A Conscious Universe

[bennyboy]

What thing, and is there a requirement for anyone to be able to identify any conceptual thing? A requirement of complete knowledge?

No. If you are making positive assertions about what makes mind, then it would be better if you could identify whether any particular thing does or doesn't make mind, and how.

Let me ask a very simple and general question. In your framework...why do you and I need computers and an internet connection to have this conversation, fundamentally? What is it about our "idea stuff" that requires this other "idea stuff" in order to interact and form a third set of "idea stuff"? What necessity is there, for starters, for this middle step?

That's a strange question. It's because your ideas and my ideas are unique to each other, and must be drawn into a context together to be communicated.

(you already know my answer, the human voice only travels so far - described by resistance in air, etc...we possess no ESP organ (if such transmission is possible), the comps and internet act as physical states and carriers...on and on)

Funny, that's my answer too. The only difference is that I believe that under the hood, all those objects supervene on a reality which cannot be expressed unambiguously in three-dimensional space.

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If you take any arbitrary collection of physical systems, then they will all meet your definition of mind,

-actually...they wont - no more so than they do (some things...sure, I'm always saying that plants and pcs have "mind" if we have "mind"...aren't I?) - but what may have to be reclassified will comprise such a miniscule portion of all the stuff in the universe...it hardly bears mention in such a manner..since neither of us have taken it upon ourselves to redefine computation.

I wouldn't have thought to do so, until you started saying that mind is brain, and is defined by computation of states.

since all matter is computing information about spin, mass, etc.

-um..no, computation is a bit more strict than stuff interacting - thats why we can;t build a computer out of anything...any old way we like.

The only difference is that we organize the computation of computers in a way that is useful to us. It's all just stuff happening.

If you are conscious, then a rock is not, even if you're both comp systems (there are further undeclared requirements).

Well heck, man, let's go ahead and declare them then. What's the difference between your computational mind and a hunk of rock?

Why not apply the same blade to the relationship between yourself and the universe? Yourself and a photon?

It's not my model of mind. . . it's yours.

[The Grand Nudger]

No. If you are making positive assertions about what makes mind, then it would be better if you could identify whether any particular thing does or doesn't make mind, and how.

I have identified how a known physical structure accomplishes an effect -as you describe it- and indicated that we possess a structure that meets (even exceeds) that requirement and -also- just happens to be active when we think about things. Wish I had more, but that's just the way it is. Who cares though, you've offered what.......?

That's a strange question. It's because your ideas and my ideas are unique to each other,

how so? Mechanics amigo, I can(and often have) offer them for physical comp.......

and must be drawn into a context together to be communicated.

Are you implying distance or separation? Careful.....

The only difference is that I believe that under the hood, all those objects supervene on a reality which cannot be expressed unambiguously in three-dimensional space.

You're teetering on the edge of three dimensional space in your comments above, and I know no more about how this is achieved after having read them.....care to scrub the language?

[The Grand Nudger]

I wouldn't have thought to do so, until you started saying that mind is brain, and is defined by computation of states.

do you disagree in principle?

The only difference is that we organize the computation of computers in a way that is useful to us. It's all just stuff happening.

Again, you''re simply wrong. The organization is required (though we aren't required as organizers), "stuff happening" is not computation.

Well heck, man, let's go ahead and declare them then. What's the difference between your computational mind and a hunk of rock?

The comp mind meets the requirements of a computational system whilst the rock does not.

It's not my model of mind. . . it's yours.

Again....I doubt that we're having the same conversation......

[bennyboy]

No. If you are making positive assertions about what makes mind, then it would be better if you could identify whether any particular thing does or doesn't make mind, and how.

I have identified how a known physical structure accomplishes an effect -as you describe it- and indicated that we possess a structure that meets (even exceeds) that requirement and -also- just happens to be active when we think about things. Wish I had more, but that's just the way it is.

That's fantastic! Link me the thread or blog in which you've achieved this, because I'd much rather read that than the stuff you are claiming in this thread.

Are you implying distance or separation? Careful.....

Why do I need to be careful? Do you think I'm bothered by the idea of distance?

The only difference is that I believe that under the hood, all those objects supervene on a reality which cannot be expressed unambiguously in three-dimensional space.

You're teetering on the edge of three dimensional space in your comments above.....care to scrub the language?

Why would I? Do you think I oppose the idea of 3D space? It's one of the most useful models I have for describing my mundane experience of the objects around me.

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The only difference is that we organize the computation of computers in a way that is useful to us. It's all just stuff happening.

Again, you''re simply wrong. The organization is required (though we aren't required as organizers), "stuff happening" is not computation.

so. . . God?

Who says that any given system is or isn't organized, and that its state changes do/don't represent computation of information?

