The Scripture Is False And The Biblical God Is Dead.

[emjay]

To be absolutely clear, I'm not trying to describe behaviourism here... I despise behaviourism. That's not what this is about at all for me. Behaviourism would have it that there is no cognition or emotional states involved, just switchboard-like actions and reactions. That's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying that every phenomenally conscious state has a corresponding neural state, or that's the contention anyway, including cognitive and emotional states. The behaviourists thought they could explain everything in terms of the inputs and outputs of the system, ignoring that there were other internal processes going on... ignoring the black box of cognition and emotion and all the rest, as it were... but I'm not ignoring that black box, just saying that whatever goes on within it, has a physical and neural basis. For instance say someone took some time thinking about a course of action. Behaviourism couldn't account for that... there being some variable amount of time between input and output... but a view that recognises those internal cognitive processes, whether it could directly observe them or not, could, at least in theory.

I know you're not defending behaviorism, and no one else should interpret you as defending behaviourism. I brought the term up because the example of dogs salivating in response to bells (which was brought up earlier in response to what you were saying) is a classic example of classical conditioning (which is a behaviourist term). And then made my own point about it.

No worries... I didn't think you were really attacking me there, I just wanted to make my position clear.

[The Grand Nudger]

The zombie proposition explicitly states that the zombie is physically indistinguishable from us. Same is true of zombie worlds. All pz's and z worlds must be physically identical to us and our own, if any such thing exists. That's the entire point of the excercize.

If different worlds and different creatures and different causes obtain different effects, well.....yeah...right? None of those worlds or creatures or causes is a logically conceivable pz or a z world, though. You nailed it, yeah, just by definition of what it means to be an ep, but specifically so in the case of proposed pzs or z worlds.

[emjay]

The zombie proposition explicitly states that the zombie is physically indistinguishable from us. Same is true of zombie worlds. All pz's and z worlds must be physically identical to us and our own, if any such thing exists. That's the entire point of the excercize.

If different worlds and different creatures and different causes obtain different effects, well.....yeah...right? None of those worlds or creatures or causes is a logically conceivable pz or a z world, though. You nailed it, yeah, just by definition of what it means to be an ep, but specifically so in the case of proposed pzs or z worlds.

Okay, I think you've proved your point; pz's are not possible in any world from an ep viewpoint by definition and using the given, identical everythings, definition of the zombie argument.

I'll have to think on whether I still have pz concerns from other perspectives, but yes, that looks pretty solid logic against the possibility of pz's.

And like you say, other worlds with other creatures and other causal structures, would be something else. Maybe interesting in their own right, but not an example of pz and pz worlds as defined.

[GrandizerII]

The zombie proposition explicitly states that the zombie is physically indistinguishable from us.  Same is true of zombie worlds.  All pz's and z worlds must be physically identical to us and our own, if any such thing exists.   That's the entire point of the excercize.

If different worlds and different creatures and different causes obtain different effects, well.....yeah...right?  None of those worlds or creatures or causes is a logically conceivable pz or a z world, though.  You nailed it, yeah, just by definition of what it means to be an ep, but specifically so in the case of proposed pzs or z worlds.

Okay, I think you've proved your point; pz's are not possible in any world from an ep viewpoint by definition and using the given, identical everythings, definition of the zombie argument.

I'll have to think on whether I still have pz concerns from other perspectives, but yes, that looks pretty solid logic against the possibility of pz's.

And like you say, other worlds with other creatures and other causal structures, would be something else. Maybe interesting in their own right, but not an example of pz and pz worlds as defined.

I disagree. There may be a big bullet to bite here for epiphenomenalists when considering the implications of p-zombies and p-zombie worlds, but I'm not seeing what's logically impossible about them. P-zombie worlds will look physically the same to us, but could have unobservable differences from our world, leading to no qualia in the case of p-zombies.

One difficulty, though, for epiphenomenalists (and perhaps other dualists) here might be that, from the p-zombie's "perspective", they could be really confident that they have qualia (as confident as many of us in the actual world may be), but will nevertheless be wrong. So what then would stop us from being wrong? Especially for epiphenomenalists, this might force them to reconsider whether consciousness don't have any impact on our cognitive states.

[Silver]

Imaginative and hypothetical

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

But I'd rather parlay with hard facts.

[emjay]

Okay, I think you've proved your point; pz's are not possible in any world from an ep viewpoint by definition and using the given, identical everythings, definition of the zombie argument.

I'll have to think on whether I still have pz concerns from other perspectives, but yes, that looks pretty solid logic against the possibility of pz's.

And like you say, other worlds with other creatures and other causal structures, would be something else. Maybe interesting in their own right, but not an example of pz and pz worlds as defined.

