The Scripture Is False And The Biblical God Is Dead.

[The Grand Nudger]

My zombie-dogs would salivate, yes; I also agree that fear is part of process, ie conditional on causes and relationships, but just that those causes and relations under epiphenomenalist thinking would be manifested entirely within the physical correlates of consciousness, ie neurons and the brain.

A zombie dog may salivate, but we'd have to wonder why..as it would not hunger, no more than it could fear.  That's what it's (supposed to be) missing - even though all of the same causes and relationships and physical correlates - an identical brain, identical nuerons... exist.   

 Perhaps you could consider them different levels of description; fear is a phenomenal experience, but it's also... or corresponds in some way to... a specific neural state of activity. As does hearing a sound, associating that sound with other neural representations, and triggering other neural events (ie salivating), same for a learned fear response... at either level of description they can be considered the same process, but just with epiphenomenalism asserting that the phenomenal side is causally inert... basically just a representation of the underlying physical processes.

Zombie dogs don't hear sounds, either.  As before, all things are equal.  They possess the structures, air is being compressed, same brain and processes....same behavioral response...but do not and cannot be hearing it.  

Motivation is something that I think the zombies and ep have trouble with.   Ever considered the the paradox of phenomenal judgement in ep?   If our behavior can change based on the acquisition of some phenomenal fact, how can we state that phenomenal contents are a dead end for interaction?  How, for that matter, do we even possess the knowledge of such an acquisition, unless the phenomenal content has interacted with whatever purportedly physical thing our cognition depends on...?  Or....to put it even more directly as an assertion rather than a series of questions.....  

...If our phenomenal content was incapable of interaction with physical events then we wouldn't have any knowledge of such content, to be explained by ep, in the first place.  If we do have knowledge of phenomenal contents, and these contents as-such thus need some satisfying explanation...then it seems that they've not only interacted with physical events/structures/processes - they've motivated you/that structure/those processes to change your/their/it's behaviors and explore the subject in depth.

(there are, ofc, responses to this - non causal acquaintance theories of knowledge - which your post above put me in the mind of)

[The Grand Nudger]

(Bold mine)

Qualia are to consciousness as phlogiston is to chemistry.

Boru

Phlogiston was something that was postulated by past chemists to try to explain something else that is observable.

Not the same thing.

...I mean, unless the p-zombie thing has legs, and we're the p-zombies...eh? Utterly and completely convinced in the accuracy of our unjustified reports, how could we not be?

[emjay]

My zombie-dogs would salivate, yes; I also agree that fear is part of a process, ie conditional on causes and relationships, but just that those causes and relations under epiphenomenalist thinking would be manifested entirely within the physical correlates of consciousness, ie neurons and the brain. Perhaps you could consider them different levels of description; fear is a phenomenal experience, but it's also... or corresponds in some way to... a specific neural state of activity. As does hearing a sound, associating that sound with other neural representations, and triggering other neural events (ie salivating), same for a learned fear response... at either level of description they can be considered the same process, but just with epiphenomenalism asserting that the phenomenal side is causally inert... basically just a representation of the underlying physical processes.

Speaking of classical conditioning (which is what the example above is about), this is a mindset which was commonly employed by behaviorists in the early/mid-20th century (along with operant conditioning). The interesting thing about behaviorism is that it claimed to provide an adequate account for dogs salivating without referring to inner mental/cognitive states and purely to external stimuli and observable behaviors. Clearly that ended up not working.

Now, we see a view similar to behaviorism in which instead of cognitive states/acts not being real or worth considering, we have qualia/phenomenal consciousness that is being questioned.

To be absolutely clear, I'm not trying to describe behaviourism here... I despise behaviourism. That's not what this is about at all for me. Behaviourism would have it that there is no cognition or emotional states involved, just switchboard-like actions and reactions. That's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying that every phenomenally conscious state has a corresponding neural state, or that's the contention anyway, including cognitive and emotional states. The behaviourists thought they could explain everything in terms of the inputs and outputs of the system, ignoring that there were other internal processes going on... ignoring the black box of cognition and emotion and all the rest, as it were... but I'm not ignoring that black box, just saying that whatever goes on within it, has a physical and neural basis. For instance say someone took some time thinking about a course of action. Behaviourism couldn't account for that... there being some variable amount of time between input and output... but a view that recognises those internal cognitive processes, whether it could directly observe them or not, could, at least in theory.