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The comp mind meets the requirements of a computational system whilst the rock does not.

So it should be simple to explain in what way your "computational system" is distinct from a rock.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's fantastic! Link me the thread or blog in which you've achieved this, because I'd much rather read that than the stuff you are claiming in this thread.

You and I have had many discussions on this. You need only understand the structure of a logic gate and the structure of a neuron. I achieved the description of neither, but I have - often- communicated it to you.

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Tell me, what do you think, is it possible that one could do the job of the other?

Why do I need to be careful? Do you think I'm bothered by the idea of distance?

You should be avoiding as much invocation of "geometric space" as possible...don't you think....since you don't think that reality or mind can be described unambiguously within such?

Why would I? Do you think I oppose the idea of 3D space?

.....yeah.....

The only difference is that I believe that under the hood, all those objects supervene on a reality which cannot be expressed unambiguously in three-dimensional space.

....so stop ambiguously describing things in this manner when asked about your own framework?

It's one of the most useful models I have for describing my mundane experience of the objects around me.

-try using it on this mind business, then - oh wait...you did........igh:

so. . . God?

So, organization...this is the part where I call you mean words, btw.

Who says that any given system is or isn't organized,

the definition of a comp system says so. If it doesn't meet the definition, it's not a comp system. Perhaps it;s organized as something else...but that;s irrelevant.

and that its state changes do/don't represent computation of information?

-he asked from his PC- which provides support for this statement definitively.

[Mudhammam]

It's also a straw man. I've explicitly talked about the relationship between brain and mind. Since I see all of reality as the complex expression of ideas and the interaction among ideas, I have no problem with the brain-- as the expression of underlying ideas.

Fair enough, but just so I don't misrepresent you, because I think your injection of "ideas" as fundamental throughout the debate is confusing and unhelpful when you actually mean some principle of nature or substance that matter dissolves into at its most primeval state, no longer possessing, or represented by any terms identifiable with, anything we could possibly describe as physical---given our perceptive and conceptual survey of the world---can you clarify what relationship you think the fundamental "stuff" "under the hood" has with your understanding of mind?

What you do not have is a reason why the mind exists at all, and what properties a brain has that a rock doesn't have, that allows/causes/necessitates this existence. And this is the sum total of the physicalist view on mind: it can't really define mind, can't establish whether a system experiences qualia, cannot explain the mechanism of the creation of mind, and cannot even prove that mind exists.

Since I'm not an expert geologist or brain chemist, I won't waste any time comparing the two, but if you're asking me to offer a specific mechanism that allows a brain to experience the world in such-and-such a way, and you think this is the portal to the soul, or mind, then I think you'd be correct that nobody can really define such a thing. It's as if you were to say (to quote Dennett imagining "some vitalist who says to the molecular biologist"): "The easy problems of life include those of explaining the following phenomena: reproduction, development, growth, metabolism, self-repair, immunological self-defence... There are not all that easy, of course, and it may take another century or so to work out of the fine points, but they are easy compared to the really hard problem: life itself. We can imagine something that was capable of reproduction, development, growth, metabolism, self-repair and immunological self-defence, but that wasn't, you know, alive. The residual mystery of life would be untouched by solutions to all the easy problems..." In response to your accusation (hock that "this is the sum total of the physicalist view on mind: it can't really define mind, can't establish whether a system experiences qualia, cannot explain the mechanism of the creation of mind, and cannot even prove that mind exists," I simply insist, you're wrong, perhaps not in practice but in principle. I don't find any reason to define mind as anything other than the trillions of nerve connections between billions of neuron cells (with probably many other complicated systems involved) functioning with the efficiency to which they evolved to map out their surroundings, gaining advantage when the proto-type with an analyzing process that is by definition everything it is to be an experiencer of sights, sounds, memories, etc., converting the particles and the surfaces they reflect off before entering the retina into the visualizations we signify as colors, etc., developed.

Granted, this is a grotesque oversimplification, but I see no reason for mind to remain such an elusive concept because we unnecessarily carry over all the philosophical baggage of generations that had virtually no grasp on how the world actually works; we no longer envision matter in terms of dead lumps of clay, but rather an elaborate play of ethereal masses and energies, why continually think of mind as this "other thing" that can't be included in our extensive picture of nature's fabric, that is one particular arrangement of electrical inputs and outputs in a self-referential strange loop that evolved like anything else? Why is your framework, not simply more or less pragmatic, but even remotely viable apart from all of the easy appeals that must inevitably result in solipsism or something like the soul of ancient thinkers, those mystical and almost theological notions of consciousness?

