Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[LadyForCamus]

@GrandizerII The average theist makes those exact same philosophical assumptions about reality. Then they go and add a few more on top.

And that's a bad thing, how?

Why would I waste my time trying to have a genuine discussion with you when you just duck out as soon as I ask you to actually explain your position?

[Anomalocaris]

@GrandizerII The average theist makes those exact same philosophical assumptions about reality. Then they go and add a few more on top.

And that's a bad thing, how?

it remove all doubt about their being incorrigible idiots.

[vulcanlogician]

I can give you that one can do a post hoc justification of some of those assumptions via science. But nevertheless, they are assumptions that must first be held before you get science.

And anyway, now that I think about, this is circular. It's like the Bible being used to demonstrate what God says or something.

(Nice to meet you. I like your posts.)

In response to what you say, there are plenty of perfectly logical reasons to be an empiricist. Locke and Hume made their cases. And they hold up pretty well. Sure, everything must be based on assumptions of some kind. That's true for science. That's true for any enterprise that wants to make significant statements about reality.

[polymath257]

And, once again, suppose that we manage to find the neural correlates to all of these experiences. We can look at the neural activity and say 'this person is experiencing a vivid experience of red'. And, suppose we can do this across the board, for all experiences. Clearly we are quire far from this. But suppose we can. is that not sufficient to explain consciousness? We have the correlates and we know how those correlate to experiences (qualia, if you will). What else is required?

In your example, the explanation would be that certain neurons are firing in a particular pattern that corresponds to having a certain experience. That *is* the explanation.

Scientific theories do more than simply find correlations, they need to explain the behavior.  Correlations don't imply causation.  Otherwise, the hypothesis that ice cream trucks cause drownings would be a confirmed scientific theory.

I think this is a misunderstanding of how hings are explained in science. We cannot observe 'causes'. We can only observe correlations. The causal component is always in the theory. it is a construct, not a basic observation. And what constitutes a 'cause' depends on the theory.

So, when we say that charged particles cause electric fields, ALL we have is the correlation between charged particles and electric fields and a theory that describes how the two are correlated. The same is true for mass and gravity. The theory says that one causes the other, but that is a postulate of the theory, not some detailed mechanism.

Once we have underlying theories, we can 'explain' other things via causality, but when we do so we rely on that underlying theory.

So, we can explain chemical bonding in terms of 'electron sharing', more specifically in terms of the formation of molecular orbitals, but such an explanation relies on the deeper theory of quantum mechanics. We can explain how motors work, but only once we have the underlying theory of electromagnetism.

So, what I think will eventually happen is that we will have neural correlates to conscious experiences to the point that we could 'read minds' by looking at neural behavior. We could then point to specific neural activity and say that is the neural signature of the experience. This can even be tested by having subjects report their experiences.

And, my point is that this would be a perfectly good 'explanation' of conscious experiences in terms of neural behavior in the same way that we can say that the electrons in s system are an explanation for the electric fields observed. No deeper 'explanation' is required past the consistent correlation. What is required is exactly the 'translation table' between neural activity and conscious experience.

In other words, there is *only* a soft problem of consciousness, just like there is only a soft problem of electric fields or of gravity.

[GrandizerII]

I feel like you're misunderstanding what the hard problem is about.

The experiences being reported (as some phenomenological or, if you're an illusionist, "pseudo-phenomenological" thing/property) require an explanation for their appearance as phenomenological or "pseudo-phenomenological". But how do you get from neurons firing in the CNS to such a bizarre, seemingly "unscientific" appearance that is "out there in your face", so to speak?

When you report feeling toothache, for example, you're not just reporting, you're having what appears to be a feeling of being in pain, an intolerable sort of "ringing" that you wish would just end.

Going with another example, when you point your head towards the screen of your computer, you are vividly identifying words on the screen. Or at least you have what appears to be a vivid experience. You're not just "detecting in the dark". It all appears as flashy to you.

How do you explain the seemingness of vividness, the intensity of the feeling, and such?

And, once again, suppose that we manage to find the neural correlates to all of these experiences. We can look at the neural activity and say 'this person is experiencing a vivid experience of red'. And, suppose we can do this across the board, for all experiences. Clearly we are quire far from this. But suppose we can. is that not sufficient to explain consciousness? We have the correlates and we know how those correlate to experiences (qualia, if you will). What else is required?

In your example, the explanation would be that certain neurons are firing in a particular pattern that corresponds to having a certain experience. That *is* the explanation.

You still need to bridge the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological. Chalmers is very clear on what the hard problem is. Even if you have all the necessary correlates, you still need to explain how those translate to experiences/qualia exactly.

And again, if you're an illusionist (I'm still not sure if you are or not), then you still have a hard problem to deal with. How is the seemingness of phenomenological experience coming about? Keith Frankish refers to it as the illusion problem (and he doesn't think that's a hard problem anymore), but I think it's still one and the same thing.

---

Scientific theories do more than simply find correlations, they need to explain the behavior.  Correlations don't imply causation.  Otherwise, the hypothesis that ice cream trucks cause drownings would be a confirmed scientific theory.

I think this is a misunderstanding of how hings are explained in science. We cannot observe 'causes'. We can only observe correlations. The causal component is always in the theory. it is a construct, not a basic observation. And what constitutes a 'cause' depends on the theory.