[emjay]

My zombie-dogs would salivate, yes; I also agree that fear is part of process, ie conditional on causes and relationships, but just that those causes and relations under epiphenomenalist thinking would be manifested entirely within the physical correlates of consciousness, ie neurons and the brain.

A zombie dog may salivate, but we'd have to wonder why..as it would not hunger, no more than it could fear.  That's what it's (supposed to be) missing - even though all of the same causes and relationships and physical correlates - an identical brain, identical nuerons... exist.   

 Perhaps you could consider them different levels of description; fear is a phenomenal experience, but it's also... or corresponds in some way to... a specific neural state of activity. As does hearing a sound, associating that sound with other neural representations, and triggering other neural events (ie salivating), same for a learned fear response... at either level of description they can be considered the same process, but just with epiphenomenalism asserting that the phenomenal side is causally inert... basically just a representation of the underlying physical processes.

Zombie dogs don't hear sounds, either.  As before, all things are equal.  They possess the structures, air is being compressed, same brain and processes....same behavioral response...but do not and cannot be hearing it.

Okay, at least for the sake of argument, I'll try and accept your way of talking about it, accepting that mine is most probably flawed, but it nonetheless is how I think about it. Ie in this context I think of hearing as a process, which consists of phenomenal hearing and/or the underlying physical processes that correspond with it. You consider it only the phenomenal experience of hearing. Your view is correct I'm sure, and probably the simplest dictionary definition, but nonetheless when I'm grappling with all of this, my way is how I conceptualise it in my mind. But for the sake of this argument, yes we can agree, zombie-dogs don't hear per se... but they do some equivalent underlying physical process, which results in identical real world consequences, is what I contend.

Motivation is something that I think the zombies and ep have trouble with.   Ever considered the the paradox of phenomenal judgement in ep?   If our behavior can change based on the acquisition of some phenomenal fact, how can we state that phenomenal contents are a dead end for interaction?  How, for that matter, do we even possess the knowledge of such an acquisition, unless the phenomenal content has interacted with whatever purportedly physical thing our cognition depends on...?  Or....to put it even more directly as an assertion rather than a series of questions.....  

...If our phenomenal content was incapable of interaction with physical events then we wouldn't have any knowledge of such content, to be explained by ep, in the first place.  If we do have knowledge of phenomenal contents, and these contents as-such thus need some satisfying explanation...then it seems that they've not only interacted with physical events/structures/processes - they've motivated you/that structure/those processes to change your/their/it's behaviors and explore the subject in depth.

(there are, ofc, responses to this - non causal acquaintance theories of knowledge - which your post above put me in the mind of)

Just to be clear, I'm not trying to be obstinate, I do most certainly appreciate your viewpoints on all of this, but there does still seem to be some fundamental or subtle misunderstanding between us, because my answer remains pretty much the same for all of these questions; whatever you experience phenomenally has underlying physical processes (unless you're contending that they don't?, or that some don't?), and therefore any phenomenal fact we learn has a corresponding physical process, just as much as any of the consequences of that fact... we're just looking at them in terms of different levels of description, the physical level and the phenomenal. In practical terms, if it's contended to be a mirror image, then phenomenal consciousness may as well be considered causal... and thus be on full equal terms with the physical underbelly, but just the possibility that that's not the case, as it's envisioned that both levels of description have exactly the same outcomes, then ep and pz's seem to remain conceivable.

[The Grand Nudger]

Okay, at least for the sake of argument, I'll try and accept your way of talking about it, accepting that mine is most probably flawed, but it nonetheless is how I think about it. Ie in this context I think of hearing as a process, which consists of phenomenal hearing and/or the underlying physical processes that correspond with it. You consider it only the phenomenal experience of hearing. Your view is correct I'm sure, and probably the simplest dictionary definition, but nonetheless when I'm grappling with all of this, my way is how I conceptualise it in my mind. But for the sake of this argument, yes we can agree, zombie-dogs don't hear per se... but they do some equivalent underlying physical process, which results in identical real world consequences, is what I contend.