And yet, after all this, "It's in the brain. . . obviously." I want to know how you go from direct experience to this level of confidence in this view. What non-arbitrary steps did you take from solipsism, to objectivism, to confident statements about the nature of mind? If you claim your view on mind is obvious, then please, tell me how to see it for the obvious truth that it is, WITHOUT making the choice to accept it to be so merely because this choice feels pragmatic.

Everything boils down to the measure of success a theory has. Idealism finds traces of its humble beginnings in the Greeks, and I'm not aware of anyone, from Plato to Kant to the quantum physics revolution, who has ever made one suggestion as to how we might discover the nature of mind if it is this mysterious substance "under the hood." You might fairly say that materialists throughout the ages deflected on the issue while science continually opened up black box after black box in other fields of inquiry. But attention has recently turned to the structure of the brain, and as technology has advanced in the past century, allowing us to probe deeper than ever before, and we are becoming more acquainted with the relationships between us and other animals and the world at large, I think the old debate of mind-matter, body-soul, is largely anachronistic.

[bennyboy]

Why do I need to be careful? Do you think I'm bothered by the idea of distance?

You should be avoiding as much invocation of "geometric space" as possible...don't you think....since you don't think that reality or mind can be described unambiguously within such?

So what? You were talking about people communicating on the internet, not QM particles or qualia.

The only difference is that I believe that under the hood, all those objects supervene on a reality which cannot be expressed unambiguously in three-dimensional space.

....so stop ambiguously describing things in this manner when asked about your own framework?

Never happened.

so. . . God?

So, organization...this is the part where I call you mean words, btw.

I dunno, man. A galaxy looks pretty organized to me. Photons traveling among galaxies seem a lot like information to me. I just want to know exactly what this "computation" you are talking about is. So far, you've said mind is not -in- the brain, it -is- the brain. Then you started talking about computational systems. Fine. What is a computational system, and how do you know whether it experiences qualia?

and that its state changes do/don't represent computation of information?

-he asked from his PC- which provides support for this statement definitively.

I don't think I know what you're talking about. The PC is a system created by people to organize and process information which they feed to it. Since it is a computational device, then you are, I believe saying it is conscious, right? The human brain is a system not created by people to organize and process information which someone feeds to it. . . unless that someone is God, I presume.

[Pizza]

-and you're not satisfied with this underlying nature unless it contains some comments about photons -and-....the mind, eh? Baggage.

How about we negotiate, photons, sure, you can have em...mind - not so much, mind isn't a photon...eh? Perhaps photons are spooky, but mind is just something that objects -made out of information- do. Same as a pc in my physical world.

Yay, I got photons! *high fives nobody in particular*

You say this about mind, and there is certainly a strong link between the human brain and the human experience, but there are a couple of problems:

1) You define mind AS brain function-- not a product of it. But you haven't defined exactly what it is about the brain that "IS" mind, except in very vague terms. Is it the information itself? Is it the sensation of a particular brain part firing? Is it a field generated by the electromagnetic fluctuations in neurons as signals travel through them? What is it, other than a general wave toward the brain, and a strong feeling that the mind must be "in there somewhere"?

I don't think vagueness is a deal breaker since that's a problem for both sides of the debate. I know what an idea is until someone asks me what an idea is.

2) It is impossible to use your definition of the mind outside the context of animal brains. You cannot, for example, look at any other physical system, and know whether it is experiencing qualia or not. In fact, in a philosophical sense, you cannot establish the existence of mind outside your own experience. It seems to me that an objective world view, largely in vogue because of scientific objective observation, is incompatible with a super-important "thing" that you cannot even identify. Is it really correct to say, "I denounce solipsism because it's a pointless position that lends little to an understanding in life," and then follow that arbitrary assumption through a chain of ideas to the brain as creator of mind?

This really depends on what set of philosophical views of knowledge we decided to go with. There are views of knowing that don't require a knower to know that she knows in order to know. I think the view I'm talking about is called externalism and the view you have seems to be internalism.

[The Grand Nudger]

So what? You were talking about people communicating on the internet, not QM particles or qualia.

I'd say something similar, "qm particles, not mind"

Never happened.

....okay

So, organization...this is the part where I call you mean words, btw.
[quote]
I dunno, man. A galaxy looks pretty organized to me.

Not as organized as a comp system - thats why you can distinguish your pc from the water in a pond or "the rest of the universe"- for example. It;s a particular type of system that produces a particular type of effect - though it can be made with a variety of materials and lean on multiple different architectures (we're discovering more architecture now with QM computing).

Photons traveling among galaxies seem a lot like information to me.

Sure, takes more than just information to compute, though. I could beam radio at your computer all day and it won;t ever do any computation on that, eh?

