Illustrating the burden of proof - pay me!

[emjay]

Neo, what is the reason for god? Or do you accept god as a brute fact?

Not at this time. The question of God's existence howver seems to me inextricably connected to things I do consider brute facts such as the Principle of Non-Contradiction.

I've always been curious about that... so it's not the case that you see Aquinas' arguments for instance, for the necessity of God, as sufficient reasons in the sense of the PSR, for the actual existence of God (in the why sense, if not the how sense)? That's how I assumed you might be squaring that circle, but looks like I was wrong on that, ie that there is still a question there for you as to how God exists, if not why?

[brewer]

I'm walking away from this rabbit hole, I just don't have the time or energy at this point.

Full stop on arguing god(s) into existence!!!

[The Architect Of Fate]

I'm walking away from this rabbit hole, I just don't have the time or energy at this point.

Full stop on arguing god(s) into existence!!!

Yup that's all it is arguing a god into existence

[Angrboda]

Very simply put:

“The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a powerful and controversial philosophical principle stipulating that everything must have a reason, cause, or ground.”

I was going to reply directly to brewer's post but I think this is a good starting point.

My point was this. Burden of Proof and the PSR are both subjective terms of art. Both relate to the evidentiary burden demanded to properly evaluate the truth status of a proposition. The subjectivity of burden of proof is exemplified by the notion that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The subjectivity of the PSR enters when we find ourselves confronted with what appear to be inexplicable brute facts, and start to carve out exceptions for them.

For example, some abstract formal systems track exceptionally well with observed phenomena (like certain maths and physical events) and others have no such obvious connection (astrology). For an advocate of the PSR, this difference between formal systems suggests there is something that needs to be explained. What do effective abstractions have in common that is lacking in apparently useless abstractions? Those who seem to consider the PSR as a quick route to “God did it,” the abstract formal systems that work are distinguished from those that don’t precisely because they work. As such they can be conveniently taken as brute facts. Personally, I do not find that satisfying philosophically.

I guess what I also saying is this. The subjectivity of Burden of Proof gets a lot of air-time on AF because that subjectivity to favor atheistic arguements grounded in foundationalism. In comparision, the PSR favors theism because it suggests that foundation of reality go deeper that many atheists suppose.

I think you've got the telescope the wrong way around. While some phenomenon appear to have explanations, and the more salient the explanations may differ, that's totally unrelated to whether things necessarily must have explanations. Additionally it's far from clear to what things the PSR should apply and why, and for which things it need not apply. God will fall on one side or the other of that line for no objectively describable reason. So as far as I'm concerned, there's nothing intuitively obvious about the many forms of the PSR. That some things do in fact have explanations grants no credit toward the principle that all things need explanations. And if you think about it, how can such things bottom out except in an infinite regress of explanations because there's always going to be a layer deeper that you can go. Take elementary particles. If quarks are the smallest unit of substance, the PSR seems to demand that there be a smaller unit that explains quarks or else there's a violation of the PSR. When a philosophical principle starts dictating how the world composes itself, the principle needs to go. I'm pretty sure reality isn't going to step aside for it.

[LadyForCamus]

I’m certain that the bottom, in the eyes of the theist, is God. But I’ve yet to hear a rational justification for why the principle doesn’t apply to him/her/it.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I was going to reply directly to brewer's post but I think this is a good starting point.

My point was this. Burden of Proof and the PSR are both subjective terms of art. Both relate to the evidentiary burden demanded to properly evaluate the truth status of a proposition. The subjectivity of burden of proof is exemplified by the notion that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The subjectivity of the PSR enters when we find ourselves confronted with what appear to be inexplicable brute facts, and start to carve out exceptions for them.

For example, some abstract formal systems track exceptionally well with observed phenomena (like certain maths and physical events) and others have no such obvious connection (astrology). For an advocate of the PSR, this difference between formal systems suggests there is something that needs to be explained. What do effective abstractions have in common that is lacking in apparently useless abstractions? Those who seem to consider the PSR as a quick route to “God did it,” the abstract formal systems that work are distinguished from those that don’t precisely because they work. As such they can be conveniently taken as brute facts. Personally, I do not find that satisfying philosophically.

I guess what I also saying is this. The subjectivity of Burden of Proof gets a lot of air-time on AF because that subjectivity to favor atheistic arguements grounded in foundationalism. In comparision, the PSR favors theism because it suggests that foundation of reality go deeper that many atheists suppose.

I think you've got the telescope the wrong way around.  While some phenomenon appear to have explanations, and the more salient the explanations may differ, that's totally unrelated to whether things necessarily must have explanations.  Additionally it's far from clear to what things the PSR should apply and why, and for which things it need not apply.  God will fall on one side or the other of that line for no objectively describable reason.  So as far as I'm concerned, there's nothing intuitively obvious about the many forms of the PSR.  That some things do in fact have explanations grants no credit toward the principle that all things need explanations.  And if you think about it, how can such things bottom out except in an infinite regress of explanations because there's always going to be a layer deeper that you can go.  Take elementary particles.  If quarks are the smallest unit of substance, the PSR seems to demand that there be a smaller unit that explains quarks or else there's a violation of the PSR.  When a philosophical principle starts dictating how the world composes itself, the principle needs to go.  I'm pretty sure reality isn't going to step aside for it.

That would be a fair critique. How does one decide what needs explaining and what doesn't? Again, not much different than saying certain claims have a high burden of proof, some very little, and some not at all. Changing the evidentiary standard in proportion to the questioner's incredulity isn't very principled IMHO.

---

I’m certain that the bottom, in the eyes of the theist, is God. But I’ve yet to hear a rational justification for why the principle doesn’t apply to him/her/it.

