A "meta-argument" against all future arguments for God's existence ?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Neither Kant nor Hume agree with you. I guess I should be proud of how stupid I am.

You're full of shit.  I can quote you where Hume shits all over the teleological argument.  Show us where Kant or Hume say the teleological argument isn't crap.  

(And Kant is a moot point, as he was a theist bound determined to bend himself into a pretzel to prove God, so he's hardly a worthwhile defeated.)

^This is why I suspect Kloro hasn’t read Hume’s ‘Dialogues’. Cleanthes’ assertion quoted above is pretty handily demolished. The ‘Dialogues’ were written as a framework of fictional debates to reject arguments for God.

Hume had his weaknesses, but supporting teleology wasn’t one of them.

Boru

[R00tKiT]

 Show us where Kant or Hume say the teleological argument isn't crap.  

Sure:

‘This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect’: Immanuel Kant.

[Angrboda]

 Show us where Kant or Hume say the teleological argument isn't crap.  

Sure:

‘This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect’: Immanuel Kant.

As noted, Kant's testimony is rather moot, but where did he say that?

[R00tKiT]

Let's not get sidetracked on a few quotes. I am aware that neither Kant nor Hume accept the TA, if that's what you want to know.

Back to the argument :

Let A be a new successful (valid and sound) argument for the God of classical theism, based on an uncontroversial set of premises, and discovered by someone (a philosopher, for example) at the date T. Here is now an argument (by reductio ad absurdum) against the very possibility of A.

1. Argument A wasn't known to (almost) anyone before the date T.
2. (From 1.) No one was rationally justified in believing in God before T.
3. (Restatement of 2.) God didn't make his existence known to anyone before T.
4*. God is willing, and was always willing, to make his existence known to everyone.
5. If God is willing, and was always willing, to make his existence known to everyone, then God was willing to make his existence known to anyone who lived before the date T.
6. (From the conjunction of 3. and 5.) God is both willing and unwilling to make his existence to everyone before T. Absurd conclusion. (3. and non-3. are simultaneously true, non-3. being: God made his existence known to at least one person. And 5. entails non-3.)

Therefore, there is no date t at which belief in the God of classical theism suddenly becomes rationally justified.

So, is premise 4 the only controversial premise? If 4. is conceded, is the argument valid ?

---

Sure:

‘This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect’: Immanuel Kant.

As noted, Kant's testimony is rather moot, but where did he say that?

http://www.epistemology.pe.kr/kant/Criti.../ideal.htm

Ctrl+F and type "with respect"

[Angrboda]

As noted, Kant's testimony is rather moot, but where did he say that?

http://www.epistemology.pe.kr/kant/Criti.../ideal.htm

Ctrl+F and type "with respect"

Skip on down a bit brother....

I therefore maintain that the physico-theological proof can never by itself establish the existence of a supreme being, but must always fall back upon the ontological argument to make good its deficiency.

[R00tKiT]

Kant on the teleological argument :

"This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect.
It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the
common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature,
just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour
from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our
observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends
our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept of a
special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This
knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the idea
which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme
Author [of nature] that the belief acquires the force of an irre-
sistible conviction.
It would therefore not only be uncomforting but utterly
vain to attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this
argument."

http://www.epistemology.pe.kr/kant/Criti.../ideal.htm

Even though he rejected the argument, it's undeniable that this argument is much more appealing (even to the philosophers) than the ontological or the cosmolgical, both of which are more abstract and independent of our everyday experience with nature around us, if that makes sense..

---

Again, @Angrboda , I am not arguing here that Kant defended this argument. But you called it crap, that was unfair.

---

Does the TA prove that there is a unique, omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being? No, not by itself, but this doesn't means it has zero argumentative force. In other words, it can be used in conjunction with other arguments to reach the ambitious conclusion of theism.

I have the perceptual experience of an external world, therefore I posit the existence of an external world.
There appears to be other people than myself, therefore it's reasonable to posit the existence of other people.
There appears to be design, therefore it's reasonable to posit a designer.

This seems to be the most natural and straightforward way to believe in God. Every other argument is contrived.

[brewer]

Oh boy, arguing god into existence.

Wheeeeeeeeeeee.............

[The Architect Of Fate]

Yay another tired attempt by Klor to make belief an invisible sky wizard into being 

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Let's not get sidetracked on a few quotes. I am aware that neither Kant nor Hume accept the TA, if that's what you want to know.

Back to the argument :

Let A be a new successful (valid and sound) argument for the God of classical theism, based on an uncontroversial set of premises, and discovered by someone (a philosopher, for example) at the date T. Here is now an argument (by reductio ad absurdum) against the very possibility of A.

1. Argument A wasn't known to (almost) anyone before the date T.
2. (From 1.) No one was rationally justified in believing in God before T.
3. (Restatement of 2.) God didn't make his existence known to anyone before T.
4*. God is willing, and was always willing, to make his existence known to everyone.
5. If God is willing, and was always willing, to make his existence known to everyone, then God was willing to make his existence known to anyone who lived before the date T.
6. (From the conjunction of 3. and 5.) God is both willing and unwilling to make his existence to everyone before T. Absurd conclusion. (3. and non-3. are simultaneously true, non-3. being: God made his existence known to at least one person. And 5. entails non-3.)

Therefore, there is no date t at which belief in the God of classical theism suddenly becomes rationally justified.

So, is premise 4 the only controversial premise? If 4. is conceded, is the argument valid ?

---

As noted, Kant's testimony is rather moot, but where did he say that?

http://www.epistemology.pe.kr/kant/Criti.../ideal.htm

Ctrl+F and type "with respect"

3 doesn’t follow from 2, nor can it be called a ‘restatement’ of 2. One can be ‘rationally justified’ in believing in God without God making his existence known. 

Boru

[R00tKiT]

3 doesn’t follow from 2, nor can it be called a ‘restatement’ of 2. One can be ‘rationally justified’ in believing in God without God making his existence known. 

Boru

Easy proof: 

4. God made his existence known to someone before T.
5. (From 4.) At least one person is justified in believing in God before T.

The contraposition of the conditional statement (4.->5.) is (non-5. -> non-4.), which is exactly (2.->3.). QED.