Just to be clear, I'm not trying to be obstinate, I do most certainly appreciate your viewpoints on all of this, but there does still seem to be some fundamental or subtle misunderstanding between us, because my answer remains pretty much the same for all of these questions; whatever you experience phenomenally has underlying physical processes (unless you're contending that they don't?, or that some don't?), and therefore any phenomenal fact we learn has a corresponding physical process, just as much as any of the consequences of that fact... we're just looking at them in terms of different levels of description, the physical level and the phenomenal. In practical terms, if it's contended to be a mirror image, then phenomenal consciousness may as well be considered causal... and thus be on full equal terms with the physical underbelly, but just the possibility that that's not the case, as it's envisioned that both levels of description have exactly the same outcomes, then ep and pz's seem to remain conceivable.

You know I love our convos.  

Our world and the zombie twin world are supposed to be completely identical, as we and the zombies are completely identical.... and yet they and we do not result in identical real world consequences for identical real world events.  In only one of the worlds and only one of the creatures, our world and us, does this identical stuff and identical process yield qualia.  

I'm not sure if pz's are conceivable (if logical conceivability is desired for possibility, later down the line) but ep I think is, sure.  In fact, I think that if we're committed to stating, as one does in ep, that a set of physical processes cause phenomenal content - then we couldn't logically allow that there's some creature that has those processes - exactly the same as we do, but not that content.

[emjay]

Okay, at least for the sake of argument, I'll try and accept your way of talking about it, accepting that mine is most probably flawed, but it nonetheless is how I think about it. Ie in this context I think of hearing as a process, which consists of phenomenal hearing and/or the underlying physical processes that correspond with it. You consider it only the phenomenal experience of hearing. Your view is correct I'm sure, and probably the simplest dictionary definition, but nonetheless when I'm grappling with all of this, my way is how I conceptualise it in my mind. But for the sake of this argument, yes we can agree, zombie-dogs don't hear per se... but they do some equivalent underlying physical process, which results in identical real world consequences, is what I contend.

Just to be clear, I'm not trying to be obstinate, I do most certainly appreciate your viewpoints on all of this, but there does still seem to be some fundamental or subtle misunderstanding between us, because my answer remains pretty much the same for all of these questions; whatever you experience phenomenally has underlying physical processes (unless you're contending that they don't?, or that some don't?), and therefore any phenomenal fact we learn has a corresponding physical process, just as much as any of the consequences of that fact... we're just looking at them in terms of different levels of description, the physical level and the phenomenal. In practical terms, if it's contended to be a mirror image, then phenomenal consciousness may as well be considered causal... and thus be on full equal terms with the physical underbelly, but just the possibility that that's not the case, as it's envisioned that both levels of description have exactly the same outcomes, then ep and pz's seem to remain conceivable.

You know I love our convos. 

Thank you, that's nice to hear I hope you know I feel the same

Our world and the zombie twin world are supposed to be completely identical, as we and the zombies are completely identical.... and yet they and we do not result in identical real world consequences for identical real world events.  In only one of the worlds and only one of the creatures, our world and us, does this identical stuff and identical process yield qualia.

I can accept that statement. It's just that under ep that additional qualia in one of those worlds is considered inert so that even if they those worlds are not identical in the way you've described, they are tantamount to being identical, in a causal sense at least. That may be the root of this confusion between us.

I'm not sure if pz's are conceivable (if logical conceivability is desired for possibility, later down the line) but ep I think is, sure.  In fact, I think that if we're committed to stating, as one does in ep, that a set of physical processes cause phenomenal content - then we couldn't logically allow that there's some creature that has those processes - exactly the same as we do, but not that content.

