (on interior lines), and how much more fuel are they burning moving those tired troops hither and fro?

[Anomalocaris]

really? what is my argument?

[Thumpalumpacus]

You're arguing for deep battle as a doctrine here when the circumstances for it don't obtain.

Is there any other help you need? I'll be going to bed in about 20 minutes, but happy to help you out all the same in the meantime.

[Anomalocaris]

You're arguing for deep battle as a doctrine here when the circumstances for it don't obtain.

Is there any other help you need?

No, I am not arguing FOR deep battle doctrine being the right doctrine to apply

I am arguing for deep battle doctrine being the actually doctrine they attempted to apply.

And excuse me if I did not have a crystal ball that can penetrate even your befuddlement and thus be able to straighten you out in one shot.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Just so everyone else is in the picture:

Using these templates, the Soviets developed the concept of deep battle, and by 1936, it had become part of the Red Army Field Regulations. Deep operations had two phases: the tactical deep battle, followed by the exploitation of tactical success, known as the conduct of deep battle operations. Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defenses, or tactical zones, through combined arms assaults, which would be followed up by fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves sent to exploit the strategic depth of an enemy front. The goal of a deep operation was to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on the enemy's logistical abilities and render the defence of their front more difficult, impossible, or indeed irrelevant. Unlike most other doctrines, deep battle stressed combined arms cooperation at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

So, the Russians have what fresh forces to hand? What logistical mobility do they possess at this point? What combined-arms operations have they successfully concluded? What exploitations are they pursuing? There's no breakthrough here at all to exploit. They're regrouping.

This is why I find this point of Chuck's unconvincing. It lacks a basis in facts.

[Anomalocaris]

Just so everyone else is in the picture:

Using these templates, the Soviets developed the concept of deep battle, and by 1936, it had become part of the Red Army Field Regulations. Deep operations had two phases: the tactical deep battle, followed by the exploitation of tactical success, known as the conduct of deep battle operations. Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defenses, or tactical zones, through combined arms assaults, which would be followed up by fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves sent to exploit the strategic depth of an enemy front. The goal of a deep operation was to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on the enemy's logistical abilities and render the defence of their front more difficult, impossible, or indeed irrelevant. Unlike most other doctrines, deep battle stressed combined arms cooperation at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

So, the Russians have what fresh forces to hand? What logistical mobility do they possess at this point? What combined-arms operations have they successfully concluded? What exploitations are they pursuing? There's no breakthrough here at all to exploit. They're regrouping.

This is why I find this point of Chuck's unconvincing. It lacks a basis in facts.

I don’t think we are talking past each other by accident.   You are intentionally misrepresenting me so as to pretend to have something to say.

[Thumpalumpacus]

You're arguing for deep battle as a doctrine here when the circumstances for it don't obtain.

Is there any other help you need?

No, I am not arguing FOR deep battle doctrine being the right doctrine to apply

I am arguing for deep battle doctrine being the actually doctrine they attempted to apply.

And excuse me if I did not have a crystal ball that can penetrate even your befuddlement and thus be able to straighten you out in one shot.

So you cannot read my mind even as we're communicating, but somehow you can read minds in Russia who are running this battle.

Got it.

They weren't trying for deep battle, they were trying for "scare the shit out of them" -- and it failed.

[Anomalocaris]

No, I am not arguing FOR deep battle doctrine being the right doctrine to apply

I am arguing for deep battle doctrine being the actually doctrine they attempted to apply.

And excuse me if I did not have a crystal ball that can penetrate even your befuddlement and thus be able to straighten you out in one shot.

So you cannot read my mind even as we're communicating, but somehow you can read minds in Russia who are running this battle.

Got it.

Right, keep misrepresenting me so you can have more witty things to say.

[Thumpalumpacus]

I don’t think we are talking past each other by accident.   You are intentionally misrepresenting me so as to pretend to have something to say.

lol, when all else fails, you go personal.

You do you, little buddy ... you do you.

---

Right, keep misrepresenting me so you can have more witty things to say.

Your tears are sweet. I've got a jacuzzi to fill.

---

So, the Russians have what fresh forces to hand? What logistical mobility do they possess at this point? What combined-arms operations have they successfully concluded? What exploitations are they pursuing? There's no breakthrough here at all to exploit. They're regrouping.

Questions Chuck doesn't want to answer.