Why "mysterious ways" don't matter.

[Esquilax]

Alternatively, I'm sure you have all heard that if God does not exist, there would be no basis for moral absolutes and therefore nothing could really be good or evil. Even more disturbing is that free will is an illusion and everything that happens is determined by your molecules--further destroying the argument that good and evil exists.

Actually, the more I thought about this comment from you, the more it irritated me, and so I think I'm not just going to let it slide.

Yes, I have heard these claims before: they're no more true now that you've said them, than they were the last time I heard them. Without god there may be no authoritarian absolutes, but that certainly doesn't mean we would be bereft of moral standards, and I think it's quite rude of you to assume this is so without first asking us what we thought. Did you really think we wouldn't have an answer?

The truth is, there are still objective facts, truths to be known about ourselves and the setting in which we operate, through which morals can be derived. Granted, they aren't made up of some external matter called "morality" that god dispenses to us, but since you haven't demonstrated that such a thing exists I see no reason to consider its absence a problem. But we're human beings, living organisms with consistent responses to stimuli; we can certainly build up a moral system based on how actions and the consequences of those actions impact conscious beings. Life is important, without life we wouldn't have anything, therefore, safeguarding life becomes a moral principle we can stand by. We enjoy pleasure, and dislike pain and what it entails, so there's two more general principles to go on. Complex moral systems can be built from simple beginnings such as these, just by addressing various contexts and scenarios in the light of the basic objective facts we all share.

And it's frankly insulting to all our intelligence that you think we could never figure out that, say, murder was wrong, without god.

Now, how about you: if god commands an immoral act, does that act become moral?

As to your free will contention, I urge you to look up "compatibilism." Should resolve that quite easily.

[Fidel_Castronaut]

Just as with any philosophy, competing religious views must be scrutinized, compared, and one needs to decide which view is more plausible.

To date, to us, none of them.

When we say things like 'why would god do x?', we are not questioning this god, we are questioning its believers; you. We parody your beliefs to poke holes in them. We do not assign them any value.

[SteveII]

@Esquilax
@Pickup_shonuff

You are correct that if you believe God is deducing the future free choices from the present conditions--which then causally determines how one would choose--it is less than free will. However, the Molinist view is that God not only has knowledge of necessary truths and contingent truths but that God's middle knowledge contains, but is not limited to, His knowledge of counterfactuals. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one.

Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:
1. God's natural knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

It is necessary to place God's middle knowledge before creation, otherwise the creation act would have started a causal chain and free will goes out the window.

Borrowed heavily from Wikipedia to save typing.

[Cato]

SteveII,

Molinism is certainly imaginatively creative, but is just wild speculation. How can any of this possibly be known?

The Euthyphro dilemma, which I don't think has been satisfactorily addressed in 2400 years, cuts Molinism down at its roots. de Molina's machinations are nothing more than an attempt to make morals as the whim of God intellectually palatable to those rightly concluding that many of God's supposed deeds and dicta are immoral by any reasonable standard.

[SteveII]

@Esquilax
@Pickup_shonuff

Regarding moral values. Of course humans can use their minds and develop a system of moral values. This process leads to subjective moral values. How do you create subjective moral values? What factors do you weigh? You will probably agree with Sam Harris' position on the foundation of morality as "we should define ‘good’ as that which supports the well-being of conscious creatures" and since increases in well-being can be reasonably measured, we have a foundation for a moral values system.

He has redefined 'good' (which in this context means "that which is morally right; righteousness") to mean supporting well-being, so when you ask the question why is the pursuit of our well-being good, it is the now the same as asking why is the pursuit of our well-being supporting well-being. You go in circles. He is not really talking about moral values. He is talking about judgments on what is more or less conducive to life.

Contrary to what Harris believes, science can only tell us what is, not what ought to be. It certainly cannot tell us we have a moral obligation to take actions which are conducive to human life.

A further problem is that 'ought' implies 'can'. Dawkins, Harris and others freely admit that free will is an illusion and that all of our actions are causally determined by our molecules.

If God does not exist, then there is no objective moral values/duties/laws. Any action whatsoever is philosophically permissible.

If you object to this:

1. If God exists, objective moral values exist
2. Objective moral values exist
3. Therefore God exists.

you are left with what Dawkins says: “there is at bottom no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pointless indifference... We are machines for propagating DNA...It is every living object’s sole reason for being”

---

And it's frankly insulting to all our intelligence that you think we could never figure out that, say, murder was wrong, without god.

Now, how about you: if god commands an immoral act, does that act become moral?

Yes, it is illogical to conclude that the source of moral law can command something immoral. By definition, it becomes moral. Of course one should be damn sure a command comes from God.

[Natachan]

Morality from God is not objective morality. It is authoritarian morality. There is a difference. I like to use the word "objective morality" as relying on values that every person can refer to and reference.

I'm going to ramble a bit here but when you say we are going in circles by asking why we go after what is good for us you are sounding like you are quoting the law of identity. A is A. A rock is a rock and no amount of wishing will make it not a rock.

But to get back, why do we do that which promotes well-being? Because we value life and happiness. Why do we value life and happiness? Because we live. Because we feel joy. Because we feel empathy for other beings. These are objective facts about human beings. Refering to them as a basis for a moral system is perfectly valid.

Basing a morality on the whims of a supernatural lawgiver is not objective. Upon what are his whims based? How does he judge right from wrong? What standards does he use? And importantly on that last, what if his standards are opposite to ours? What if what God says is moral is harmful to us?

