What's the point of philosophy any more?

[polymath257]

If this doesn't satisfy us, then we haven't observed electricity, or temperature, or any other x in-kind either...and we find ourselves in the conceptual black hole all over again.

Temperature isn't really a thing or a property of a thing except at the macro level, so let me skip that.  Electricity, though. . . that is something very interesting indeed.  We can catalogue massive amounts of data around and near it.  But the thing itself-- that is more elusive than ever before.

It is my belief that science, good hard science, has reached a point where it's much better at telling us what reality ISN'T than what it IS, n'est-ce pas?  I can say that to a very large degree my ideas about mind and the Universe are closely connected to my first inquiries into QM maybe 30 or so years ago, and that newer science seems to be taking us farther and farther into a wilderness of uncertainty.

This is partly why I am allergic to the notion of 'the thing itself' separated from the information we have about it.

Temperature and electricity are both macroscopic phenomena: temperature is related to the average kinetic energy of the atoms and molecules while electricity is related to the motion of charges.

Now, you can reasonably ask what an electric field is. or what a magnetic field is. Or even what mass is. Or energy. But *all* are operationally defined. The meaning of those terms is *defined* by how we can take measurements of them. At no point is it even reasonable to talk about the 'thing itself'. ALL we can do is model what we observe. We go beyond that only in models we create to understand and predict future observations.

[I_am_not_mafia]

Most lit reviews take that form, don't they?  Summarize the subject body, identify potential issues with varying positions, suggest undeveloped areas as potential places for improvement.  Still need a few philosphers working on the systems themselves, though.  Pure philosophy-as-blue sky analog...as you suggested earlier.

I'm all for blue sky research because we are not always aware of what we do not know, but even blue sky research gives results. In the natural sciences you get to better understand some natural phenomenon that can lead to better predictions, or create a new technique for working with it. In Mathematics you get a proof or find some new way to quantify something and work with those quantities. Successful blue sky research can then become applied research and eventually when it is understood well enough it becomes engineering.

I could well be arguing from ignorance here but what new results does pure philosophy ever give us?

[The Grand Nudger]

It gave you science (just as one example), and every implicational mechanic you use to generate conclusions from observational data. Continued work on material implication has...implications, for all implication.

ie: What are the rules? Are the rules we have now in their final state? Are there exceptions to the rules? Is an exception more appropriately an indication of an unknown rule? Does every rule have a universal correlate, such that because implication has bidirectional flow so too..then, does cause-in-time? Could there be more than one set of rules? Which sets are mutually exclusive? Which are the most productive? Which are the most informative in some specific sub-field?

[I_am_not_mafia]

It gave you science (just as one example), and every implicational mechanic you use to generate conclusions from observational data.  Continued work on material implication has...implications, for all implication.  

Is it appropriate to say that philosophy gave us science? Or is it more apt to say that philosophy evolved into science? You could say that biology for example gave us immunology, true, but it's probably better to say that immunology is a specialisation of biology. How much biology can you still do without specialising?

After all, everything that philosophy can do, science can also do. But science is also equipped with so much more. Science is self-correcting, even down to reshaping its methodology. In fact, who would know better about the limitations of the current approach than the actual scientists seeing what it is capable of? So it's not like philosophy even has this role any more.

[The Grand Nudger]

Is it appropriate to say that philosophy gave us science? Or is it more apt to say that philosophy evolved into science?

Absolutely appropriate..and philosophy didn't evolve into science at all.  It's still the study, essentially, of knowledge and -how- we know things.  This is distinct from science in that science is the study of what things we know that employs that how.

The how is still, to bring it into familiar terms, an open field of research unto itself.

You could say that biology for example gave us immunology, true, but it's probably better to say that immunology is a specialisation of biology. How much biology can you still do without specialising?

After all, everything that philosophy can do, science can also do. But science is also equipped with so much more. Science is self-correcting, even down to reshaping its methodology. In fact, who would know better about the limitations of the current approach than the actual scientists seeing what it is capable of? So it's not like philosophy even has this role any more.

Not true at all, and again science can only -do- anything because of the underlying philosophy.  As to how much work there may be for specialists compared to generalists..it's probably useful to point out that philosophy is also full of specialists..philosophy of science -is- a specialty (with many sub-specialties and specialists), and that there are more nurses in the world than surgeons anyway.

---

Put simply, the entire enterprise of science could be completely defenestrated by a single person someday, if that person credibly annihilates the underlying philosophy of science - which is why vociferously anti-science nutters tend to go that route rather than deny some observation. Good luck to them, on that count..and for what it's worth I think it's a laudible endeavor even if I don't think it will produce the results they desire, lol.

