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Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 18, 2022 at 7:49 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote:  Like, I can imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn. How does it follow that because I can conceive of it, a unicorn that farts rainbows is logically possible? I don’t get it.

If I'm understanding right (always a big "if") something can be logically possible and still not at all something we ought to believe in.

Like, there's no LOGICAL contradiction in the idea of a one-horned horse-like creature whose anal glands spray a mist which, in the proper light, make rainbows.

So that's logically possible, but no sane person expects to get one for Christmas.

Something that's logically impossible is like a square triangle, or a married bachelor, or a thing that exists and doesn't exist simultaneously. Self-contradictory.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 18, 2022 at 3:28 pm)emjay Wrote: The main paradox for me, and what really boggles my mind, is if phenomenal consciousness is basically a mirror (or emergent property or whatever) of let's call it 'neural consciousness' (ie the neural correlates of consciousness)... if both are identical but viewed from different perspectives... just two sides of the same coin... (which is how I see it, and it looks like you do similarly as well)... then it's curious if we would treat them differently depending on if they had or did not have phenomenal consciousness. And intuitively I think we would treat them differently because (ie a non-PZ or PZ interacting with a hypothetically confirmed PZ (even though there'd be no way to confirm it, but just for argument's sake say it was confirmed somehow)) we feel empathy and sympathy for others based on not wanting them to feel pain, but feeling pain we intuitively see (or at least I see) as a purely phenomenal aspect of consciousness... ie sure there are distributed physical and neural correlates of that consciousness, and thus that pain... our brain state that is mirrored (for want of a better term) in/by consciousness, but nonetheless, I cannot intuitively look at those distributed processes in isolation, which is what the concept of a pZ is about, and feel the same sort of emotional response to it, in the sense of empathy/sympathy, as I would for imagining a phenomenally conscious state.

This reminds me of an opinion of Descartes that the torture of animals was OK since animals only 'appear' to be in pain, but are not *actually* in pain because they are not conscious. It also parallels the question of the middle ages about whether women have souls. Somehow, cries of agony and desperate attempts to avoid the torture are not enough to recognize something is in pain.

And this is another aspect of the zombie question: a zombie that is crying out in pain *is* in pain. A zombie that obviously 'appears' deeply moved by a piece of music or poetry *is* deeply moved by the music or poetry. A zombie that appears to be overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset *is* overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset.

And this is one reason why zombies are simply incoherent. Whatever they have, we *should* identify as being conscious.

(January 18, 2022 at 8:28 pm)Belacqua Wrote:
(January 18, 2022 at 7:49 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote:  Like, I can imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn. How does it follow that because I can conceive of it, a unicorn that farts rainbows is logically possible? I don’t get it.

If I'm understanding right (always a big "if") something can be logically possible and still not at all something we ought to believe in.

Like, there's no LOGICAL contradiction in the idea of a one-horned horse-like creature whose anal glands spray a mist which, in the proper light, make rainbows.

So that's logically possible, but no sane person expects to get one for Christmas.

Something that's logically impossible is like a square triangle, or a married bachelor, or a thing that exists and doesn't exist simultaneously. Self-contradictory.

The way I like to say it is that logical consistency is a very weak filter on ideas. it is, in no way, sufficient to saying the idea is true.

I'd also be careful of the 'thing that both exists and does not exist simultaneously'. That assumes that 'existence' is a property that a thing either has or not. And, if that were the case, I would *expect* a quantum superposition of the two states to be possible, allowing for both existence and non-existence with a 50% probability in a single state. We have, for example, superpositions where an item can be in two different places simultaneously (look up quantum bomb detector).

(January 18, 2022 at 7:49 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: @emjay it wasn’t anything in response to your personal take on PZ’s; I just always hear the argument prefaced with that assumption and I’m not quite sure I entirely follow it, that’s all. 🙂 Like, I can imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn. How does it follow that because I can conceive of it, a unicorn that farts rainbows is logically possible? I don’t get it.

And this goes to the issue of what it means to 'imagine' something. Can you *really* imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn *in detail*, complete with all biological systems, the physics involved, etc?

In the same way, can we *really* imagine a philosophical zombie in detail? I'm not sure we can. The level of complexity to make something like that work *and* being able to distinguish it from an ordinary conscious person seems to be well beyond my ability to imagine.

But then, I can work with 11 dimensional spheres and not have an actual image of them.

Being able to imagine is a very poor filter for ideas. 

And simply because we *think* we can imagine something, does mean we can make metaphysical conclusions about it. THAT is something I think is a HUGE mistake that Chalmers made when discussing zombies.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 18, 2022 at 3:12 pm)polymath257 Wrote:
(January 18, 2022 at 2:41 pm)GrandizerII Wrote: So before I respond to this, I need to correct myself on one thing I said earlier: that zombies need not be metaphysically possible. This is not correct.

The zombie argument is as follows:

Zombies are logically possible (conceivable), therefore they are metaphysically possible, and therefore strict physicalism is false (consciousness is something on top of the physical).

And I don't think they are conceivable. I certainly cannot conceive of something that is physically identical to a conscious being that is not itself conscious. That seems nonsensical to me.

I can. For me, it's not that hard. In the same way I can conceive of centaurs and cyclopes. It's not logically contradictory.

Metaphysically possible, on the other hand, I don't know. My position on consciousness doesn't rest on the zombie argument anyway. But I don't think the idea of zombie is incoherent.

Quote:But that connection depends on our knowledge of that link. Previous to that, and even after molecules were known, it was certainly 'logically possible' that temperature was not the average kinetic energy of the molecules.

