A Conscious Universe

[Surgenator]

But do numbers exist independently?

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@ Fallen. The video section you suggested viewing presented a strawman. It's correct in pointing out the strong correlation between brain states and mental states is not proof for causality. However, it didn't mention anything about the cases when we forcebly alter the brain state and observe what the mental state becomes. If the brain is only a map of mental states, then interacting with the map should have little to no affect on the mental state. We observe the opposite.

Benny's comment about this suffers from the fallacy of division.

He insists that means that all qualia is just a material thing. However, if they are truly equivalent, then you could just as equally insist that all material is an experienced thing, since by definition qualia are what it's like to subjectively experience things.

Qualia is NOT just a material thing but a brain state. Brain state is a series of processes, and a process is the interactions of things. Benny is treating qualia as a thing and Rhythm is treating it a process. So an equivalency does not exist between the two definitions of qualia.

[bennyboy]

Benny's comment about this suffers from the fallacy of division.

He insists that means that all qualia is just a material thing. However, if they are truly equivalent, then you could just as equally insist that all material is an experienced thing, since by definition qualia are what it's like to subjectively experience things.

Qualia is NOT just a material thing but a brain state. Brain state is a series of processes, and a process is the interactions of things. Benny is treating qualia as a thing and Rhythm is treating it a process. So an equivalency does not exist between the two definitions of qualia.

No, all that was just addressing Rhythm's definition. He said qualia isn't -in- the brain, it -is- the brain, which I disagree with, and I doubt he would really want to stick to anyway.

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But do numbers exist independently?

Independent of what? I think you want to argue that to have the idea of "2," you need to have two real objects in front of you, i.e. that the reality must precede the number, which is just a symbol. Correct?

[Neo-Scholastic]

But do numbers exist independently?

Independent of what? I think you want to argue that to have the idea of "2," you need to have two real objects in front of you, i.e. that the reality must precede the number, which is just a symbol. Correct?

In order to perceive a pattern the pattern must already be present independent of any particular observer. That is what makes ideas objective. It is also what provides the link between the intellect and sensible bodies. The idea that is in the intellect is the same as the idea that is embodied by various things. In the case of numbers, the ability to enumerate is based on the idea of unity, i.e. that a thing is a thing distinct from other things because it is a unit.

I do not see why it is necessary to call either matter or ideas fundamental to the exclusion of the other. It seem to me that both can be distinctly present in a single manifestation even if they cannot exist independent of one another, e.g. every sensible body must have both a substance and a form. Reductionism seems like more of an aesthetic pursuit than reflective of our current understanding.

[Chas]

What arrant nonsense.

You need matter (or energy) to create a process

INPUT -> ACTION -> OUTPUT = PROCESS

When the INPUT is electrochemical, the ACTION is electrochemical/biochemical and the OUTPUT is electrochemical/biochemical how can thought not be made up of fundamental particles?

What results from this process is nothing more than can result from this process, regardless of whether or not we understand it. If you are suggesting a 'thought process' has some magical property not possessed by the interaction of its constituent parts then you're just making things up, and if you're not then you have no point to make.

MM

You're committing the fallacy of division. Just because A is composite of B's doesn't mean the property A has, B also has. A process REQUIRES interactions, things do NOT.

It appears to me that you two are saying the same thing.

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Let me say this for now about brains and minds. In any true monism, they are by definition of identical stuff. Rhythm has stated that qualia is brain states. But that means that brain states are qualia; the '=' sign is funny that way. He insists that means that all qualia is just a material thing. However, if they are truly equivalent, then you could just as equally insist that all material is an experienced thing, since by definition qualia are what it's like to subjectively experience things. The only way to avoid this, as far as I can see this, is to deny that anyone experiences things, and that the definition of qualia is therefore irrelevant.

It seems to me that the collection of information about a "physical" universe outside the observer is intrinsically dependent on experience. If there were no experience, there could be no observation, and no ideas about what is being observed. If, however, there were no actual "physical" universe, then nothing changes: the experiences are still experiences, and it only means that the ideas we've inferred from those experiences (i.e. that there is a "real" physical universe which is more than information, math, and ideas) are wrong. There is no model possible which does not include human consciousness as a feature of reality, as no model could be created without it; but there is a model possible which does not include actual "things" that are more than the experience of ideas or information. Therefore, I think materialists at best can hope for a stalemate.

Except you would need to prove that the material universe does not exist without consciousness. You haven't.

Stalemate? Not really. The evidence supports the material existing without any consciousness.

[bennyboy]

Stalemate? Not really. The evidence supports the material existing without any consciousness.

Except that 100% of that evidence was gathered via consciousness, you mean?

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Except you would need to prove that the material universe does not exist without consciousness. You haven't.

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that consciousness is an incontrovertible fact, not really open to opinion. The material universe is a model, an interpretation of conscious minds of the things they have experienced. I don't see that the material universe is "proven," or that it should be the default. It seems to me that is must be assumed on philosophical grounds.

It may be that the material universe we think is there actually IS there. Or it may be that the way we process our experiences leads us to a false conclusion. But how would you tell the difference, without already have assumed your conclusion?

[Mudhammam]

Stalemate? Not really. The evidence supports the material existing without any consciousness.

Except that 100% of that evidence was gathered via consciousness, you mean?

I mean, rocks seem to have got on just fine for billions of years before my consciousness developed. Since you're not saying rocks are conscious you would presumably be in agreement with Chas.

[Chas]

Stalemate? Not really. The evidence supports the material existing without any consciousness.

Except that 100% of that evidence was gathered via consciousness, you mean?

Since we discover new things all the time, the evidence is that they existed before we were conscious of them.

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Except you would need to prove that the material universe does not exist without consciousness. You haven't.

