Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[GrandizerII]

I just don't see this as being a "hard problem".  Qualia are what the conscious mind experiences - full stop.  The conscious mind must have some experience - it might as well be the qualia we know.  It could be different qualia if we had different brains or different senses, but it has to be something.

Now, identity and a sense of self is a bit of a mystery, but I feel that is an illusion created by our mind.  If we were part of the Borg collective, we wouldn't experience a singular identity.  Our separateness and our memories creates the sense of self.

It's not that easy though. Just examine two competing theories of mind: functionalism and biological naturalism. Both theories are materialistic (ie. physicalist). Both theories posit that conscious experiences are causally dependent on brain functioning. They agree there. But, otherwise, they arrive at two different conclusions concerning what consciousness is.

One theory (functionalism) states that conscious states arise due to the information feedback that happens with brain function. According to this theory, a computer could have conscious experiences if it somehow transmitted the same information your brain does when say, eating a hamburger.

The biological naturalist disagrees. The biological naturalist says you can transmit that information in a computer system and the computer will not experience eating a burger. To the biological naturalist, consciousness is a product of the physical features of neurons. If you wanted to create an artificial consciousness, you'd need to create a physical object that does the same physical thing that a neuron does when it fires. (A whole bunch of them actually.) Then you'd need to get them to fire in one of the myriad ways a neuron can fire when hamburger-eating is being done.

Who of us can say which of these theories is correct? Each has its merits. Each has its problems.

So while, yes, our conscious experience has to be something ... exactly what that something is eludes us. Hence, questions about consciousness are worth exploring. And the problem is indeed hard.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding something here, but neither of these two theories attempts to explain how phenomenological consciousness comes about, only how it could be simulated in non-human entities. The hard problem is not about the latter concern, but the former.

[vulcanlogician]

@Angrboda

I mean, you can't falsify a correlation. But from a correlation, you can develop a hypothesis: "ice cream trucks cause drownings." Then you arrange an experiment. Create a dozen or so "Truman Show" neighborhoods in which all factors are the same, except some neighborhoods have more ice cream trucks. Then you see which neighborhoods have more drownings. Rinse and repeat.

It might not be practical, but it (in principle) is a way science could detect the strength of the correlation.

---

Maybe I'm misunderstanding something here, but neither of these two theories attempts to explain how phenomenological consciousness comes about, only how it could be simulated in non-human entities. The hard problem is not about the latter concern, but the former.

You could go deeper than these theories attempt. Neither fully explains the ontology of consciousness. But, if we were to discover that one or both of the theories is false, we'd be one step closer to understanding that ontology, whatever it is.

[GrandizerII]

Well, I disagree with Chalmers on a number of points. For example, i don't see philosophical zombies as being coherent.

Can I hear the argument for that?

But, I also don't think that there is any need to go beyond the correspondences between neural correlates and conscious states. Those correspondences *are* the explanation of conscious  states, And if there is a way of translating neural behavior and conscious states, that linkage is all that is required to explain consciousness.

Establishing correspondences alone doesn't provide the full picture. There's still something missing here. You may be personally satisfied with such an account, but it doesn't mean there's not something missing here that demands an answer.

I no more have to give a mechanism for the connection than I have to give a mechanism linking charged particles and electric fields. Having the correlation *is* the explanation.

Again, I disagree. Like I said earlier, correlation isn't the full explanation.

That said, maybe this isn't too much of a problem in this case since physicists can perhaps logically conceive of ways that particles cause fields, and they just haven't/can't establish this scientifically.

In the case of consciousness, because we're talking about a switch from the physical to something that seems to be not physical (it may still be physical but it nevertheless "feels" bizarre and funny), there is more demand for an explanation of how that switch works. In other words, there is concern that phenomenological consciousness may not be in line with strict physicalism/materialism.

[LadyForCamus]

Science can handle the possibility that correlations are false. If the correlation between drownings and phenomenon x becomes apparent, the next step is to formulate a new hypothesis that can be falsified and continue testing.

For example: more people swim in the summer. Also more ice cream trucks rolling around in the summer. Let's see if "it being summer" (or something else) doesn't better explain the supposed correlation.

If poly is taking up the mantle of Humean skepticism, then I think your criticisms are apt. But I don't think these criticisms are good criticisms of science in general. If only one experiment could be done ever, then yes... a false correlation is devastating to gnosis. But science can take hundreds of cracks at a problem. So one bad result doesn't seem like an issue to me.