Temperature is the average kinetic energy of the molecule. They're not two distinct things here. You observe the motion of molecules and you attribute the descriptive label of "high temperature" or "low temperature" to the observation.

Of course, I'm assuming by temperature, you're not including one's experience of it and thereby conflating things.

Quote:I think it holds. We do not know the specifics of how neural activities correlate to conscious states. Until we do, saying what is and what is not possible is going to be fraught with dangers.

No, it doesn't hold. Even if you want to refer to neural activity as "consciousness", there's still that "perceptibly separate quality" on top of that.

Quote:And if we can 'explain' how conscious states work by pointing to their correlates in neural activity?

That would not be enough. If that's how one explains how computer programs exist, then they're not giving the full explanation. But we know theoretically how a computer program arises by explaining it in terms of a series of 0s and 1s. It is basically 0s and 1s.

I hope you're not conflating a computer program with our interactive experience of it, by the way.

Quote:I'm not sure what you mean here. If I detect something visual, it is 'vivid flashy'. Since I don't detect 'in the dark', if it is detected, it is not 'in the dark'. If I detect something auditory it is 'vivid soundy'.

An advanced computer arguably can detect things, but it does so "in the dark". So I wanted to be sure that's what you considering when you say "sensory detection".

But to your question earlier, whether there's a difference between a quale and sensory detection. I would say they're different. That the latter is one type of the former.

Quote:
Quote:If you're having [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences, you're not a zombie.

And how can I determine that?

Via awareness of having such experiences.

Quote:And yet, for some reason, they *report* having such, just like their physically identical conscious counterparts do.

Yeah, they may report but it doesn't mean they have it.

Quote:Now, why would they report this if it is not the case?

I don't know, because they're conditioned to do so? Or some other reason?

Anyway, I don't think the thought experiment necessitates that a zombie report having experiences without any reason whatsoever.

Quote:And doesn't that show that zombies are an incoherent concept?

Not really. It may be counterintuitive, but it's not an incoherent concept.

Quote:How can I determine if I actually have 'phenomenological experiences'?

By being aware you're having the experiences.

Quote:What is the difference between 'seeing stuff' and 'vividly seeing stuff'? Is the alternative to 'dimly see stuff'?

It's probably the same thing, depending on how you're defining "seeing". But if you consider a car with sensors to have the capacity to "see", then there is a difference and the difference is relevant.

The alternative is "not seeing" or "seeing in the dark" depending on how you're looking at "seeing".
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 11:39 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: [Image: q54sO25.png]

Science can handle the possibility that correlations are false. If the correlation between drownings and phenomenon x becomes apparent, the next step is to formulate a new hypothesis that can be falsified and continue testing.

For example: more people swim in the summer. Also more ice cream trucks rolling around in the summer. Let's see if "it being summer" (or something else) doesn't better explain the supposed correlation.

If poly is taking up the mantle of Humean skepticism, then I think your criticisms are apt. But I don't think these criticisms are good criticisms of science in general. If only one experiment could be done ever, then yes... a false correlation is devastating to gnosis. But science can take hundreds of cracks at a problem. So one bad result doesn't seem like an issue to me.

What in the world is this?
I am impressed.
You actually collected the data from 1999 to 2009?
Or is there some kind of gigantic database of all the facts that ever existed and you can have it generate a graph like that?
Did you fake this graph?

Nicolas Cage, in 2009, appeared in Astro boy, G-Force, Bad Lieutenant: Port of Call New Orleans, Knowing. That's 4.
Nicolas Cage, in 2005, appeared in The Weather Man, The Lord of warz. That's 2.
Nicolas Cage, in 2003, appeared in Matchstick Men, That's 1.
So, those data points in your graph are correct.

Man, you should have typed in Ice Cream Trucks. Did you type in Nicolas Cage by accident?
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 18, 2022 at 8:33 pm)polymath257 Wrote:
(January 18, 2022 at 3:28 pm)emjay Wrote: The main paradox for me, and what really boggles my mind, is if phenomenal consciousness is basically a mirror (or emergent property or whatever) of let's call it 'neural consciousness' (ie the neural correlates of consciousness)... if both are identical but viewed from different perspectives... just two sides of the same coin... (which is how I see it, and it looks like you do similarly as well)... then it's curious if we would treat them differently depending on if they had or did not have phenomenal consciousness. And intuitively I think we would treat them differently because (ie a non-PZ or PZ interacting with a hypothetically confirmed PZ (even though there'd be no way to confirm it, but just for argument's sake say it was confirmed somehow)) we feel empathy and sympathy for others based on not wanting them to feel pain, but feeling pain we intuitively see (or at least I see) as a purely phenomenal aspect of consciousness... ie sure there are distributed physical and neural correlates of that consciousness, and thus that pain... our brain state that is mirrored (for want of a better term) in/by consciousness, but nonetheless, I cannot intuitively look at those distributed processes in isolation, which is what the concept of a pZ is about, and feel the same sort of emotional response to it, in the sense of empathy/sympathy, as I would for imagining a phenomenally conscious state.

This reminds me of an opinion of Descartes that the torture of animals was OK since animals only 'appear' to be in pain, but are not *actually* in pain because they are not conscious. It also parallels the question of the middle ages about whether women have souls. Somehow, cries of agony and desperate attempts to avoid the torture are not enough to recognize something is in pain.

I see what you're saying... but at the same time, these extreme examples you're giving, notwithstanding their brutality, seem self-refuting and contradictory on the merits of their own supposed logic... in the sense that if the goal/purpose of inflicting torture/punishment is to cause suffering, then if you truly do not believe that the recipient of those actions has consciousness, and thus the ability to suffer, then the act is pointless for that goal... it would be the equivalent of trying to punish a rock for instance. Realistically I think the most you could logically infer from this sort of thinking is that you should be indifferent to that which you do not believe has consciousness, not that you should go out of your way to cause it harm, just as you are indifferent towards the fate of a rock on account of believing it not to have consciousness, rather than trying to hurt it.