Yeah, I have no problem with this statement either; I'm not asserting that I think there are actual pz's out there... if I was to meet a clone of me for instance, I'd have no rational justification for thinking it could lack qualia while I have it. And extend that thinking to any human life or indeed any animal life which appears to exhibit signs of consciousness, though of course that link gets more tenuous the further removed we are from direct human experience, ie more reason to assume an ape is conscious than an ant, based on our own experience and the similarities between species, but the point remains the same. So yeah, I'm not actually suggesting that I think there are pz's in our world; all indications suggest there are not, but the philosophical questions remain of why not, especially in light of an epiphenomalist viewpoint.

[The Grand Nudger]

In an ep view, there are no pzs in our world (or any world) because that would not be possible - those physical events the pz's are contended to have being the cause of the phenomenal content that they are contended to lack.

[emjay]

In an ep view, there are no pzs in our world (or any world) because that would not be possible - those physical events the pz's are contended to have being the cause of the phenomenal content that they are contended to lack.

Do you mean any world with the same causal structure as our world, or any conceivable imaginable world? Ie are you saying it would not be true in another world because it would have the same physical -> phenomenal causality as this world?

ETA: Nevermind, I think I get you now... just by definition you mean? Of what it means to be an epiphenomalist?

[GrandizerII]

. Qualia are the phenomenal properties experienced through consciousness. For example, pain. Another example, the "redness" color. Another example, the "triangularity" shape. We observe qualia, and we try to account for them.

That is a generous way to put it because there is no evidence it exists.

From wikipedia

"various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Consequently, the nature and existence of qualia under various definitions remain controversial.
While some philosophers of mind like Daniel Dennett argue that qualia do not exist and are incompatible with neuroscience and naturalism, some neuroscientists and neurologists like Gerald Edelman, Antonio Damasio, Vilayanur Ramachandran, Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch and Rodolfo Llinás state that qualia exist and that the desire to eliminate them is based on an erroneous interpretation on the part of some philosophers regarding what constitutes science"

Indeed, this topic has turned into talking about concepts without clear definitions so some people pin whatever they want to "win the argument".

There is no way to establish through science that qualia (and phenomenal consciousness) are real, because they can only be observed from a first person perspective. If that's what you mean by "there is no evidence it exists", then great, I'm happy to agree.

Philosophers who deny qualia are real, and there are a handful of them, still agree that it does seem like we have something that it is like to feel pain, see "red", feel "smooth", etc. They agree that it does seem like we are observing these properties in a way that feels weird, they just reason further to say that nevertheless it's a trick of the brain.

Nice ad hominem there at the end, but that doesn't invalidate what I'm saying.

[GrandizerII]

Speaking of classical conditioning (which is what the example above is about), this is a mindset which was commonly employed by behaviorists in the early/mid-20th century (along with operant conditioning). The interesting thing about behaviorism is that it claimed to provide an adequate account for dogs salivating without referring to inner mental/cognitive states and purely to external stimuli and observable behaviors. Clearly that ended up not working.

Now, we see a view similar to behaviorism in which instead of cognitive states/acts not being real or worth considering, we have qualia/phenomenal consciousness that is being questioned.

To be absolutely clear, I'm not trying to describe behaviourism here... I despise behaviourism. That's not what this is about at all for me. Behaviourism would have it that there is no cognition or emotional states involved, just switchboard-like actions and reactions. That's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying that every phenomenally conscious state has a corresponding neural state, or that's the contention anyway, including cognitive and emotional states. The behaviourists thought they could explain everything in terms of the inputs and outputs of the system, ignoring that there were other internal processes going on... ignoring the black box of cognition and emotion and all the rest, as it were... but I'm not ignoring that black box, just saying that whatever goes on within it, has a physical and neural basis. For instance say someone took some time thinking about a course of action. Behaviourism couldn't account for that... there being some variable amount of time between input and output... but a view that recognises those internal cognitive processes, whether it could directly observe them or not, could, at least in theory.

I know you're not defending behaviorism, and no one else should interpret you as defending behaviourism. I brought the term up because the example of dogs salivating in response to bells (which was brought up earlier in response to what you were saying) is a classic example of classical conditioning (which is a behaviourist term). And then made my own point about it.