I think it was jorg that referenced popper, pages back. His work cast horrendous shade on what was, up to that point, a fundamental operating principle of science..but in doing so..rather than destroy it, it was improved. It;s impossible to give a full and credible account of science, today, without at least acknowledging that work...and that work continues.

[vulcanlogician]

The 'practical' man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of  providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a  valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time.


Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

[I_am_not_mafia]

Is it appropriate to say that philosophy gave us science? Or is it more apt to say that philosophy evolved into science?

Absolutely appropriate..and philosophy didn't evolve into science at all.  It's still the study, essentially, of knowledge and -how- we know things.  This is distinct from science in that science is the study of what things we know that employs that how.

No way is it that clear cut between the two. After all, science knows how it knows what it does. It can point to the evidence in the literature. It can also question how the scientific method can be adapted to investigate for each specialisation or whether there is a new class of problems that needs to be approached in a different way.

You could say that biology for example gave us immunology, true, but it's probably better to say that immunology is a specialisation of biology. How much biology can you still do without specialising?

After all, everything that philosophy can do, science can also do. But science is also equipped with so much more. Science is self-correcting, even down to reshaping its methodology. In fact, who would know better about the limitations of the current approach than the actual scientists seeing what it is capable of? So it's not like philosophy even has this role any more.

Not true at all, and again science can only -do- anything because of the underlying philosophy.  As to how much work there may be for specialists compared to generalists..it's probably useful to point out that philosophy is also full of specialists..philosophy of science -is- a specialty (with many sub-specialties and specialists), and that there are more nurses in the world than surgeons anyway.

Whether science evolved from philosophy, or whether philosophy said 'here you go, here's something called science that I want you to try out', or whether science came about as a fruitful way to investigate things and exploit them and philosophy came along later and gave it respectability, the end result is the same. Science can stand on its own two feet even if every philosopher was rounded up and burnt along with their publications.

Put simply, the entire enterprise of science could be completely defenestrated by a single person someday, if that person credibly annihilates the underlying philosophy of science - which is why vociferously anti-science nutters tend to go that route rather than deny some observation.  Good luck to them, on that count..and for what it's worth I think it's a laudible endeavor even if I don't think it will produce the results they desire, lol.  

I think it was jorg that referenced popper, pages back.  Hos work cast horrendous shade on what was, up to that point, a fundamental operating principle of science..but in doing so..rather than destroy it, it was improved.

I disagree that anyone could do that because of what has been achieved by science.

[The Grand Nudger]

The hope, is that if we continue to "do philosophy" we can produce more sciences out of them.  Though, interestingly, and it played out in this thread...as soon as philosophy dopes manage to produce a science it gets awfully possessive about the now lost subject...like...say.....mind.

---

No way is it that clear cut between the two. After all, science knows how it knows what it does. It can point to the evidence in the literature. It can also question how the scientific method can be adapted to investigate for each specialisation or whether there is a new class of problems that needs to be approached in a different way.

That -is- the philosophy of science.  Which is a sub-field of philosophy.

Whether science evolved from philosophy, or whether philosophy said 'here you go, here's something called science that I want you to try out', or whether science came about as a fruitful way to investigate things and exploit them and philosophy came along later and gave it respectability, the end result is the same. Science can stand on its own two feet even if every philosopher was rounded up and burnt along with their publications.

Philosophy -is- one of it's feet. 

I disagree that anyone could do that because of what has been achieved by science.

A positively positivist response..but, you know...popper had thoughts on that. 

I agree with you, btw. I simply acknowledge the limitations and underlying philosophy of our shared expectation that any meaningful refutation of the philosophy of science will -improve- science rather than sending it tumbling out the window....but if we were trying to be real hardcore scientific about it..we'd probably acknowledge that no amount of success ever overcomes a single integral failure. Falsifiability over positivism.

Put another way, if the theory of science is not at least conceptually falsifiable....how much scientific value does it have?

[Whateverist]

Well, yes, the first person experience isn't discernible to me because their brain isn't my brain. But I would know that they are feeling pain, or in the case of the bat, sonar. I would be able to describe, probably in some detail, *what* they are experiencing. But yes, it is not my brain that is experiencing it all.

But I fail to see why that is such a deep issue to so many people. When my computer gets some information, and processes it, your computer may not get the same information or it may process it slightly differently. That seems, to me, to the sole difference in 'first person' versus 'third person' descriptions.

The problem isn't missing information. The problem is, even when every single piece information is accounted for, something is still missing.