So, when we say that charged particles cause electric fields, ALL we have is the correlation between charged particles and electric fields and a theory that describes how the two are correlated. The same is true for mass and gravity. The theory says that one causes the other, but that is a postulate of the theory, not some detailed mechanism.

Once we have underlying theories, we can 'explain' other things via causality, but when we do so we rely on that underlying theory.

So, we can explain chemical bonding in terms of 'electron sharing', more specifically in terms of the formation of molecular orbitals, but such an explanation relies on the deeper theory of quantum mechanics. We can explain how motors work, but only once we have the underlying theory of electromagnetism.

So, what I think will eventually happen is that we will have neural correlates to conscious experiences to the point that we could 'read minds' by looking at neural behavior. We could then point to specific neural activity and say that is the neural signature of the experience. This can even be tested by having subjects report their experiences.

And, my point is that this would be a perfectly good 'explanation' of conscious experiences in terms of neural behavior in the same way that we can say that the electrons in s system are an explanation for the electric fields observed. No deeper 'explanation' is required past the consistent correlation. What is required is exactly the 'translation table' between neural activity and conscious experience.

In other words, there is *only* a soft problem of consciousness, just like there is only a soft problem of electric fields or of gravity.

All I'm seeing here is that you're not concerned with the hard problem. But this does not mean therefore there is no hard problem.

In your physics/chemistry examples, correct me if I'm mistaken, but you're still able to explain how particles cause fields and such (it's just you need to accept the underlying theory first)? That's the thing though. When it comes to consciousness, whatever underlying theory we want to consider, how could that theory explain how neuron firings translate to qualia (or appearance of it)?

ETA: If you think a complete correlation map is sufficient to explain how X causes Y, then that's not a sufficient account. An explanation of causality would still be required, whether talking consciousness or not.

[HappySkeptic]

You still need to bridge the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological. Chalmers is very clear on what the hard problem is. Even if you have all the necessary correlates, you still need to explain how those translate to experiences/qualia exactly.

I just don't see this as being a "hard problem". Qualia are what the conscious mind experiences - full stop. The conscious mind must have some experience - it might as well be the qualia we know. It could be different qualia if we had different brains or different senses, but it has to be something.

Now, identity and a sense of self is a bit of a mystery, but I feel that is an illusion created by our mind. If we were part of the Borg collective, we wouldn't experience a singular identity. Our separateness and our memories creates the sense of self.

[GrandizerII]

You still need to bridge the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological. Chalmers is very clear on what the hard problem is. Even if you have all the necessary correlates, you still need to explain how those translate to experiences/qualia exactly.

I just don't see this as being a "hard problem".  Qualia are what the conscious mind experiences - full stop.  The conscious mind must have some experience - it might as well be the qualia we know.  It could be different qualia if we had different brains or different senses, but it has to be something.

Now, identity and a sense of self is a bit of a mystery, but I feel that is an illusion created by our mind.  If we were part of the Borg collective, we wouldn't experience a singular identity.  Our separateness and our memories creates the sense of self.

I have no problem with your last paragraph. I think that's very reasonable.

Your first paragraph, however, is confusing to me. I'm not sure why you don't think the way that qualia presents itself to us is a challenge for us to explain. And you say the conscious mind must have some experience, but then why must there be a conscious mind in the first place? How is it arising?

[The Grand Nudger]

Those would be evolutionary and mechanical questions - but the hard problem states that answering such questions....indeed...all such questions, still wouldn't be an explanation of consciousness. Making them no question or challenge at all, at least with respect to understanding qualia - since they're fundamentally irrelevant.

The safe bet is that a collection of abilities or functions of what we call a conscious mind is a better system of control than any number of other control models we find in the natural world (and in our machines). The how appears to be an issue of information processing - that's super vague..but, hey, we're just starting to figure it out.

There are people who think that answering such questions about consciousness would be the same as answering them about any other thing. Why must there be a toaster and how does it toast, for example, is an explanation of toasters. So, that's a challenge, sure, but only because those kinds of people think that the answers to those questions have any relationship to explaining toasters.

[HappySkeptic]

Your first paragraph, however, is confusing to me. I'm not sure why you don't think the way that qualia presents itself to us is a challenge for us to explain. And you say the conscious mind must have some experience, but then why must there be a conscious mind in the first place? How is it arising?

If you are asking "why must there be a "me"" that experiences consciousness, that is the harder question.  Consciousness itself is something the brain has evolved (I understand this explains nothing, but bear with me).  Consciousness is a process that does a few things - it creates a model of the world and the self in order to predict the future and make survival choices.  No, we don't know everything about this mode of operation, but for it work, it must have something like "qualia" that are the inputs of conscious experience.

I think AI will one day become conscious, but it may require replicating much of how the human brain works.  A sense of self is likely necessary for survival purposes.  If an AI is in a data center, it likely doesn't need consciousness.  If it is part of a moving robot that has limited connection to other AIs, a sense of self is a whole lot more useful.

[The Grand Nudger]

Anything in an environment that needs to be navigated (in multiple senses of that phrase), real or simulated, would benefit from the sorts of things we associate with consciousness. That's not even a what if, it's a known known. Machines with attention control and body control significantly outperform otherwise equivalent systems.