Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yeah, I'm not counting any frogs yet, because you haven't pointed to any. You've compared apples and oranges and declared them identical. What, exactly, makes your sense of morality objective, aside from your "I do think" appeal to subjectivism?

[The Grand Nudger]

The basis of metaethical objectivity is not in the number of the frogs, but in that the truth making property is the number of frogs whatever that number is. As opposed to some other possible or actual fact about other things, specifically individual predispositions in subjectivism and societal constructs in relativism.

If we're both pointing at frogs, we're both objectivists even if we both miscount the frogs. To subjectivists and relativists, the number of frogs is irrelevant to the question of how many frogs are on the log. Get it?

[Thumpalumpacus]

The basis of metaethical objectivity is not in the number of the frogs, but in that the truth making property is the number of frogs whatever that number is.  As opposed to some other possible or actual fact about other things, specifically individual predispositions in subjectivism and societal constructs in relativism.  

If we're both pointing at frogs, we're both objectivists even if we both miscount the frogs.  To subjectivists and relativists, the number of frogs is irrelevant to the question of how many frogs are on the log.  Get it?

In this context objectivity means not appealing to opinion. Show me a moral stance that doesn't appeal to personal feelz. I'll wait.

[The Grand Nudger]

I have opinions, you have opinions, we all have opinions. If I say it's my opinion that there are three frogs and you say it's your opinion that there are four frogs we may both be wrong but we are still both objectivists - as we're answering the question of how many frogs by referring to a fact of the frogs. A subjectivists opinion about how many frogs refers to some fact of themselves. A relativists opinion about frogs refers to some fact about his society. All three types of metaethical claims report true facts, as our various opinions about frogs. The difference between metaethical objectivity, subjectivity, and relativity as cognitivist positions is not the truth of their contents in general or in specific, but the referent of their true facts.

I already offered one up. Toe stepping and murder. If that one doesn't work for you and you genuinely think that the only reason I'm of the opinion that there's a difference in harm between the two is personal feelz then no other example I can offer would satisfy whatever criteria you demand for things to be more than opinion, whatever you think that means.

[Sheldon]

I do think that there is an objective difference between stepping on a toe and murder.  

As do I, but I think this misses the point, as the assertion that either is immoral is subjective. We can objectively measure consequences of actions of course, and this definitely informs my morality, but when asked why murder is wrong, it leads ultimately to a subjective claim. 

I do think one is objectively more harmful than the other.  

I agree, but again the assertion causing harm is immoral is a subjective one, thus ultimately the assertion either act is immoral seems to rest ultimately on a subjective opinion. 

Is this purely my private opinion with no basis in facts of toes and murder and harm?  

No, but it doesn't matter, as the assertion that causing harm is immoral is where we get to a subjective one. I already acknowledged we can make objective moral decisions - once we subjectively accept an action is immoral, or leads to immorality, in this instance causing harm. 

Note this is also relative, since I would limit even my subjective assertion to unnecessary harm, we don't arrest dentists for causing pain, or surgeons for cutting you with sharp scalpels for example, and we would of course cite mitigation where harm is caused to prevent a greater harm, as I said earlier. 

Is this purely the product of my cultural indoctrination with no basis in facts of toes and murder and harm?

No, but it is only immoral if we accept the assertion that causing harm is immoral, and that is as far as I can see a subjective assertion, and a relative one in as much as it does not apply universally even if we accept the assertion.

If I stepped deliberately on your toe without reason, then I would consider that wrong, though subjectively. If I stepped on your toe by accident to shove you out of the way of a speeding car you'd not seen, then I would not consider it wrong. Since the same action caused the same harm, it is clear it is not objectively true that causing harm is immoral, it merely is a subjective conclusion I drew based on the relative consequences of actions.

[The Grand Nudger]

You're describing moral objectivism. Like Ben Shapiro, but for different reasons, you believe that the term means or refers to things it does not, and cannot include things that it does as metaethics use the term, to distinguish between three different cognitivist moral theories. Different grounds for truth, different truth making properties. Rightly or wrongly. Correct or incorrect. You're using the terms subjective and relative in a casual sense - which I understand perfectly well and agree with, as an objectivist, btw.

I want to point out for what seems like the millionth time that none of these extenuating circumstances like speeding cars or intent or whatever are relevant to metaethical subjectivity or relativity. It is for -no- fact of the matter in question that metaethically subjective or relative claims are true. That is what distinguishes them from objectivity, conceptually, and also what distinguishes them from each other.

We can, ofc, believe that we always fail at objectivity because of specific incompetence. Our subjective natures. Our cultural indoctrinations. I don't believe that's the case. I still stand on there being an objective and empirically verifiable difference in harm between stepping on toes and murder. If there are extenuating circumstances to either then we're just talking extenuating circumstances to lesser and greater harms. I also think that there is objective and empirically verifiable evidence that harm is a compoent in whatever we happen to be talking about when we talk about moral systems -of any kind-. Even noncognitive moral systems like emotivism have an implicit harm base, as the subject seeks to avoid the experience of discomfort and disgust..or, in extreme cases, abject terror at certain (to them) impending harm.

[Ferrocyanide]

It depends on how you define morality.
If you define morality as = causing harm is immoral.

And there's your subjectivity.

How so?

[Ferrocyanide]

Not really.  If you and I both observe that there are two frogs on a log and there -are- two frogs on a log the assertion that there are two frogs on a log is not subjective or intersubjective and the next guy who comes along and says there may be three will not make it so.  He'll just be wrong in fact. 

Sure, but you and I can count frogs. How do you count morals? First we need to agree on what is or isn't moral. If we share the same definition, we can agree an act is moral or immoral. But that definition is not something we can point to in nature and say, "That, my friend, is a frog."

But isn't counting also subjective? You might want to count frogs by counting object A as 1 frog and frog B as 2 frogs.

You might say that object 1 is 1 frog because it has 4 legs.
Object 2 is 2 frogs because it has a pencil that is glued to a styrofoam cup.

Object 3 is 1.35 frogs because it is a painting of object 1 using watercolors.

As you can see, an agreement must be achieved.
Did I show that definitions are subjective?

[The Grand Nudger]

Most people would say no, but as far as metaethically subjective..no, even if counting (and in fact everything) are subjective in the way you're describing. These terms refer to distinct types of moral justifications even if the whole universe is metaethically other-than. Objectivism in a metaethically subjective universe would still be objectivism...and it would be wrong.

"Has a pencil glued to a styrofoam cup" is an assertion of facts of the matter - not to a fact about me, or a fact about my society. Thus an objectivist claim. At least half of all possible objectivist claims must fail. Must be untrue, btw. This one..read plainly... is subjectively, relatively, and objectively wrong. Utterly wrong, aka, fucking nuts, tipped over into non cognitivism.

[The Grand Nudger]

*and all of them might be, they are, after all, the only ones that can be untrue in any non novel sense.