[Esquilax]

Regarding moral values. Of course humans can use their minds and develop a system of moral values. This process leads to subjective moral values. How do you create subjective moral values? What factors do you weigh? You will probably agree with Sam Harris' position on the foundation of morality as "we should define ‘good’ as that which supports the well-being of conscious creatures" and since increases in well-being can be reasonably measured, we have a foundation for a moral values system.

He has redefined 'good' (which in this context means "that which is morally right; righteousness") to mean supporting well-being, so when you ask the question why is the pursuit of our well-being good, it is the now the same as asking why is the pursuit of our well-being supporting well-being. You go in circles. He is not really talking about moral values. He is talking about judgments on what is more or less conducive to life.

You can only say that Sam Harris has "redefined" good to mean something else by first establishing that there was an initial definition based upon something effective and true. In short, it's all well and good for you to point to morals derived from well being and call them subjective, but you haven't even made the first step toward demonstrating the existence of superior, objective morals, or even that morality is an objective thing that exists beyond the minds of sentient agents. My position is that morality exists only where there are moral agents capable of dealing in moral acts, and yours seems to be that morality exists separate from humanity, either as an objective item, or a function of god's presence in the universe.

That's great, but if you want that position of yours to present a problem for mine, you'll need to demonstrate the existence of either thing. You can't just assert it and then expect us to tapdance on imaginary quicksand.

As to why well being should be our yardstick for moral goodness, well... in a universe where morality doesn't come from an external source the only way in which morality could even be a thing is in the presence of thinking agents. You call that thinking agent god, and credit him as the source of morality, but I don't believe he exists; to me, the source of morality necessarily is the only available thinking agents we know of. Conscious creatures in our world. In a world where morality is sustained by thinking minds it's only natural that it also revolves around them.

Our morality is derived from well being because what else is there?

Contrary to what Harris believes, science can only tell us what is, not what ought to be. It certainly cannot tell us we have a moral obligation to take actions which are conducive to human life.

Which, again, rests on the assumption that moral obligations are divorced from human minds, which I don't think is true. Care to make a case for that?

A further problem is that 'ought' implies 'can'. Dawkins, Harris and others freely admit that free will is an illusion and that all of our actions are causally determined by our molecules.

Did you read up on compatibilism? I'm not required to fight the battles of Dawkins or Harris, they're separate beings with their own opinions on these matters, but I happen to find that compatibilism solves this problem you have with determinism quite handily.

If God does not exist, then there is no objective moral values/duties/laws.

Yyyyup.

Any action whatsoever is philosophically permissible.

Nnnnnope. Do you realize that "objective morals or no morals at all," is a false dichotomy? I explained in detail a method for acquiring subjective morals that is conducive to a well run human society in my last post; dismissing that out of hand isn't very nice.

If you object to this:

1. If God exists, objective moral values exist
2. Objective moral values exist
3. Therefore God exists.

I think you've yet to even attempt to prove point two, there. I'll listen, if you care to start. But merely asserting it, just the same as William Lane Craig does, isn't convincing.

you are left with what Dawkins says: “there is at bottom no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pointless indifference... We are machines for propagating DNA...It is every living object’s sole reason for being”

Do you not see something rather inconsiderate in sitting there and telling us what we must believe? You don't see any of us demanding that if you don't accept atheism you're left with some other undesirable thing, do you? Where do you get off, thinking you can impose these false dichotomies onto us, rather than letting us speak for ourselves?

Yes, it is illogical to conclude that the source of moral law can command something immoral. By definition, it becomes moral. Of course one should be damn sure a command comes from God.

So then you don't have objective morals coming from god, you have a set of dictates from on high. Objective morals can't be altered, they're immutable, dare I say it, objective and separate from any orders given, yet you've just said that whatever god says becomes moral, even if it was immoral before.

You just fell right into the prongs of the Euthyphro Dilemma, my friend.

[The Grand Nudger]

If God does not exist, then there is no objective moral values/duties/laws. Any action whatsoever is philosophically permissible.

Even -with- god, that's the situation we're presented with, as laid so incredibly bare -by the very line of apologetics you've chosen to put forward. What have you done, if not argued for the "philosophical permissibility" of any given act we might call heinous, evil...or wrong?


Sigh.

[SteveII]

SteveII,

Molinism is certainly imaginatively creative, but is just wild speculation. How can any of this possibly be known?

The Euthyphro dilemma, which I don't think has been satisfactorily addressed in 2400 years, cuts Molinism down at its roots. de Molina's machinations are nothing more than an attempt to make morals as the whim of God intellectually palatable to those rightly concluding that many of God's supposed deeds and dicta are immoral by any reasonable standard.

A dilemma must only have two possible outcomes. Philosopher William Lang Craig did some work on this and argues that a third option exists: "what the alternative is is “God is good because his nature is The Good.” His nature defines or determines what is The Good. So that doesn’t lead to this then further dilemma which he wants to erect that “Is God’s nature good because it creates The Good or because it recognizes The Good?” That question in a sense doesn’t even make sense. Natures don’t create anything or recognize anything. When you are talking about the nature of God you are talking about his essential properties. And the nature of God neither creates nor recognizes things at all so the whole question is just malformed.

Rather what we want to say is that God’s nature is The Good and that this simply determines what goodness is. Therefore, to say “why is God’s nature good?” or “does it create the good or recognize the good?” is to fail to understand the alternative. It is sort of like asking, “Is The Good, good because it creates The Good or because it recognizes The Good?” Well, neither one – The Good is good because it is The Good. It defines what is The Good. It is the standard. It simply makes no sense to ask this further question."

[Natachan]

Good has a definition. To simply say that good is good because it is such is to abuse the word horribly. You can't get away with saying that God's commandments are good because his nature is good without explaining it further. Good for what? To whom?