How do you falsify a correlation?  Typically, confounding factors are considered better explanations because lower-level phenomena correlate with drownings in a way that ice cream trucks do not.  But this requires assuming that the causative mechanism of the confounding factor is lower level than that of ice cream trucks, which is a conclusion you can only reach through an argument from ignorance.  If correlation is causation, then the concept of a confounding factor evaporates and you have no way to privilege the confounding factors as explanations over that of the ice cream trucks.

Pardon the dummy interjecting. What do you mean by “lower-level phenomena”?

Like @vulcanlogician pointed out, you can’t falsify a correlation. Or, the only way to falsify a correlation between two variables is by showing that there is, in fact, no actual correlation between them. But the demonstration of a correlation between two variables, by itself, tells us nothing about cause and effect one way or the other. A correlation is simply a description of the relationship between two variables. It doesn’t assume how or why. But how many confounding variables are intertwined with the relationship between ice cream trucks and drownings versus neural activity and qualia? Or charged particles and electric fields? I don’t think that to say ‘a strong correlation, after known confounding variables are ruled out or controlled for, can be sufficient evidence of cause and effect’ is quite the same as claiming ‘a more detailed mechanism of action doesn’t exist or can’t be found.’ It may be reasonable to tentatively conclude, based on strong correlative evidence, that neural activity is the likely cause of conscious experience while acknowledging that we don’t yet have a complete understanding of the exact mechanistic explanation.

[Angrboda]

@Angrboda

I mean, you can't falsify a correlation. But from a correlation, you can develop a hypothesis: "ice cream trucks cause drownings." Then you arrange an experiment. Create a dozen or so "Truman Show" neighborhoods in which all factors are the same, except some neighborhoods have more ice cream trucks. Then you see which neighborhoods have more drownings. Rinse and repeat.

It might not be practical, but it (in principle) is a way science could detect the strength of the correlation.

That wouldn't work because you can't assume the cause results in a one-to-one correlation. Once you interpret correlation as causation you're stuck, because anything you try to add to that is basically a refutation of your previous commitment.

---

Pardon the dummy interjecting. What do you mean by “lower-level phenomena”?

In reduction, you replace an explanation of a phenomenon in certain terms with an explanation consisting of the things which compose and explain those terms. So in chemistry, one might explain a chemical reaction in terms of the valences of the elements being used in the reaction. A reduction would be to explain that reaction in terms of the electrons and particles and their bonding in the individual elements because valences represent the practical physics of how electrons and such work to give an element its valence. Thus explaining the phenomena in terms of electrons and other elementary particles would be a lower-level explanation than explaining it in terms of valences. Likewise, explaining drownings in terms of the physics of the particles and forces that are involved in ice cream trucks and drownings would be lower level than explaining it in terms of ice cream trucks, drownings, and an unnamed mediating force or mechanism.

[polymath257]

Well, what is the data that suggests that they do? How localized is the correlation? How good is the correlation? Does it work at the level of individual ice cream trucks? How far away are the drownings and the trucks?

More specifically, suppose that I hypothesize that ice cream trucks cause drownings, what sort of data would e that hypothesis? And have we collected data in that context?

How does any of that matter?  Every summer drownings correlate with ice cream trucks being in the neighborhood.  It being local or not is irrelevant because the speed of light need not be violated by the causative effect of ice cream trucks.  QM postulates statistical effects so the idea that ice cream trucks correlates with drownings need not occur at the individual level.  Additionally, that assumes that 100% of drownings are caused by ice cream trucks and that there is no delay, fixed or random, in the mechanism.  It hypothesizes exactly what we see, a rise in frequency of nearby ice cream trucks correlating to a rise in drownings.  The fact is things correlate with other things regardless of how near or far, aggregate or individual, or any of this other crap.  You're trying to add other factors on top of correlation as being necessary to establish causation, but your prior argument doesn't allow for that.  Your Humean skepticism has led you to a dead-end in which you can't rule out anything as a cause of anything else.  I just burped.  Somewhere in the world, somebody fell off a building.  And according to you, I caused that, because my burp correlated with them falling off a building.

We have two hypotheses:

1. Ice cream trucks cause drownings.

2. Both ice cream trucks and drownings occur mostly in summer.

So what we need is an observation that will distinguish between these two hypotheses.

The most obvious one would be to rent a bunch of ice cream trucks in the winter and see if drownings increase then as well. Even better, do this at various different times of the year and in various locations. Then see if the correlation persists.

You are right, the correlation is primarily observational.  But when there is more than one active hypothesis (and there almost always is), the key is to find some setup where the two hypotheses give different predictions and see which one is wrong.

This is yet another reason why a single experiment is not enough to overthrow a theory. The experiment needs to be conducted in a variety of situations to explore when the observed correlation (or lack) is there.