I disagree. There may be a big bullet to bite here for epiphenomenalists when considering the implications of p-zombies and p-zombie worlds, but I'm not seeing what's logically impossible about them. P-zombie worlds will look physically the same to us, but could have unobservable differences from our world, leading to no qualia in the case of p-zombies.

I believe his point was that the worlds would have to be absolutely identical in every respect - ie no unobservable differences because that would not be identical... that would just put it into the 'other worlds' category of my third paragraph, even if only subtly - in order to fulfil the requirements the zombie argument, presumably as Chalmers defined it. If we're talking about something else, then that might be a different discussion (ie my zombie concerns didn't necessarily come from Chalmers, maybe yours didn't either... so if that's the case we'd have had different concepts but at the same time never would have been talking about the same thing as everyone else in the first place), but as regarding that, I think TGN has proved it to me that ep is logically incompatible with Chalmers' argument if identical really means in absolutely every respect, seen or unseen. Ie if ep states that x causes y, where x is physical and y is phenomenal, and the zombie argument requires that pz worlds must be identical to ours in every respect, then x must cause y in every pz world to be valid, and therefore there can be no zombies (ie nowhere where x does not cause y). And since I am an epiphenomalist, and can't, at the moment at least, see any other persuasive viewpoint on that score, then I think that's a pretty solid proof, that as far as ep is concerned, pz's are a dead end. Could there be creatures similar to us without qualia? Maybe. But identical to us? I think this proves no.

One difficulty, though, for epiphenomenalists (and perhaps other dualists) here might be that, from the p-zombie's "perspective", they could be really confident that they have qualia (as confident as many of us in the actual world may be), but will nevertheless be wrong. So what then would stop us from being wrong? Especially for epiphenomenalists, this might force them to reconsider whether consciousness don't have any impact on our cognitive states.

This one's a bit too much for 1am in the morning so I think I'll think about that one tomorrow But off the top of my head, in my view a pz would report having consciousness, just the same as its consciousness-possessing counterpart, but would obviously not have that experience... so to talk about its 'perspective' is fraught with difficulty and paradoxes etc. That's part of my general confusion on the subject, and where if logical or semantic errors are seeping in, that's where I think they're most likely to be seeping in; in trying to conceptualise stuff like that. So long story short, no idea right now. But maybe tomorrow

[GrandizerII]

I disagree. There may be a big bullet to bite here for epiphenomenalists when considering the implications of p-zombies and p-zombie worlds, but I'm not seeing what's logically impossible about them. P-zombie worlds will look physically the same to us, but could have unobservable differences from our world, leading to no qualia in the case of p-zombies.

I believe his point was that the worlds would have to be absolutely identical in every respect - ie no unobservable differences because that would not be identical... that would just put it into the 'other worlds' category of my third paragraph, even if only subtly - in order to fulfil the requirements the zombie argument, presumably as Chalmers defined it. If we're talking about something else, then that might be a different discussion (ie my zombie concerns didn't necessarily come from Chalmers, maybe yours didn't either... so if that's the case we'd have had different concepts but at the same time never would have been talking about the same thing as everyone else in the first place), but as regarding that, I think TGN has proved it to me that ep is logically incompatible with Chalmers' argument if identical really means in absolutely every respect, seen or unseen. Ie if ep states that x causes y, where x is physical and y is phenomenal, and the zombie argument requires that pz worlds must be identical to ours in every respect, then x must cause y in every pz world to be valid, and therefore there can be no zombies (ie nowhere where x does not cause y). And since I am an epiphenomalist, and can't, at the moment at least, see any other persuasive viewpoint on that score, then I think that's a pretty solid proof, that as far as ep is concerned, pz's are a dead end. Could there be creatures similar to us without qualia? Maybe. But identical to us? I think this proves no.

One difficulty, though, for epiphenomenalists (and perhaps other dualists) here might be that, from the p-zombie's "perspective", they could be really confident that they have qualia (as confident as many of us in the actual world may be), but will nevertheless be wrong. So what then would stop us from being wrong? Especially for epiphenomenalists, this might force them to reconsider whether consciousness don't have any impact on our cognitive states.

This one's a bit too much for 1am in the morning so I think I'll think about that one tomorrow But off the top of my head, in my view a pz would report having consciousness, just the same as its consciousness-possessing counterpart, but would obviously not have that experience... so to talk about its 'perspective' is fraught with difficulty and paradoxes etc. That's part of my general confusion on the subject, and where if logical or semantic  errors are seeping in, that's where I think they're most likely to be seeping in; in trying to conceptualise stuff like that. So long story short, no idea right now. But maybe tomorrow

Bolded mine. We can review what Chalmers means to say by something like "physically identical" later today or tomorrow, once I have the time to do so.