I just want to know exactly what this "computation" you are talking about is. So far, you've said mind is not -in- the brain, it -is- the brain. Then you started talking about computational systems. Fine. What is a computational system,

One of the more amusing questions ever asked about computation, and as yet unanswered. It is, in practical use and terms, a system organized such that logical functions can be performed upon variables. We can point to examples of computation more readily than we can explain computation in toto, if you ask me. That's actually the crux of my position on mind - when we parcel up the universe into what does ort does not fit a technical description (or when we consider it as a whole) where do we draw the line. We all think a calculator does comp, we all think a pc does comp, some of us are pretty sure a plant does comp, cells do comp.....but people..ah, people "experience qualia".

and how do you know whether it experiences qualia?

I don't know that any more than I know that you experience qualia. Maybe neither of you do. All I know is that as you describe this qualia business to me it has clear computational analogs.

I don't think I know what you're talking about. The PC is a system created by people to organize and process information which they feed to it.

Right, when we "feed information" we're selecting physical states of an actual structure - that's how that's accomplished, it is an example of a computational system. It's like a train track for current. A simple example of architecture that everyone is familiar with is a circuit breaker. When then lever is in the "on" position contact is made and current can pass through - this is "true". When it is in the off position contact -is not made- and so current -cannot pass through. This is "false". Or, 1/0. Arrange enough circuit breakers just so and you have a computational system

Since it is a computational device, then you are, I believe saying it is conscious, right?

I don't think so, no - I think that it's computation is alot like ours, ours alot like its...but I doubt that a PC is quite as robust as a conscious agent such as myself or yourself. I think that our line of conscious/not conscious is a benchmark along the functional range of computational systems. I do think that consciousness is at a point lower than ourselves, yes - though I also see consciousness as having a broad representation on that range.

The human brain is a system not created by people to organize and process information which someone feeds to it. . . unless that someone is God, I presume.

Not sure what gods doing in the discussion at all? Does our brain not seem to be a system organized to process information which it is fed (not really the best description of a comp system but even so...what part of this is true of computers but not true of the human brain?
(I don;t think it matters all that much how it got to be what it is, for the purposes of our discussion, so long as we can both agree on what it is - at least in this bare bones summary, though, allow me to offer that even though coming from my angle the things you find difficult to conceptualize in the current model are not...in my model, a whole different set of things is difficult to conceptualize - the process by which such a system might be implemented biologically is definitely one of those things even though qualia is not)

[bennyboy]

Not as organized as a comp system - thats why you can distinguish your pc from the water in a pond or "the rest of the universe"- for example. It;s a particular type of system that produces a particular type of effect - though it can be made with a variety of materials and lean on multiple different architectures (we're discovering more architecture now with QM computing).

Okay you keep saying this. Define the particular type of system and the particular type of effect. Right now, it seems to me the difference between one state-changeable system and another is that an EXTERNAL intellect aribtrarily calls one "computation" and the other "just stuff doiong stuff."

One of the more amusing questions ever asked about computation, and as yet unanswered. It is, in practical use and terms, a system organized such that logical functions can be performed upon variables.

Maybe, but why don't you include momentum as a variable? Or the mean elevation state of electrons as they absorb energy?

We can point to examples of computation more readily than we can explain computation in toto, if you ask me.

I would say the same thing about mind itself, so fair enough. However, it seems to suffer to the Heywood Paradigm: We are using definitions about things that are instrinsic to the human experience in making general definitions. So, we think of mind in terms of brain because we can only communicate about mind with other people (and, by generous inference, some animals). The same for computation: we define (maybe not explicitly, but at least implicitly) computation as the assisted processing of information in a way that is useful for people.

Right, when we "feed information" we're selecting physical states of an actual structure - that's how that's accomplished, it is an example of a computational system. It's like a train track for current. A simple example of architecture that everyone is familiar with is a circuit breaker. When then lever is in the "on" position contact is made and current can pass through - this is "true". When it is in the off position contact -is not made- and so current -cannot pass through. This is "false". Or, 1/0. Arrange enough circuit breakers just so and you have a computational system

Switches are not naturally occurring. However, binary or plural state-holding systems are: electron orbits, spin of particles, even momentum of larger bodies, can be seen as state-saving devices that are changed only when brought into interaction with other state-saving devices.

[quote]
The human brain is a system not created by people to organize and process information which someone feeds to it. . . unless that someone is God, I presume.

Not sure what gods doing in the discussion at all?

My point is that computation seems to be not an intrinsic property of a system, but of an already-existent intellect assessing a system's ability to usefully process data.

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This really depends on what set of philosophical views of knowledge we decided to go with. There are views of knowing that don't require a knower to know that she knows in order to know. I think the view I'm talking about is called externalism and the view you have seems to be internalism.

Sounds almost thread-worthy. Can we start with a link?