Quote:And this is another aspect of the zombie question: a zombie that is crying out in pain *is* in pain. A zombie that obviously 'appears' deeply moved by a piece of music or poetry *is* deeply moved by the music or poetry. A zombie that appears to be overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset *is* overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset.

And this is one reason why zombies are simply incoherent. Whatever they have, we *should* identify as being conscious.

The way I look at it is this; *anything* in consciousness that we can *notice*... beit the content of our senses or meta-content so to speak (ie an example of the latter would be the visual field itself, and the former - content - what we see in the visual field)... *must* in my view have a neurally accessible representation because we are able to name it or mentally refer to it (ie you don't need to explicitly name something, though you can, in order to mentally refer to it as something like an instance in memory... 'ie that [unnamed] experience I had the other day which nonetheless I can explicitly refer to in my memory'), which I believe would require neurally associating either the language representation of a name/label or similar for an instance of memory. Roughly I would liken this view to that of a very complicated switchboard, but the main thing is that there is nothing about this concept that to me implies the necessity for phenomenal consciousness; I think all of this could tick along perfectly fine without it... this constant flux of activation and association, and so to me, the question is why it does not. So where you don't seem to be able to conceptualise the beauty of a sunset as apart from phenomenal consciousness, I disagree, and think that if you can notice it, or anything else, in consciousness, and associate things with it, it must have a neurally accessible representation... and if it has that, then it is subject to physics and determinism, thus making phenomenal consciousness seem, as I said, superfluous and unnecessary.

Granted this is just a theory, and it's been a long time since I've been seriously interested in neuroscience, but the logic still seems perfectly reasonable to me. But all I'm trying to show is where I'm coming from, but like I said, I do accept that this view follows from my own particular perspectives on all this and could well be flawed... and that others, such as yourself, with other perspectives can see it vastly differently. As I said, I'm open to seeing it another way, if convinced, but these are my reasons for seeing it as I currently do.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 18, 2022 at 9:30 pm)GrandizerII Wrote:
(January 18, 2022 at 3:12 pm)polymath257 Wrote: And I don't think they are conceivable. I certainly cannot conceive of something that is physically identical to a conscious being that is not itself conscious. That seems nonsensical to me.

I can. For me, it's not that hard. In the same way I can conceive of centaurs and cyclopes. It's not logically contradictory.

Metaphysically possible, on the other hand, I don't know. My position on consciousness doesn't rest on the zombie argument anyway. But I don't think the idea of zombie is incoherent.

I guess I cannot see how such would be possible.

Quote:
Quote:But that connection depends on our knowledge of that link. Previous to that, and even after molecules were known, it was certainly 'logically possible' that temperature was not the average kinetic energy of the molecules.

Temperature is the average kinetic energy of the molecule. They're not two distinct things here. You observe the motion of molecules and you attribute the descriptive label of "high temperature" or "low temperature" to the observation.

We know *now* that they are not two distinct things. But that is the result of the development of statistical mechanics. Are they *logically* required to be the same thing? Not at all.
If the laws of physics were different,t hey would not be the same.
Quote:Of course, I'm assuming by temperature, you're not including one's experience of it and thereby conflating things.

No, the experience of temperature is quite different than the temperature. It has to deal with how *we* process information our senses collect about temperature.
[/quote]
Quote:I think it holds. We do not know the specifics of how neural activities correlate to conscious states. Until we do, saying what is and what is not possible is going to be fraught with dangers.

No, it doesn't hold. Even if you want to refer to neural activity as "consciousness", there's still that "perceptibly separate quality" on top of that.
[/quote]

Just like temperature is a quality 'on top of movement of molecules'?
Quote:
Quote:And if we can 'explain' how conscious states work by pointing to their correlates in neural activity?

That would not be enough. If that's how one explains how computer programs exist, then they're not giving the full explanation. But we know theoretically how a computer program arises by explaining it in terms of a series of 0s and 1s. It is basically 0s and 1s.

Actually, it would be better to explain it in terms of semi-conductors and the actual physical properties. The 0/1 description isn't how it *actually* happens: it happens by our *coding* of 0 and 1 in terms of some physical phenomenon, like different voltage levels.

But, again, they are *the same thing* in a certain sense.

Quote:I hope you're not conflating a computer program with our interactive experience of it, by the way.

Well, the interactive part is certainly crucial. We collect sensory data, process it, using our memories and expectations, and that is what ends up in a conscious experience.

Quote:
Quote:I'm not sure what you mean here. If I detect something visual, it is 'vivid flashy'. Since I don't detect 'in the dark', if it is detected, it is not 'in the dark'. If I detect something auditory it is 'vivid soundy'.

An advanced computer arguably can detect things, but it does so "in the dark". So I wanted to be sure that's what you considering when you say "sensory detection".

1. If it detects, it isn't 'in the dark' since (visual) detection cannot happen without light.

2. Which means you are making a metaphor. But a metaphor of what, precisely? Since humans are very visual creatures, the metaphor is visual (light) as opposed to auditory
or olfactory. But what is it a metaphor about?

3. Don't forget that Chalmers proposed that thermostats might have a degree of consciousness. So how do you know the advanced computer isn't conscious to some degree?

4. Most likely, the 'conscious experience' is partly due to the complexity of processing of the information, the linkage to memories, the linkage to emotions, and the sharing with other processing pieces of the mind. So the computer is still way to simple to have what we would call consciousness.