What is the rational justification for saying anything "just is what it is"? I do not have an answer but it seems theoretically possible, and worthy of discussion, to discern between what is necessary versus what is merely possible or impossible.

[Neo-Scholastic]

[quote='Neo-Scholastic' pid='2087861' dateline='1644084388']
... so it's not the case that you see Aquinas' arguments for instance, for the necessity of God, as sufficient reasons in the sense of the PSR, for the actual existence of God (in the why sense, if not the how sense)?...there is still a question there for you as to how God exists, if not why?

Just to clarify, I was talking about the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) as a necessary feature of an intelligibility. The 5W of Aquinas only work if two conditions are met: 1) reality is intelligible and 2) human reason is effective. Believing either of conditions to be the case requires a leap of faith.

[LadyForCamus]

I think you've got the telescope the wrong way around.  While some phenomenon appear to have explanations, and the more salient the explanations may differ, that's totally unrelated to whether things necessarily must have explanations.  Additionally it's far from clear to what things the PSR should apply and why, and for which things it need not apply.  God will fall on one side or the other of that line for no objectively describable reason.  So as far as I'm concerned, there's nothing intuitively obvious about the many forms of the PSR.  That some things do in fact have explanations grants no credit toward the principle that all things need explanations.  And if you think about it, how can such things bottom out except in an infinite regress of explanations because there's always going to be a layer deeper that you can go.  Take elementary particles.  If quarks are the smallest unit of substance, the PSR seems to demand that there be a smaller unit that explains quarks or else there's a violation of the PSR.  When a philosophical principle starts dictating how the world composes itself, the principle needs to go.  I'm pretty sure reality isn't going to step aside for it.

That would be a fair critique. How does one decide what needs explaining and what doesn't? Again, not much different than saying certain claims have a high burden of proof, some very little, and some not at all. Changing the evidentiary standard in proportion to the questioner's incredulity isn't very principled IMHO.

---

I’m certain that the bottom, in the eyes of the theist, is God. But I’ve yet to hear a rational justification for why the principle doesn’t apply to him/her/it.

What is the rational justification for saying anything "just is what it is"? I do not have an answer but it seems theoretically possible, and worthy of discussion, to discern between what is necessary versus what is merely possible or impossible.

I agree that it’s an interesting discussion. That’s why I asked how/where god fits in here. You deferred the discussion for another time. Unless I misunderstood which part of my post that was in reference to. In which case, apologies ahead of time for the confusion.

[emjay]

... so it's not the case that you see Aquinas' arguments for instance, for the necessity of God, as sufficient reasons in the sense of the PSR, for the actual existence of God (in the why sense, if not the how sense)?...there is still a question there for you as to how God exists, if not why?

Just to clarify, I was talking about the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) as a necessary feature of an intelligibility. The 5W of Aquinas only work if two conditions are met: 1) reality is intelligible and 2) human reason is effective. Believing either of conditions to be the case requires a leap of faith.

I'm sorry but I think I may have got a little lost in translation there too... what I meant I was always curious about was LFC's question to you... ie whether you were curious about the reason/how of God's actual existence, or whether you treat its existence as a brute fact that requires no further explanation beyond the necessity implied by the Five Ways... the latter either out of necessity/practicality, in the sense of still having questions like the former but accepting you can't answer them, or in the sense of seeing the Five Ways as a complete explanation of God's existence. Rightly or wrongly I've always assumed you do treat it as a brute fact, on account of the Five Ways, but I've never seen you explicitly state it, nor if that's the case, whether that is out of necessity/practicality or because you consider the Five Ways a complete explanation. So here I was only really replying to your first sentence in reply to LFC... 'Not at this time.' rather than anything that followed (or may have been in the previous, larger post), just curious what you meant by saying you don't see it as a brute fact, at least 'not at this time'.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Just to clarify, I was talking about the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) as a necessary feature of an intelligibility. The 5W of Aquinas only work if two conditions are met: 1) reality is intelligible and 2) human reason is effective. Believing either of conditions to be the case requires a leap of faith.

I'm sorry but I think I may have got a little lost in translation there too... what I meant I was always curious about was LFC's question to you... ie whether you were curious about the reason/how of God's actual existence, or whether you treat its existence as a brute fact that requires no further explanation beyond the necessity implied by the Five Ways... the latter either out of necessity/practicality, in the sense of still having questions like the former but accepting you can't answer them, or in the sense of seeing the Five Ways as a complete explanation of God's existence. Rightly or wrongly I've always assumed you do treat it as a brute fact, on account of the Five Ways, but I've never seen you explicitly state it, nor if that's the case, whether that is out of necessity/practicality or because you consider the Five Ways a complete explanation. So here I was only really replying to your first sentence in reply to LFC... 'Not at this time.' rather than anything that followed (or may have been in the previous, larger post), just curious what you meant by saying you don't see it as a brute fact, at least 'not at this time'.

All I can say is that for me trying to understand a problem from all sides raises more questions and reveals unexpected uncertainties. I may once have niavely considered the existence of God a kind of brute fact but I do not think I openly expressed the sentiment. As a practical matter, I consider belief in the Divine to be properly basic, i.e. a useful framework through which to interpret everyday experience. On a theoretical level though, I think do nt think the proposition "God exists" can serve as a foundational premise. But my problem is not anything about the premise "God exists" but rather difficulty with foundationalism. And my difficulty with foundationalism is that it prioritizes certainty over epistemic virtue. IMHO there is no foundation premise but there are unavoidable foundational choices, existential stances forced upon us as conscious beings. Either the world has a rational order or it does nor. Either that order is intelligible or it is not. Pick a side. Take a stand...for any or no reason at all. Because IMO the most obvious of all brute facts is the inexplicability of choice.