I think the basic problem is the expectation that science will give a 'mechanism' for all 'causes'. And that is simply false. In fact, the whole idea of 'mechanism' assumes a metaphysics that is very likely to be wrong.

[Angrboda]

How does any of that matter?  Every summer drownings correlate with ice cream trucks being in the neighborhood.  It being local or not is irrelevant because the speed of light need not be violated by the causative effect of ice cream trucks.  QM postulates statistical effects so the idea that ice cream trucks correlates with drownings need not occur at the individual level.  Additionally, that assumes that 100% of drownings are caused by ice cream trucks and that there is no delay, fixed or random, in the mechanism.  It hypothesizes exactly what we see, a rise in frequency of nearby ice cream trucks correlating to a rise in drownings.  The fact is things correlate with other things regardless of how near or far, aggregate or individual, or any of this other crap.  You're trying to add other factors on top of correlation as being necessary to establish causation, but your prior argument doesn't allow for that.  Your Humean skepticism has led you to a dead-end in which you can't rule out anything as a cause of anything else.  I just burped.  Somewhere in the world, somebody fell off a building.  And according to you, I caused that, because my burp correlated with them falling off a building.

We have two hypotheses:

1. Ice cream trucks cause drownings.

2. Both ice cream trucks and drownings occur mostly in summer.

So what we need is an observation that will distinguish between these two hypotheses.

The most obvious one would be to rent a bunch of ice cream trucks in the winter and see if drownings increase then as well. Even better, do this at various different times of the year and in various locations. Then see if the correlation persists.

You are right, the correlation is primarily observational.  But when there is more than one active hypothesis (and there almost always is), the key is to find some setup where the two hypotheses give different predictions and see which one is wrong.

This is yet another reason why a single experiment is not enough to overthrow a theory. The experiment needs to be conducted in a variety of situations to explore when the observed correlation (or lack) is there.

I think the basic problem is the expectation that science will give a 'mechanism' for all 'causes'. And that is simply false. In fact, the whole idea of 'mechanism' assumes a metaphysics that is very likely to be wrong.

How are you ruling out the possibility that cold temperatures can cancel out the ice cream truck effect? You have a methodological flaw in that your experiment can't distinguish actual falsification from confounding factors. All you can say is that it is unknown why ice cream trucks do not cause drownings in winter, not that the hypothesis that ice cream trucks cause drownings is false. This is because your test, and any test you devise, depends upon the absence of certain observations, and that absence could have many explanations. Science depends upon observations, not inferences based on their absence. As noted earlier, basing a conclusion on an absence of something is basically an argument from ignorance and is invalid. Cold fusion has never been observed. Does this mean that cold fusion does not occur? No, it does not. I think the basic problem is there is no prediction implicit in a correlation, only that under certain conditions, the two phenomena co-occur. This does not lead to any type of prediction as the correlation doesn't imply that the two will co-occur under any conditions, so any changing of the conditions will leave you, not with a falsification, but simply an interesting mystery. Explanations, however, possess the property that certain inferences naturally follow from the explanation and thus predictions can be made. But without an explanation, you're simply left not knowing which correlations are meaningful and why, and the inability to produce predictions from the correlation means that you can't falsify the theory. If all theories are nothing more than correlations, then no predictions can be made from them, and none can be falsified. That would mean that none of them are scientific.

[The Grand Nudger]

In the case of consciousness, because we're talking about a switch from the physical to something that seems to be not physical (it may still be physical but it nevertheless "feels" bizarre and funny), there is more demand for an explanation of how that switch works. In other words, there is concern that phenomenological consciousness may not be in line with strict physicalism/materialism.

IDK if consciousness seems nonphysical - but it's no surprise when a control model gives a description of itself that isn't entirely or strictly accurate.  

If you gave it much thought, you might report that you are not your  body, but some small thing in your body, behind the eyes and slightly above the level of the nose.  In contrast, a boundary box or body model reports being much larger than the apparatus which produces the report actually is.  The system assumes that it occupies it's maximum extent on all axes.  This is what some researchers call attending to attention, or attending to self - respectively.  In both cases it's being done for effect, not accuracy of contents.  

You feel like a tiny ghost even though you're a rather hefty ball of meat.... and a roomba's miniscule processor thinks it's as massive as the box it came in.

[polymath257]

Well, I disagree with Chalmers on a number of points. For example, i don't see philosophical zombies as being coherent.

Can I hear the argument for that?

Well, let's consider what Chalmers proposed. Imagine a conscious person. Then imagine another being that is physically identical in every way with that conscious person. The question is whether it is coherent to say the construct is not conscious. I don't believe it is.