Quote:But to your question earlier, whether there's a difference between a quale and sensory detection. I would say they're different. That the latter is one type of the former.

OK, so what is the difference? Give an example showing the difference.

Quote:
Quote:And how can I determine that?

Via awareness of having such experiences.

Awareness: I have the information that I have perceived it. OK, how is that different than simply having the perception and remembering it?.

Quote:
Quote:And yet, for some reason, they *report* having such, just like their physically identical conscious counterparts do.

Yeah, they may report but it doesn't mean they have it.

But here's the question: WHY would they report it if they don't have it? The only reason I can see for them reporting it is if they actually have a perceptio, remember it, and can report it. How is that different than being conscious?

Quote:
Quote:Now, why would they report this if it is not the case?

I don't know, because they're conditioned to do so? Or some other reason?

The most obvious reason is that they actually have the experience. You are assuming that *we* are not similarly 'conditioned'. The conditioning isn't exclusive of being conscious.

Again, this isn't reflex: it involves complex brain processing of the information, the formation of memories, the processing of emotions, the use of the frontal cortex for planning, etc.

In every way, they are physically identical to a conscious person. That, to me, means that are clearly conscious.
Quote:Anyway, I don't think the thought experiment necessitates that a zombie report having experiences without any reason whatsoever.

And the only possible reason is that they actually have the experience and are thereby conscious.
Quote:
Quote:And doesn't that show that zombies are an incoherent concept?

Not really. It may be counterintuitive, but it's not an incoherent concept.

OK, I disagree with that. The only reason for something to have the complex interaction with their environment that demonstrates consciousness in ordinary people is that they *be* conscious.

Quote:
Quote:How can I determine if I actually have 'phenomenological experiences'?

By being aware you're having the experiences.

So, having the information that I have sensed something and having that information readily available?
Quote:
Quote:What is the difference between 'seeing stuff' and 'vividly seeing stuff'? Is the alternative to 'dimly see stuff'?

It's probably the same thing, depending on how you're defining "seeing". But if you consider a car with sensors to have the capacity to "see", then there is a difference and the difference is relevant.

The car's sensors do not have nearly the complexity of processing that our brains do. But we can and do say that the sensors 'picked up' some object and that the computer running the sensor is then 'aware' of it. We can and do talk about a robot 'being aware' of something in its environment when it starts to interact in ways that *we* see as showing awareness.

That may not be simple laziness in our use of language: maybe that car and robot *are* aware in a certain way.

Quote:The alternative is "not seeing" or "seeing in the dark" depending on how you're looking at "seeing".

It seems to me that the difference is one of degree of processing of the information, not something greatly different.

(January 19, 2022 at 1:38 am)emjay Wrote:
(January 18, 2022 at 8:33 pm)polymath257 Wrote: This reminds me of an opinion of Descartes that the torture of animals was OK since animals only 'appear' to be in pain, but are not *actually* in pain because they are not conscious. It also parallels the question of the middle ages about whether women have souls. Somehow, cries of agony and desperate attempts to avoid the torture are not enough to recognize something is in pain.

I see what you're saying... but at the same time, these extreme examples you're giving, notwithstanding their brutality, seem self-refuting and contradictory on the merits of their own supposed logic... in the sense that if the goal/purpose of inflicting torture/punishment is to cause suffering, then if you truly do not believe that the recipient of those actions has consciousness, and thus the ability to suffer, then the act is pointless for that goal... it would be the equivalent of trying to punish a rock for instance. Realistically I think the most you could logically infer from this sort of thinking is that you should be indifferent to that which you do not believe has consciousness, not that you should go out of your way to cause it harm, just as you are indifferent towards the fate of a rock on account of believing it not to have consciousness, rather than trying to hurt it.

Well, an example that isn't motivated by causing suffering is giving an anesthetic to an animal during surgery. Suppose a limb need to be removed. Descartes would say that it is acceptable to hack through it because the animal feels no real pain. I would say that an anesthetic would be required unless there is a good medical reason otherwise. Not all pain is inflicted with the intent to cause suffering.
Quote:
Quote:And this is another aspect of the zombie question: a zombie that is crying out in pain *is* in pain. A zombie that obviously 'appears' deeply moved by a piece of music or poetry *is* deeply moved by the music or poetry. A zombie that appears to be overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset *is* overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset.

And this is one reason why zombies are simply incoherent. Whatever they have, we *should* identify as being conscious.

The way I look at it is this; *anything* in consciousness that we can *notice*... beit the content of our senses or meta-content so to speak (ie an example of the latter would be the visual field itself, and the former - content - what we see in the visual field)... *must* in my view have a neurally accessible representation because we are able to name it or mentally refer to it (ie you don't need to explicitly name something, though you can, in order to mentally refer to it as something like an instance in memory... 'ie that [unnamed] experience I had the other day which nonetheless I can explicitly refer to in my memory'), which I believe would require neurally associating either the language representation of a name/label or similar for an instance of memory. Roughly I would liken this view to that of a very complicated switchboard, but the main thing is that there is nothing about this concept that to me implies the necessity for phenomenal consciousness; I think all of this could tick along perfectly fine without it... this constant flux of activation and association, and so to me, the question is why it does not. So where you don't seem to be able to conceptualise the beauty of a sunset as apart from phenomenal consciousness, I disagree, and think that if you can notice it, or anything else, in consciousness, and associate things with it, it must have a neurally accessible representation... and if it has that, then it is subject to physics and determinism, thus making phenomenal consciousness seem, as I said, superfluous and unnecessary.