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that consciousness is an incontrovertible fact, not really open to opinion. The material universe is a model, an interpretation of conscious minds of the things they have experienced. I don't see that the material universe is "proven," or that it should be the default. It seems to me that is must be assumed on philosophical grounds.

It may be that the material universe we think is there actually IS there. Or it may be that the way we process our experiences leads us to a false conclusion. But how would you tell the difference, without already have assumed your conclusion?

The material universe is almost certainly not what we currently think; we keep discovering new things about it.

If your position is that we are just making it all up, then I'm done here as that is solipsism writ large.

[bennyboy]

Except that 100% of that evidence was gathered via consciousness, you mean?

I mean, rocks seem to have got on just fine for billions of years before my consciousness developed. Since you're not saying rocks are conscious you would presumably be in agreement with Chas.

I'm not talking about the rocks. I'm talking about the evidence.

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm treating qualia as a functional description of a thing, yes, a description of many things and the material interactions between them (those interactions are themselves things- the pulsing wire is material, the weighted pad on the paddle is material, the air between you and the tv is material...this is all stuff doing stuff, not ideas doing ideas). Not as a description of an idea divorced from a thing or separate from it somehow....I use explanations from digital and analog circuitry to show that the -things- we call ideas can properly -be things- (like Mario) in a physical monism....even if we do it some other way (lets say dualism or just "I don;t know"). That true, as per my last example, is a description of the state of a machine, not a free floating idea of an idea. I don't mind acknowledging that we have an incomplete description of qualia, what I mind is the insistence that there is some problem with qualia in a physical monism -in principle-...because there demonstrably is not, judging by the description I've accepted of what qualia is.

If qualia is experience alone (and not depth of experience, robustness of experience, breadth of experience, power of experience, accuracy of experience, awareness of experience, process of experience, all of these things and more), then there is no shortage of conditions which can be met by material things and material interactions to provide that -with no requirement for any "other"- and which only provide that with specific reference to material, and material interaction (any other state of a gate, any other physical arrangmenet of that particular machine is not "true"). Personally, I think that experience is a word so easily equivocated upon that it's likely Benny and I aren't even thinking of the same thing when we use it. Bricks experience drag when you throw them...in my world.

(of course the evidence in your head is "consciousness stuff" but even though it may not be the thing that it refers to, and even though you may not be able, individually, to refer to anything else, I'm proposing that it's still a thing, in the same way that mario may not be a little red man in suspenders but is still, demonstrably, a thing (or a collection of things, more accurately - and you -are- retreating into solipsism with this, btw) - and that there -is- a way to determine this which you likely accept in every other instance except, perhaps, this mind and consciousness business. You accept that there are things (and I use the word in this instance in a neutral way, things either material or conceptual) which exist independently of your individual consciousness, yes? Do you think that it's actually impossible to determine this, do you think, in short...that the world cannot be known?

I don't personally expect you to be able to offer me a truth which is beyond not only your specific abilities - but also beyond the capability of the equipment you use to reach that truth. If you expect me to be able to offer you something which you feel is beyond not only my ability, but also the capabilities of my machinery (regardless of whether it's material or "other") then I think that I might be operating with undue burden. If your mind stuff (whatever that is) can reach some truth about this world ala idealism - and what you offer is good enough reason for you in that regard....it shouldn't be incumbant upon me to offer anything more elaborate than that in reaching my truth about this world ala materialism. The incomplete nature of your proposition allows for my own to be incomplete - so I don't have to nail qualia to the wall for you at all....unless you can, for me. You shouldn't expect that from my end, if you accept less from your own. Best I can get out of you is "it's all ideas doing ideas to ideas"...and maybe you and I differ here, but that seems a whole hell of alot less involved and exacting that what I;v offered...even if what I've offered doesn't provide you with a complete explanation.

Now, I don't expect, nor would I demand that you will say "Fuck me rhythm, your right, qualia is the machine" I'm aiming lower...."well, I guess it could be the machine". My gripe is not with either of our incomplete descriptions, it is with this notion that qualia presents a problem for physical monism. I haven't heard any description of it which presents a problem -even with my limited ability to design physical systems-, though, obviously, I can't explain it to you to the level you seem to require for my position - but not your own. Hell, if I can;t hit that, I'd go for a "well..maybe qualia is more than just experience" as well. So now you know where I'm headed, all that I hope to establish or have ever attempted to establish.

[ManMachine]

What arrant nonsense.

You need matter (or energy) to create a process

INPUT -> ACTION -> OUTPUT = PROCESS

When the INPUT is electrochemical, the ACTION is electrochemical/biochemical and the OUTPUT is electrochemical/biochemical how can thought not be made up of fundamental particles?

What results from this process is nothing more than can result from this process, regardless of whether or not we understand it. If you are suggesting a 'thought process' has some magical property not possessed by the interaction of its constituent parts then you're just making things up, and if you're not then you have no point to make.

MM

You're committing the fallacy of division. Just because A is composite of B's doesn't mean the property A has, B also has. A process REQUIRES interactions, things do NOT.

Well of course A does not have the same properties as B? Otherwise it's not a process.

Yes, a process requires interactions, as stated above (as identified by Chas).

So back to my point, you claim 'thought' is an identity we give to a particular process - fine, no problem with that so far - and by that definition, needs an interaction - again no problem with that.

Then we come to your statement (paraphrased) - bear in mind I began my point on a Quantum Level - "... 'things' do NOT [require interactions]". (square parenthesis's mine)

Given that you and those that have shown support for your posts are among the people who I consider to have a better grasp of QM in this forum, can you or anyone else give me an example of any 'thing' that is not, on a Quantum Level, in a state of perpetual quantum (procedural) flux?

If you can, I'll accept your definition, acknowledge the distinction and concede the point.

MM