ETA: And also to be clear on what the point of the argument is exactly. As I think you will agree, it's important that we don't get pulled down into irrelevant depths to the extent we miss the point of the thought experiment itself.

[The Grand Nudger]

Subtly dissimilar mimics in an alien universe don't have the sorts of dualist implications that the pz angles for. Chalmers...for example... argues that because a pzombie is by definition physically identical to a conscious person, their mere possibility could refute physicalism.

[GrandizerII]

I disagree. There may be a big bullet to bite here for epiphenomenalists when considering the implications of p-zombies and p-zombie worlds, but I'm not seeing what's logically impossible about them. P-zombie worlds will look physically the same to us, but could have unobservable differences from our world, leading to no qualia in the case of p-zombies.

I believe his point was that the worlds would have to be absolutely identical in every respect - ie no unobservable differences because that would not be identical... that would just put it into the 'other worlds' category of my third paragraph, even if only subtly - in order to fulfil the requirements the zombie argument, presumably as Chalmers defined it. If we're talking about something else, then that might be a different discussion (ie my zombie concerns didn't necessarily come from Chalmers, maybe yours didn't either... so if that's the case we'd have had different concepts but at the same time never would have been talking about the same thing as everyone else in the first place), but as regarding that, I think TGN has proved it to me that ep is logically incompatible with Chalmers' argument if identical really means in absolutely every respect, seen or unseen. Ie if ep states that x causes y, where x is physical and y is phenomenal, and the zombie argument requires that pz worlds must be identical to ours in every respect, then x must cause y in every pz world to be valid, and therefore there can be no zombies (ie nowhere where x does not cause y). And since I am an epiphenomalist, and can't, at the moment at least, see any other persuasive viewpoint on that score, then I think that's a pretty solid proof, that as far as ep is concerned, pz's are a dead end. Could there be creatures similar to us without qualia? Maybe. But identical to us? I think this proves no.

One difficulty, though, for epiphenomenalists (and perhaps other dualists) here might be that, from the p-zombie's "perspective", they could be really confident that they have qualia (as confident as many of us in the actual world may be), but will nevertheless be wrong. So what then would stop us from being wrong? Especially for epiphenomenalists, this might force them to reconsider whether consciousness don't have any impact on our cognitive states.

This one's a bit too much for 1am in the morning so I think I'll think about that one tomorrow But off the top of my head, in my view a pz would report having consciousness, just the same as its consciousness-possessing counterpart, but would obviously not have that experience... so to talk about its 'perspective' is fraught with difficulty and paradoxes etc. That's part of my general confusion on the subject, and where if logical or semantic  errors are seeping in, that's where I think they're most likely to be seeping in; in trying to conceptualise stuff like that. So long story short, no idea right now. But maybe tomorrow

Emjay, having done a bit of research on this, from what I have read, it does not seem like Chalmers is saying that the zombie world is strictly identical to the actual world, only that it is physically identical (in the sense that it is exactly the same in all physical aspects). While Chalmers unfortunately doesn't decisively clarify this in any of the dozen articles I was reading earlier, he does seem to hint at the interpretation I'm suggesting. Here's an excerpt from an article written by Chalmers to illustrate this:

But zombies suggest that materialism must be false. To see this, note that because there is no contradiction in the idea of a zombie, it seems that it would be within God’s powers to create a zombie world: a world that is physically identical to ours, but without
consciousness. If this is right, then even after God ensured that all the physical truths about our world obtained, the truths about consciousness did not automatically follow. After creating everything in physics, God had to do more work to put consciousness into
the world. This suggests that consciousness is something over and above the physical, and that materialism is false

https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/...lmers1.pdf

So it seems we can allow for the zombie world to be different non-physically from the actual, enough so that the zombie world is blocked from allowing consciousness to be a thing in it. In this way, the zombie really is identical to us physically, but lacks qualia because, metaphorically speaking, God did the extra work needed for qualia in the actual world but not in the zombie world.

Basically, if I were to be thrown into the zombie world suddenly, I would then become a zombie. If a zombie were to be thrown into this actual world, they would cease to be a zombie. Or maybe not (if so, disregard this line).

For Chalmers, the point is that if such a world is metaphysically possible, then physicalism must be false because physicalism cannot allow (even as a metaphysical possibility) for a world in which something goes over and beyond the physical. Under physicalism, all possible worlds are strictly physical with nothing over and above the physical.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Subtly dissimilar mimics in an alien universe don't have the sorts of dualist implications that the pz angles for.  Chalmers...for example... argues that because a pzombie is by definition physically identical to a conscious person, their mere possibility could refute physicalism.

And if my gran had wheels, she’d be a wagon.

Boru