Granted this is just a theory, and it's been a long time since I've been seriously interested in neuroscience, but the logic still seems perfectly reasonable to me. But all I'm trying to show is where I'm coming from, but like I said, I do accept that this view follows from my own particular perspectives on all this and could well be flawed... and that others, such as yourself, with other perspectives can see it vastly differently. As I said, I'm open to seeing it another way, if convinced, but these are my reasons for seeing it as I currently do.

I do think that one crucial aspect for consciousness is interaction with a changing environment *and* maintaining a record of internal states in memory. So a simple switchboard would not have the memory aspect.

And I also think we need to get a better vocabulary. If I out a noxious chemical in with a bacterium, it will react and move away. That *is* a type of awareness. But I suspect it is quite different than what humans have simply because of the differences in complexity of the information processing. Plants *do* respond to changes in their environment, even releasing chemicals 'informing' other plants of dangers, leading them to react in ways that are protective. That is *also* a type of awareness, but it seems to be significantly different than the other two types.

There is a sense in which *everything* that is alive maintains information about its internal state and its environment in order to maintain homeostasis. That is a type of awareness.

In a different direction, even someone who is asleep (unconscious?) is processing information from the environment and can wake up if something unusual happens.  That is also a certain type of awareness. There other other states like 'conscious sedation' that also seem relevant.

We need a fuller vocabulary to discuss the similarities and differences between all of these different types of awareness. This lack of vocabulary and precision makes the discussion of consciousness very difficult because we cannot point to examples distinguishing the process we want to talk about.

I think this *is* a problem in the study of consciousness, but again, it is a 'soft' problem, not a hard problem.

I see the problem of consciousness as a question about information processing and that alone: how and why do we become 'aware' (have information) of something?
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 19, 2022 at 10:21 am)polymath257 Wrote: I guess I cannot see how such would be possible.

Logically possible means it's not logically contradictory, that's all. Is a zombie a square-circle? Is a rainbow-farting unicorn a square-circle?

Forget the actual laws of physics or biology. Those are relevant for when you're pondering physical possibility, not logical possibility.

But again, it doesn't really matter to me whether zombies are physically possible or not. I was curious as to why you think they're incoherent as a concept, but it seems you're referring to physical impossibility here rather than logical impossibility.

Now as for the thought experiment itself, even though my position on consciousness does not rely on it, let me see if I can give it a proper go.

For the thought experiment, maybe avoid mentally putting yourself in the zombie's shoes and stay where you are. As far as you're concerned, you cannot distinguish between a zombie and a conscious being. Even if we granted zombies extra differentiating properties (besides lack of qualia), as long as you cannot determine if they are zombies or not, then the thought experiment still stands. As far as you're concerned, they behave just like conscious beings. It may be they have to be intentionally giving false statements when they report having experiences. Or they only report having experiences because they see you do the same and think it must be the case for them as well, even though they lack the knowledge of what it is like to have experiences. Even so, you will not be able to make the differentiation.

Now contrast with you, who has experiences. These zombies behave exactly like you; they can react to a bad smell with a wrinkling of the nose, reflexively move their hand away from a hot stove upon touching it, physically express sexual arousal when they are in close contact with someone sexually attractive. Their nervous systems even operate the same way yours do. The key difference is they don't ever have the phenomenal experiences accompanying these behaviors and reactions.

Now the question you want to ask yourself is: are these zombies metaphysically possible? Could this actual reality (given its laws of nature) grant room for these zombies somewhere?

If the answer is yes, then this is a threat to strict physicalism or strict materialism.

If the answer is no, then you don't need to concern yourself with this argument.

***

I fail to see how you can have temperature on top of the motion of molecules unless temperature per se is being conflated with temperature as experienced by us. But if so, that would defeat the point of such an analogy, since you would just be illustrating an instance of the hard problem rather than trying to explain it away.

Stripped off from our experiences, temperature is just a label applied to the motion of molecules. In this sense, there is nothing to be "felt by us", so there is "no extra layer of temperature on top". It's only when you add us into the picture that we hen have something extra about temperature.

With regards to computer programs, similar thing. Stripped off from our experiences (though it's hard to visualize, admittedly), a computer program is the series of 0s and 1s (when converted to binary code).

To get the computer program executed, you need the hardware, circuitry, switches, voltages, and so on, to process the 0s and 1s per that program. And you get the intended output as a result, such as words on the screen. Everything is adequately explained in terms of the hardware and circuitry and such. Particles that are arranged a certain way manifest as printed words on the screen. But the "on top of the particles" part of such an output comes from our experiences of the program. We point our heads towards the screen with open eyes and vividly see these words. Once again, I remind you this is the hard problem; how is it we can not only make use of a program, but we can vividly experience it?

***

Chalmers has flirted with panpsychism (at least in the past) which is probably why he said that thermostats have a degree of consciousness. But put aside panpsychism for now. Does a thermostat vividly experience things? Probably not. Based on its programming, it detects change in surrounding temperature and then performs a series of actions that adjusts the temperature and keeps it within the desired range ... or however it works. But it doesn't feel anything, right? It just does what it's programmed to do.

Now we also detect things, but we also have experiences when we detect things. We feel the heat, not just detect it. We hear sounds, not just detect motion of molecules in air. We see objects, not just detect light waves. Thermostats detect stuff, but without these vivid experiences. They detect things "in the dark". That's all I mean by "in the dark".

***

I'm not sure what else to say. I know I've left a few questions unanswered, but maybe I'll attempt those next time.

I like the view expressed by emjay, though. Epiphenomenalism is a view I briefly held in the past. It sounds quite reasonable, but there's a bit of iffiness about consciousness not having any effect whatever on the physical. When I'm talking about my own consciousness for example, that seems to refute epiphenomenalism (at least in the strict sense).
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 19, 2022 at 12:52 pm)GrandizerII Wrote:
(January 19, 2022 at 10:21 am)polymath257 Wrote: I guess I cannot see how such would be possible.