That is the essence of the mind/body problem, and that is the great riddle of consciousness.

Of course, some will say it's really no big problem at all, which is why super empirically-minded folks seem comfortable with functionalism. I'm not one of them though. Something about the mystery of consciousness intrigues me. Looking at it one way, it almost seems more fundamental than any other metaphysical problem. Looking at it another way, its a simple distinction that (if made like the functionalists make it) is really no problem at all.

It is interesting to wonder whether there is a way that it feels to be an X for any organism X whatsoever.  Being able to express what it feels like to be an X as propositions is entirely a different question, of course.  Framing propositions is something (just?) we do to capture and communicate what we are feeling.  But there is a way it feels to be thirsty, to be lost, to recognize from facial expressions how another feels, and so on.

What gives rise to these subjective states?  Why do our brains bother with adding a 'flavor' to so many functions?  Is it because of our capacity for consciously weighing alternative interpretations and actions?  Perhaps the need to form abstractions to represent alternatives for the sake of consciously choosing between them makes our subjective experience distinctive.  Most of us know what it is like to operate more spontaneously, being in-the-moment, as when immersed in a task for which our expertise allows us to just flow.  Maybe my dogs spend more time in flow (lucky bastards) so that, while there is still a way that if feels to be a dog, what that is would never become a subject of wonder or speculation for them.  

We are probably the only organism on this planet to question how/why the brain adds flavor to experience.  The rest of them experience it but don't or can't isolate it as something apart from what motivates what they are doing.  The motivation they experience and the response it engenders may be something we can hypothesize about but is probably not something they themselves can reflect on.  Abstraction and deliberate, strategic planning may be something we alone engage in and our doing so allows us to isolate experiences as subjects which an animal in flow need not be aware of.  There are probably both advantages and disadvantages to that.

Maybe the important question isn't why experience has a flavor, but rather why is this one organism (us) trying so hard to understand what its flavor is, why it arises and why it even interests us?  Is there anything to be gained?

[polymath257]

The problem isn't missing information. The problem is, even when every single piece information is accounted for, something is still missing.

That is the essence of the mind/body problem, and that is the great riddle of consciousness.

Of course, some will say it's really no big problem at all, which is why super empirically-minded folks seem comfortable with functionalism. I'm not one of them though. Something about the mystery of consciousness intrigues me. Looking at it one way, it almost seems more fundamental than any other metaphysical problem. Looking at it another way, its a simple distinction that (if made like the functionalists make it) is really no problem at all.

It is interesting to wonder whether there is a way that it feels to be an X for any organism X whatsoever.  Being able to express what it feels like to be an X as propositions is entirely a different question, of course.  Framing propositions is something (just?) we do to capture and communicate what we are feeling.  But there is a way it feels to be thirsty, to be lost, to recognize from facial expressions how another feels, and so on.

What gives rise to these subjective states?  Why do our brains bother with adding a 'flavor' to so many functions?  Is it because of our capacity for consciously weighing alternative interpretations and actions?  Perhaps the need to form abstractions to represent alternatives for the sake of consciously choosing between them makes our subjective experience distinctive.  Most of us know what it is like to operate more spontaneously, being in-the-moment, as when immersed in a task for which our expertise allows us to just flow.  Maybe my dogs spend more time in flow (lucky bastards) so that, while there is still a way that if feels to be a dog, what that is would never become a subject of wonder or speculation for them.  

We are probably the only organism on this planet to question how/why the brain adds flavor to experience.  The rest of them experience it but don't or can't isolate it as something apart from what motivates what they are doing.  The motivation they experience and the response it engenders may be something we can hypothesize about but is probably not something they themselves can reflect on.  Abstraction and deliberate, strategic planning may be something we alone engage in and our doing so allows us to isolate experiences as subjects which an animal in flow need not be aware of.  There are probably both advantages and disadvantages to that.

Maybe the important question isn't why experience has a flavor, but rather why is this one organism (us) trying so hard to understand what its flavor is, why it arises and why it even interests us?  Is there anything to be gained?

Well, the 'feel' seems to be a combination of the information and the emotional response to that information. The emotional response is the 'flavor'. And it seems pretty clear why the flavor was added from an evolutionary viewpoint: in makes it easier to remember and recall. It also makes it easier to act on in emergencies.

Do you question whether your dog is conscious? Isn't it clear?

---

The 'practical' man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of  providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a  valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time.


Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

I find it interesting that we call it philosophy until we figure out a way to actually test an idea. After that, we call it science. The first is speculation and the second is knowledge.

This is not to say that speculation isn't a useful thing: it most definitely is. But it isn't knowledge.