God and Morality: Separate Issues

[theVOID]

Option 4: Moral terms are grounded in the nature of God. They are grounded in the sense that goodness is one of God's properties, in exactly the same way that charge and mass are properties of fundamental particles. If fundamental particles do not exist, there is no such thing as charge and mass. In the same way (on this view), if God does not exist, there is no such thing as goodness.

A few problems here...

Your analogy is flawed in that DAT (Divine attitude theory) requires a God who is necessarily good where as an elementary particle does not necessarily have mass and/or charge (such as some flavors of neutrino) they are both optional properties.

It may still be true that charge and mass could not exist without elementary particles, but just because a particle exists does not necessitate either.

Charge and mass are likely not even properties of the particles themselves, they may be the effects of interactions between particles and forces (that may or may not in turn be carried by particles).

I would argue that like mass and charge being properties of interactions and not the objects themselves, goodness only exists in the interaction between beings and not as some independent thing. God was not "good" before there were other beings to consider (unless you would argue that God's knowledge of the effect of his actions was present from t0 and thus he can be good from t0).

In any case, Good cannot be one of gods fundamental properties if goodness is contingent upon interaction, it makes goodness an emergent and contingent property.

You would also have to show that god is necessarily good, I've never seen a single theist do this.

[DeistPaladin]

there is no necessity for an advocate of Option 3 to say that "We know God is good because God is good".

Here you go, I have put in bold the entire statement that I made.
You somehow seem to think that this means:

"We don't have to explain what we mean or how we figure what we claim to be true.

How you interpret me as saying this I have absolutely no idea. Have another go at reading what I originally said and see if you can interpret me as not being stupid.

The entire sentence makes no difference. The phrase "we know God is good because good is good" would be an explanation of the circular logic that supports the assertion "God is good". Hence, your statement in bold still boils down to "I don't have to explain". If I'm not understanding you correctly, please rephrase.

[Edwardo Piet]

"God is good because good is good" implies "God is good because God is good" and "good is good because good is good", both being examples of Question Begging. Circularity would be "God is good because goodness is God, and goodness is God because God is good".

[Ryft]

My debates with Theologica37, where he avoided the first two options by claiming the third. I'll see if I can dig up some more academic sources.

Please do, because I have no idea who Theologica37 is and seriously doubt he constitutes what you and I would consider an apologist (e.g., Norman Geisler). My library has a significant collection so there is a good chance I'll be familiar with your academic references.

Can we agree that anyone, academic or layman, who does make such a claim ["We know God is good because God is good"] is using circular reasoning, as I have explained?

Certainly. And can we agree that it is an epistemological claim, which is categorically distinguished from metaphysical ones? Discussing the nature of morality falls under the latter, while 'how we know' falls under the former. Our discussion will not get anywhere useful if we conflate distinct categories.

Sure, if you are content to beg the question.

Well do tell then, if I've missed any other options. That's what this thread is all about.

I know that is what this thread is about. That's why your statement was question-begging. You can do that if you like, of course, but I will call you out on it.

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Your analogy is flawed...

You criticize it for not being analogous, then make your case by showing how it's not identical. Does anything more need to be said? Of COURSE they're not the same; hence Stempy illustrating his point with an analogy.

[theVOID]

Your analogy is flawed...

You criticize it for not being analogous, then make your case by showing how it's not identical. Does anything more need to be said? Of COURSE they're not the same; hence Stempy illustrating his point with an analogy.

Uh, The analogy was bad, I pointed that out, what's the problem?

[Ryft]

Uh, the analogy was bad. I pointed that out. What's the problem?

The analogy wasn't bad. That's the problem. You said it was flawed because these two things are not the same, pointing out what the chief difference between them is. But Stempy never suggested they were the same in the first place! He knows very well that they have differences; that's why he used an ANALOGY. It served as an illustration without any pretense that they were identicals. Obviously there are differences; that's why analogies are analogs, not identicals. You criticized his analogy for being an analogy. It was an utterly absurd objection. (It did give me a good laugh, though. I appreciated it for that, if nothing else. So thank you.)

[theVOID]

I'm sorry but wasn't his argument that Goodnesss is a fundamental property of God like charge and mass are fundamental properties of particles? That is what I understood him to say and if that is the case then my comment stands - Charge and mass are probably not fundamental properties of particles. Illustrating one concept by using a different concept only works if the concepts are similar... "Goodness = Fundamental property of god" and "Charge/Mass = emergent/contingent properties of particles" isn't similar and thus is a poor analogy.

[Ryft]

Then you misunderstood his point, which is not necessarily his fault and certainly not the fault of his analogy. He defined the property relation in this way: just as charge and mass are properties of fundamental particles, such that without the latter the former is unintelligible, so goodness is a property of God, such that without God goodness is unintelligible. You can push is analogy to extents he never intended with it, but that is your doing and not his. All analogies break down if you push them far enough. But why not contend with the analogy as he presented it, instead of pushing it to extent he did not?

[Anomalocaris]

In your opinion what would be a bad analogy?

[DeistPaladin]

Please do, because I have no idea who Theologica37 is and seriously doubt he constitutes what you and I would consider an apologist (e.g., Norman Geisler). My library has a significant collection so there is a good chance I'll be familiar with your academic references.

My experience has been that the amateur apologist is every bit as "skilled" as the professional apologist, since there really is no skill involved. It's not like a real academic pursuit where there's anything to know. It's just a matter of finding some canned arguments that have been recycled for centuries, skillfully using logical fallacies and mental slight of hand, bandy around a few philosophy terms and you can spew as well as Habermas, Craig, McDowell or any other.

Can we agree that anyone, academic or layman, who does make such a claim ["We know God is good because God is good"] is using circular reasoning, as I have explained?

Certainly.

Excellent so we agree that #3 is not a valid argument then. Since it sounds like you would not use that argument yourself, then I'm curious as to what argument you would use.

And can we agree that it is an epistemological claim, which is categorically distinguished from metaphysical ones? Discussing the nature of morality falls under the latter, while 'how we know' falls under the former. Our discussion will not get anywhere useful if we conflate distinct categories.

Actually, these fields are closely connected, as the dictionary.com site itself says.

met·a·phys·ics
   /ˌmɛtəˈfɪzɪks/ Show Spelled[met-uh-fiz-iks] Show IPA
–noun ( used with a singular verb )
1.
the branch of philosophy that treats of first principles, includes ontology and cosmology, and is intimately connected with epistemology.

One is what you are claiming about the nature of morality and the other is how you know it. Again, we're back to the topic of:
"A is true"
"what do you mean by that and how do you know?"
"I don't have to explain."

I know that is what this thread is about. That's why your statement was question-begging. You can do that if you like, of course, but I will call you out on it.

Fine, and, as I did, I will call you out on your failure to elaborate. What do you mean by "begging the question"? What is your position? How do you relate the two topics of morality and God's existence? Do tell.

Or are you content to just throw out an accusation with no explanation?