Logically possible means it's not logically contradictory, that's all. Is a zombie a square-circle? Is a rainbow-farting unicorn a square-circle?

Forget the actual laws of physics or biology. Those are relevant for when you're pondering physical possibility, not logical possibility.

But again, it doesn't really matter to me whether zombies are physically possible or not. I was curious as to why you think they're incoherent as a concept, but it seems you're referring to physical impossibility here rather than logical impossibility.

Now as for the thought experiment itself, even though my position on consciousness does not rely on it, let me see if I can give it a proper go.

For the thought experiment, maybe avoid mentally putting yourself in the zombie's shoes and stay where you are. As far as you're concerned, you cannot distinguish between a zombie and a conscious being. Even if we granted zombies extra differentiating properties (besides lack of qualia), as long as you cannot determine if they are zombies or not, then the thought experiment still stands. As far as you're concerned, they behave just like conscious beings. It may be they have to be intentionally giving false statements when they report having experiences. Or they only report having experiences because they see you do the same and think it must be the case for them as well, even though they lack the knowledge of what it is like to have experiences. Even so, you will not be able to make the differentiation.

Now contrast with you, who has experiences. These zombies behave exactly like you; they can react to a bad smell with a wrinkling of the nose, reflexively move their hand away from a hot stove upon touching it, physically express sexual arousal when they are in close contact with someone sexually attractive. Their nervous systems even operate the same way yours do. The key difference is they don't ever have the phenomenal experiences accompanying these behaviors and reactions.

Now the question you want to ask yourself is: are these zombies metaphysically possible? Could this actual reality (given its laws of nature) grant room for these zombies somewhere?

If the answer is yes, then this is a threat to strict physicalism or strict materialism.

If the answer is no, then you don't need to concern yourself with this argument.

And if they respond *exactly* in the same way as conscious beings, then I see no reason to say that they are not conscious. The neural activities perform the role of information acquisition and processing that *is* consciousness. So, no, I don't think that they *can possible be without* whatever 'phenomenal consciousness' is supposed to be.

***
Quote:I fail to see how you can have temperature on top of the motion of molecules unless temperature per se is being conflated with temperature as experienced by us. But if so, that would defeat the point of such an analogy, since you would just be illustrating an instance of the hard problem rather than trying to explain it away.

Think of it like this. Before the rise of statistical mechanics, was it logically possible that temperature was NOT the average kinetic energy of molecules?

And the answer has to be 'of course it was logically possible at that time'. it was only after the development of statistical mechanics and the resulting *explanation* of temeprature that the identity was accepted (after appropriate testing, of course).

Quote:Stripped off from our experiences, temperature is just a label applied to the motion of molecules. In this sense, there is nothing to be "felt by us", so there is "no extra layer of temperature on top". It's only when you add us into the picture that we hen have something extra about temperature.

Not true. We can measure temperature via the expansion of liquids and solids. There is no *logical* reason that must be the result of molecular motion. In fact, it doens't even *logically* require the existence of molecules at all.

Quote:With regards to computer programs, similar thing. Stripped off from our experiences (though it's hard to visualize, admittedly), a computer program is the series of 0s and 1s (when converted to binary code).

Not true. And easy way to see this is that the same program can operate on different processors with different machine codes. The sequences of 0 and 1's would then be quite different even though it is the same program.

Quote:To get the computer program executed, you need the hardware, circuitry, switches, voltages, and so on, to process the 0s and 1s per that program. And you get the intended output as a result, such as words on the screen. Everything is adequately explained in terms of the hardware and circuitry and such. Particles that are arranged a certain way manifest as printed words on the screen. But the "on top of the particles" part of such an output comes from our experiences of the program. We point our heads towards the screen with open eyes and vividly see these words.
No person actually needs to interact with the program, though. It can still 'monitor' incoming data, respond to it in a variety of ways, and adjust the computers internal state to remember that.

Quote:Once again, I remind you this is the hard problem; how is it we can not only make use of a program, but we can vividly experience it?

You like the word 'vivid' in this regard. But what does it actually mean? Why would a zombie, that is admittedly able to detect and react to sensory data not have a 'vivid' sensation?

Quote:Chalmers has flirted with panpsychism (at least in the past) which is probably why he said that thermostats have a degree of consciousness. But put aside panpsychism for now. Does a thermostat vividly experience things? Probably not. Based on its programming, it detects change in surrounding temperature and then performs a series of actions that adjusts the temperature and keeps it within the desired range ... or however it works. But it doesn't feel anything, right? It just does what it's programmed to do.

And perhaps we just do what our brains and physics dictates that we do. So? Does that mean we are not conscious?

Does the thermostat have a feedback loop where it actually members its actions?

What does it mean to 'feel something' in the context you require. how can I determine if I am 'feeling something' in the sense you are using it?

Quote:Now we also detect things, but we also have experiences when we detect things. We feel the heat, not just detect it. We hear sounds, not just detect motion of molecules in air. We see objects, not just detect light waves. Thermostats detect stuff, but without these vivid experiences. They detect things "in the dark". That's all I mean by "in the dark".

What is the difference between detecting the heat and feeling the heat? What is the difference between detecting the light from something and seeing it?

And, again, that word 'vivid'. Can you give more detail about what that exactly means? How do I know if my sensations are 'vivid' in the sense you mean?

Quote:I'm not sure what else to say. I know I've left a few questions unanswered, but maybe I'll attempt those next time.