For example, if the conscious person waxes eloquent about their experience of the color red, so will the zombie. If the conscious person goes into a long discussion about their qualia, so will the zombie. if the conscious person acknowledges Mary might have learned something when she saw red, so would the zombie. In every single physical situation, the two will be *exactly* the same in how they respond.

And no, I don't think it is possible for that to occur without the 'zombie' actually being conscious. At some point in some way, there would be something where a non-conscious being would react differently than a conscious one and *that* would be a physical difference between the two.

But, I also don't think that there is any need to go beyond the correspondences between neural correlates and conscious states. Those correspondences *are* the explanation of conscious  states, And if there is a way of translating neural behavior and conscious states, that linkage is all that is required to explain consciousness.

Establishing correspondences alone doesn't provide the full picture. There's still something missing here. You may be personally satisfied with such an account, but it doesn't mean there's not something missing here that demands an answer.

I'm curious what you think is still missing.

I no more have to give a mechanism for the connection than I have to give a mechanism linking charged particles and electric fields. Having the correlation *is* the explanation.

Again, I disagree. Like I said earlier, correlation isn't the full explanation.

That said, maybe this isn't too much of a problem in this case since physicists can perhaps logically conceive of ways that particles cause fields, and they just haven't/can't establish this scientifically.

No, there is no 'logically conceiving how particles cause fields'. Whenever we have a certain type of particle, we have afield of a certain type. This is universal. There is no 'mechanism' proposed. There is nothing that isn't established scientifically. There is simply a universal correlation: particles and fields always appear together.
That is what can be tested and that is what the theories are based upon.

In the case of consciousness, because we're talking about a switch from the physical to something that seems to be not physical (it may still be physical but it nevertheless "feels" bizarre and funny), there is more demand for an explanation of how that switch works. In other words, there is concern that phenomenological consciousness may not be in line with strict physicalism/materialism.

And I'm saying that if we get to the point that we can read minds by looking at neural activity, where we can induce conscious states by stimulating neurons in the right way, and where we have a universal correlation between neural acitvities of certain types and conscious states, then we *have* the causal link. There is nothing more left to explain.

I suspect that the desire is for some sort of 'mechanism'. That, I believe, is a deep philosophical mistake. We cannot detect causality. What we can detect is correlation. And certain types of correlation we *call* causality. That is what it *means* to say X causes Y.

[Spongebob]

We have two hypotheses:

1. Ice cream trucks cause drownings.

2. Both ice cream trucks and drownings occur mostly in summer.

So what we need is an observation that will distinguish between these two hypotheses.

The most obvious one would be to rent a bunch of ice cream trucks in the winter and see if drownings increase then as well. Even better, do this at various different times of the year and in various locations. Then see if the correlation persists.

You are right, the correlation is primarily observational.  But when there is more than one active hypothesis (and there almost always is), the key is to find some setup where the two hypotheses give different predictions and see which one is wrong.

This is yet another reason why a single experiment is not enough to overthrow a theory. The experiment needs to be conducted in a variety of situations to explore when the observed correlation (or lack) is there.

I think the basic problem is the expectation that science will give a 'mechanism' for all 'causes'. And that is simply false. In fact, the whole idea of 'mechanism' assumes a metaphysics that is very likely to be wrong.

This was a very concise explanation, but I would like to expound on the last statement, the idea that explaining a mechanism assumes metaphysics.  I'm not sure how you mean that so I would like to hear more.  What I do know is that providing a mechanism for any theory does not necessarily validate the theory.  What it does do is provide a context from which we can evaluate how likely the theory is valid.  If a theory or hypothesis has a very weakly devised mechanism, then it's reasonable to discard that idea.

An example:  acupuncture therapy.  There are very detailed descriptions of the mechanism for how acupuncture works, so this should work to make the hypothesis sound.  But the mechanism relies heavily on the existence an energy called "chi" and the precise location of important energy pathways, sometimes called meridians.  The existence of both chi and meridians is theoretical itself and cannot be assumed to be valid, so assuming this in a mechanism which is assumed to explain how acupuncture works is not valid.  Also, no scientific experiments conducted to evaluate the flow of energy or release of endorphins due to the insertion of needles (using as many blinds as possible) have failed.  So the mechanism in this case is practically useless.  However, in the case of something like the mechanism of how the covid 19 virus works to invade cells has helped to develop vaccines and other medications that have been successful.  So in this case the mechanism wasn't crucial in validating theories but was helpful in developing treatments that work because the theories are accurate. I also like how most explanations of acupuncture state how the practice is based on "Traditional Chinese Medicine", which intentionally invokes thoughts of ancient and mysterious practices when in fact, TCM is not ancient at all, nor particularly mysterious.  Or something like that.