A Conscious Universe

[The Grand Nudger]

Okay you keep saying this. Define the particular type of system and the particular type of effect.

Comp -is- the type of system, it it named after the described effect. A large amount of things qualify, but not -everything-.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computation

Right now, it seems to me the difference between one state-changeable system and another is

Computation requires more than just information and more than just steady states, or changeable states. They must be organized so that a logical function can be leveraged - and that's what states are so useful for -in- computation.

that an EXTERNAL intellect aribtrarily calls one "computation" and the other "just stuff doiong stuff."

I call "stuff doing computation" a computational system - stuff doing stuff may not be stuff doing computation.

Maybe, but why don't you include momentum as a variable?

The variables can stand in for anything you want, but this probably doesn't mean what you'll take from that statement. If you'd like to assume some value "momentum" we can put that through a computational system.

Or the mean elevation state of electrons as they absorb energy?

again, any variable you would like to assume works just fine -for doing work-.

Do you mean include them architecturally?

I would say the same thing about mind itself, so fair enough. However, it seems to suffer to the Heywood Paradigm: We are using definitions about things that are instrinsic to the human experience in making general definitions.

a designation as a comp system is exceedignly specific, it includes alot of stuff because theres alot of stuff in the universe - sheer force of demographics - but that doesn;t make it any more or less general.

So, we think of mind in terms of brain because we can only communicate about mind with other people (and, by generous inference, some animals). The same for computation: we define (maybe not explicitly, but at least implicitly) computation as the assisted processing of information in a way that is useful for people.

Thats not actually how the effect is defined in it's barest sense...that's its most prevalent application - it;s most common use, familiar to us anyway, sure. No assistance is required (not even for our computers operation).

Switches are not naturally occurring.

Of course they are. Any area of a stream thats shallow enough to freeze quicker than the rest acts as a dam switch. It takes an input (in this case temp.) based upon that input it can be in one of two states (liquid or solid), the states correspond to an effect (stream flows/stream dams).

However, binary or plural state-holding systems are: electron orbits, spin of particles, even momentum of larger bodies, can be seen as state-saving devices that are changed only when brought into interaction with other state-saving devices.

plenty of steady state stuff in the world sure...but I'd explain that by reference to the behavior of stuff.....

My point is that computation seems to be not an intrinsic property of a system, but of an already-existent intellect assessing a system's ability to usefully process data.

Again, already existent intellects don't need to assess anything. There's a computer sitting in a box right now that no one has ever assessed - it's still a comp system (and as above...doesn't require -us- specifically, even for it's operation). I'm uninterested, because it -doesn't apply-.

[bennyboy]

Computation requires more than just information and more than just steady states, or changeable states. They must be organized so that a logical function can be leveraged - and that's what states are so useful for -in- computation.

I feel like we're circumnavigating the argument here. Are you saying that computers experience qualia?

I would say the same thing about mind itself, so fair enough. However, it seems to suffer to the Heywood Paradigm: We are using definitions about things that are instrinsic to the human experience in making general definitions.

a designation as a comp system is exceedignly specific, it includes alot of stuff because theres alot of stuff in the universe - sheer force of demographics - but that doesn;t make it any more or less general.

I don't know what these words mean.

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Okay, look. You have confidently asserted that minds are brain, and that it is the ability to "compute" that we experience as mind. You have rejected counter-examples on the grounds that they represent no true Scotsman. I'm not really arguing against your view at this time, I frankly don't understand what you are talking about.

[Jackalope]

Am I the only one who read the thread title as "A Couscous Universe"?

Hungry.

/delurk

[bennyboy]

Am I the only one who read the thread title as "A Couscous Universe"?

Hungry.

/delurk

Yes, but where did the couscous come from, and why does it manifest as subjective experience?

[The Grand Nudger]

I feel like we're circumnavigating the argument here. Are you saying that computers experience qualia?

I don't know, I'm simply suggesting that if qualia is a biological implementation of computation then any system that can meet that range of function -even under some other implementation- is likely to experience an analog to qualia, may not be a mirror image, our qualia is, in some regards, implementation specific (however arrived at) - but, again, whatever difference there may be would only be window dressing. You experience sight referenced qualia based upon the range of light visible to the human eye, a comp with infrared spotting would experience something different, solely regarding the light. You may have a vast network of associations with any given color seen (but so may the comp with IR - take a look at drone targeting subroutines) - you may have a more robust awareness of process or range of function - but I think that the same principles are involved - and more than that, I know that they -can be-...so this isn't an open ended mystery with no explanation, for me. If we're doing it some other way then there are at least two ways to get to that point. Comp can get us there, or "other". Thing is, I don;t see the need for the "other" - which is why, even if i give you "idea world" I don;t think that mind has much to say on the matter. "Idea world" may be underpinning the physical world, but the physical world offers descriptions and capability enough to explain the effect, and evidence enough to accept a provisional claim. The brain is mind stuff, it is capable of computation (like many things are, by reference to their material structure), computation produces effects that -when described- can be explained -by- computation/are interchangeable /wq computation.