I like the view expressed by emjay, though. Epiphenomenalism is a view I briefly held in the past. It sounds quite reasonable, but there's a bit of iffiness about consciousness not having any effect whatever on the physical. When I'm talking about my own consciousness for example, that seems to refute epiphenomenalism (at least in the strict sense).

I think maybe the key in your exposition is that word 'vivid', but how does that differ from simply being reactive to the stimulus? Being sensitized to the possible reception of that stimulus?
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 18, 2022 at 8:28 pm)Belacqua Wrote:
(January 18, 2022 at 7:49 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote:  Like, I can imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn. How does it follow that because I can conceive of it, a unicorn that farts rainbows is logically possible? I don’t get it.

If I'm understanding right (always a big "if") something can be logically possible and still not at all something we ought to believe in.

Like, there's no LOGICAL contradiction in the idea of a one-horned horse-like creature whose anal glands spray a mist which, in the proper light, make rainbows.

So that's logically possible, but no sane person expects to get one for Christmas.

Something that's logically impossible is like a square triangle, or a married bachelor, or a thing that exists and doesn't exist simultaneously. Self-contradictory.

I thought that rainbow farting meant that some hole opens from the body of the animal and a rainbow comes out of the hole. Perhaps it is a CD that comes out of the hole and the CD surface acts as a diffraction grating.

You are talking about a mist but mist forming is difficult. I think the droplet size would have to be less than 0.1 mm in diameter.
Skunks spray large drops and so, the drops quickly fall to the ground. We don’t ever see a rainbow with these.

There is sea creature that somehow creates a sudden shockwave. I think it sort of like a crab. The force of the shockwave is like a bullet existing the barrel of a gun. Anyway, no mist here.

There is a type of beetle that mixes H2O2 and another chemical and it creates a large explosion of hot steam. Maybe this one creates a mist.


Quote:Something that's logically impossible is like a square triangle, or a married bachelor, or a thing that exists and doesn't exist simultaneously. Self-contradictory.

Those examples are fine but they are about word definitions and words are not real. Nature operates without words.

Better examples that tie into our universe would be
“It is logically impossible to find a star or a planet that has a cubic shape.”
“It is logically impossible to find a soap bubble that is cubic in shape, unless there are nearby bubbles creating a restriction.”
“It is impossible to find a Home-Depot hammer made by nature.”
“It is impossible to find a screw made by nature.”
“It is impossible to find a gear with 50 teeth made by nature.”
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 19, 2022 at 10:21 am)polymath257 Wrote:
(January 19, 2022 at 1:38 am)emjay Wrote: I see what you're saying... but at the same time, these extreme examples you're giving, notwithstanding their brutality, seem self-refuting and contradictory on the merits of their own supposed logic... in the sense that if the goal/purpose of inflicting torture/punishment is to cause suffering, then if you truly do not believe that the recipient of those actions has consciousness, and thus the ability to suffer, then the act is pointless for that goal... it would be the equivalent of trying to punish a rock for instance. Realistically I think the most you could logically infer from this sort of thinking is that you should be indifferent to that which you do not believe has consciousness, not that you should go out of your way to cause it harm, just as you are indifferent towards the fate of a rock on account of believing it not to have consciousness, rather than trying to hurt it.

Well, an example that isn't motivated by causing suffering is giving an anesthetic to an animal during surgery. Suppose a limb need to be removed. Descartes would say that it is acceptable to hack through it because the animal feels no real pain. I would say that an anesthetic would be required unless there is a good medical reason otherwise. Not all pain is inflicted with the intent to cause suffering.

Fair point. And it's not the only example of potentially faulty assumptions about the presence/absence of phenomenal consciousness... I read recently about medical cases where due to brain structure, certain people were believed not to be conscious, but then exhibited signs of consciousness... showing up only that our knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness is not complete, and therefore to make medical assumptions based on it is dangerous. So I agree these sorts of assumptions, about the presence or absence of conscious experience, can have serious real world implications, and is again why I would say the only ethical thing to do... on the principle of trying to prevent even the risk of causing harm... is in the presence of any such doubt about that, to err on the side of assuming the presence of phenomenal consciousness. Granted the structural issue is a different one from these dualistic/PZ issues, but there is crossover in the sense of making assumptions about the presence or absence of consciousness, in such a way that can have serious real-world effects.

Quote:
Quote:The way I look at it is this; *anything* in consciousness that we can *notice*... beit the content of our senses or meta-content so to speak (ie an example of the latter would be the visual field itself, and the former - content - what we see in the visual field)... *must* in my view have a neurally accessible representation because we are able to name it or mentally refer to it (ie you don't need to explicitly name something, though you can, in order to mentally refer to it as something like an instance in memory... 'ie that [unnamed] experience I had the other day which nonetheless I can explicitly refer to in my memory'), which I believe would require neurally associating either the language representation of a name/label or similar for an instance of memory. Roughly I would liken this view to that of a very complicated switchboard, but the main thing is that there is nothing about this concept that to me implies the necessity for phenomenal consciousness; I think all of this could tick along perfectly fine without it... this constant flux of activation and association, and so to me, the question is why it does not. So where you don't seem to be able to conceptualise the beauty of a sunset as apart from phenomenal consciousness, I disagree, and think that if you can notice it, or anything else, in consciousness, and associate things with it, it must have a neurally accessible representation... and if it has that, then it is subject to physics and determinism, thus making phenomenal consciousness seem, as I said, superfluous and unnecessary.

Granted this is just a theory, and it's been a long time since I've been seriously interested in neuroscience, but the logic still seems perfectly reasonable to me. But all I'm trying to show is where I'm coming from, but like I said, I do accept that this view follows from my own particular perspectives on all this and could well be flawed... and that others, such as yourself, with other perspectives can see it vastly differently. As I said, I'm open to seeing it another way, if convinced, but these are my reasons for seeing it as I currently do.

I do think that one crucial aspect for consciousness is interaction with a changing environment *and* maintaining a record of internal states in memory. So a simple switchboard would not have the memory aspect.

As I said, that was just meant as a rough analogy of what I meant. A computer with discrete memory locations is not really a good analogy for the brain nor is a switchboard since neurons are basically just nodes in an ever-dynamic network, each essentially 'learning' and recalling in the same process... and it was that dynamic connectivity and learning that I was trying to emphasise with the example of a switchboard... a flux of ever changing neural dynamics of activation and connectivity/association, where that dynamic change in connectivity/association, is learning.

Quote:And I also think we need to get a better vocabulary. If I out a noxious chemical in with a bacterium, it will react and move away. That *is* a type of awareness. But I suspect it is quite different than what humans have simply because of the differences in complexity of the information processing. Plants *do* respond to changes in their environment, even releasing chemicals 'informing' other plants of dangers, leading them to react in ways that are protective. That is *also* a type of awareness, but it seems to be significantly different than the other two types.

There is a sense in which *everything* that is alive maintains information about its internal state and its environment in order to maintain homeostasis. That is a type of awareness.

In a different direction, even someone who is asleep (unconscious?) is processing information from the environment and can wake up if something unusual happens.  That is also a certain type of awareness. There other other states like 'conscious sedation' that also seem relevant.

We need a fuller vocabulary to discuss the similarities and differences between all of these different types of awareness. This lack of vocabulary and precision makes the discussion of consciousness very difficult because we cannot point to examples distinguishing the process we want to talk about.

I think this *is* a problem in the study of consciousness, but again, it is a 'soft' problem, not a hard problem.

I see the problem of consciousness as a question about information processing and that alone: how and why do we become 'aware' (have information) of something?

I think in practical terms we probably have very similar goals and outlooks on this question... ie we're both interested in what I called 'neural consciousness' (as opposed to phenomenal consciousness)... ie the neural correlates of consciousness... from the point of view of information processing etc. Likewise, I think we're both more interested in the 'soft problems' of consciousness than the 'hard problem'... like you, a complete and consistently reliable predictive mapping of neural states to conscious states would be as close to a complete explanation of consciousness as I think we could ever expect to get... I don't know if I would go so far as to say, as you seemed to earlier, that that consistent correlation *is* causation from a physics point of view, and therefore that there is no further question beyond that from a physics point of view; but then, I'm not a physicist/scientist, but you are presumably?

In contrast, to that same issue, I think of the hard problem, as in an explanation of how something physical like the brain gives rise to something apparently immaterial like phenomenal consciousness, as something that can only really be addressed with philosophical speculation, not science... so despite us getting there by different routes... it looks like roughly we are arriving at the same destination; you think there is no causation question to answer beyond that consistent correlation from a physics point of view? whereas I think, possibly due to dualist baggage skewing my thinking on these types of questions, that there *is* a question to answer but that science can't answer it, only philosophical speculation... but that being the case, I see it as something for idle speculation only and not something to as it were, put all my eggs in that basket; ie I think to do so, either individually or as a population, is basically a fool's errand that only serves to keep the whole issue of consciousness shrouded in mystery... gravitating around a question that we can never really expect to answer beyond unverifiable speculation... stifling real progress into 'softer' problems of consciousness, such as comprehensively mapping neural correlates of consciousness, which cumulatively I think will amount to as full an explanation of consciousness as we can ever realistically expect to get... with that explanation not really lacking in any practical meaningful way, but the difference between us seeming to be that with you that would be a complete explanation, but for me, that would still leave this philosophical question untouched. Basically if I'm understanding you correctly, from your physics point of view, you would write off this entire paragraph as at best irrelevant, or at worst, an erroneous/skewed perception of the problem? Or an unneeded, superflous problem? On account of seeing the buck of causation stopping at that reliable and consistent correlation? Not angry, just want to be clear if that's what you're saying.

So yeah, I definitely agree I think there is a language barrier here so to speak, where we need a better vocabulary about these sorts of questions, because as it stands it's well open to conflation and misunderstanding.

Like, how you're defining awareness here, I'm not sure I understand. Basically does awareness imply phenomenal consciousness to you, or can a distributed neural state, in both time and space, but with nothing else involved (ie no phenomenal experience of any kind), be considered awareness? I don't disagree that it's information processing, but whether it's what I'd think of as awareness, I'm not so sure. It's awareness in a sense I'd say... in a kind of abstract global sense that it is information that will drive the behaviour of the organism, whether there is experienced phenomena or not (back to PZ assumptions I know), but just want to be clear whether you mean it in a phenomenal sense or not. This seems to be the crux of the communication problem between us... I have these potentially dualist assumptions, splitting consciousness into two aspects, phenomena and physical/neural, whereas you don't see it that way at all, or believe they are truly inseparable to such a degree that splitting them apart even hypothetically or conceptually, is erroneous thinking? Basically, do you make any distinction between the presence and the absence of phenomenal experience in your scientific thinking? I still think it might be difficult to get beyond this language barrier, if the two are conceptually inseparable to you. I think I can get as far as saying awareness is a conceptual middle ground representing the abstract/summary information encoded by that distributed neural state at any given moment, but whether I can equate that with phenomenal consciousness or not is a different matter... ie I'm not sure, but it looks like you may be saying they are the same thing? If so, that's again something we might differ on, but it might be at least a step towards a common ground between our different perspectives.
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