I don't know what these words mean.

Then google them and get back to me. I'm offering alot for no return.

Okay, look. You have confidently asserted that minds are brain,

That's the position in evidence, yes.

and that it is the ability to "compute" that we experience as mind.

That is one explanation for mind, that fits many descriptions that others give regarding what mind is, what it does, what they experience, what can be observed, and what we know of the interactions and structures involved in the whole bit, yes.

(it can only be taken so far, of course, because we aren't digital or analog comps - it;s an explanation of principle, not a tech schem - though hopefully one day we'll have both, regardless of how mind is achieved)

You have rejected counter-examples on the grounds that they represent no true Scotsman.

I've done no such thing. I've even indicated that I;m willing, in our conversation, to extend the designation onto things we might not normally think of as comp systems - but we still have to maintain some sort of specificity or else what are we talking about? This ball is and -has been- in your court. My only request thusfar has been that "everything" is neither a useful or accurate set of things to include within that designation -if, for now other reason (and there are plenty) than that in using it so that it means everything, it, effectively, means nothing.

I'm not really arguing against your view at this time, I frankly don't understand what you are talking about.

I was starting to figure that. But you'd -have to- to be able to claim that something about mind rules out a physical monism. You;d have to understand the current candidates for mind enough to know that they are indeed -not compatible- with a physical monism. Comp mind -is- compatible with a physical monism. It doesn't require that there be some underlying foundation of ideas or information, it is achieved -practically- by specific reference to the interaction of material structures capable of forming logical functions, accepting input, providing output ...however those systems were arrived at (no god req, no men req, no exterior intelligence req). If you don't understand this explanation then you have no grounds for your claim that mind cannot be unambiguosly expressed in geometric space. It can be...you just can't imagine how..........and after having had long discussions about this with you before...I'm willing to say that this is not -my- problem.

Now, understanding comp systems or comp mind is, in the context of our discussion, neutral. It would provide a way for you to conceptualize how ideas do ideas to ideas (you'll still need to work out the mechanics, but the principles can be leveraged)- just as readily as it allows me to offer an explanation of how "stuff" is "mind". It could help you to explain, for example, how ideas "make/are qualia". So there's always that (and I think that you do envision comp systems, or even the universe as a comp system - you simply may not be familiar /w the position). It's common ground between us, I think, but for the assumptions you make about how computers must be conscious, or "therefore gods" that are not part of this explanation, not requirements (though they aren't ruled out by them).

If the fundamental unit of the universe were ideas, and if ideas could be organized so that they could perform logical functions, then idea-comp systems would be possible. Describing them as I have, from a physical monism, explains how comp systems do the work that they demonstrably do, and what -could be- the work of comp systems (in areas like mind, where it;s up for discussion). That won't change, if it just so happens that matter is based on ideas - but we will need a new description of how ideas do comp, how do you reckon that works...if it doesn't work the way it appears to work?

[Pizza]

This really depends on what set of philosophical views of knowledge we decided to go with. There are views of knowing that don't require a knower to know that she knows in order to know. I think the view I'm talking about is called externalism and the view you have seems to be internalism.

Sounds almost thread-worthy. Can we start with a link?

Sure. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internalism...istemology
I'm thinking of making a thread based on this topic in future or a related topic like reliabilism vs evidentialism or some criticisms of evidentialism. I need to do more research to say anything interesting about it.

[bennyboy]

Sounds almost thread-worthy. Can we start with a link?

Sure. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internalism...istemology
I'm thinking of making a thread based on this topic in future or a related topic like reliabilism vs evidentialism or some criticisms of evidentialism. I need to do more research to say anything interesting about it.

Okay, I'm down. If you make that thread, I'll be happy to participate in it. Maybe it's the actual philosophical issue underyling things like materialism and idealism.

[Pizza]

I don't know if it's the big underlining issue but what epistemological stance is taken often affects the metaphysical stances open to a thinker.

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For example it seems to me most people who say, "I don't know if I'm a brain in a vat," are evidentialists and internalists of some kind. However, I'm not sure of this.