How worthless is Philosophy?

[vulcanlogician]

Science is useful because it makes correct predictions.  

True.

Its utility and its correctness are inseparable.  

False. They are independent metrics.

As to whether the causal story that science provides, its correctness is a deep question.

What exactly do you mean by that?

Some theists posit that the universe is regular and ordered because of the constant action of God.  How do we divine whether that is correct versus appealing to invisible forces?

Well, we can't disprove the theists there. But we can show how their explanation is superfluous.

Plus that, they did a lot of "god of gaps" stuff when they were in charge. They provided more than enough rope during that period to hang themselves. Sure, that doesn't refute their claims, but we should remember how all that went down.

Until they show that God is necessary for anything (without resorting to fiat) then we are well within our rights to not take their claims seriously.

[HappySkeptic]

Science is useful because it makes correct predictions.  

True.

Its utility and its correctness are inseparable.  

False. They are independent metrics.

As to whether the causal story that science provides, its correctness is a deep question.

What exactly do you mean by that?

I have to agree with Angrboda on this, at least from a pedantic point of view.  

Science provides pragmatic truth only.  Because it can only disprove claims, it can't strictly prove causality, nor can it prove that its models correspond to any Platonic reality.

[vulcanlogician]

Science provides pragmatic truth only. 

I wholeheartedly disagree with this. There may be no practical value in establishing how many Eukaryotes existed 500 million years ago. But science can still furnish us with that information.

Because it can only disprove claims, it can't strictly prove causality, nor can it prove that its models correspond to any Platonic reality.

Yup. Science assumes causality. But it can't explain it. To be fair, even philosophy fumbles the ball too.

And "double yup"... science will never prove that any of its models correspond to Plato's ideas. And any effort on science's part to do so would be a complete waste of time. Maybe if you went the math route. Like, math has explanatory power, as Plato thought it did. But that's a bit of a stretch.

--Also nice to see you again, dude. Hope you've been well.--

I remember talking to you some time before... you were saying that QM had a "measurement problem"... as in, QM as a theory couldn't define what a measurement really was. Has any headway been made in that regard since we last spoke? Or do you have any further thoughts on that at least?

[HappySkeptic]

--Also nice to see you again, dude. Hope you've been well.--

I remember talking to you some time before... you were saying that QM had a "measurement problem"... as in, QM as a theory couldn't define what a measurement really was. Has any headway been made in that regard since we last spoke? Or do you have any further thoughts on that at least?

I'm doing well, thanks.  I'm still working because they pay me too much to retire.

No headway has been made with the QM measurement problem.  The Many Worlds Interpretation doesn't solve it - it just shifts the problem from "how does the wavefunction collapse?" to "how do I end up in one of the Worlds and not all of them at once?".  That's an identical problem.

Most physicists punt the problem.  It is something that happens when the system-under-test interacts with the "environment".  The problem is that the boundary between the two is artificial.  Every system is something else's environment.

[vulcanlogician]

No headway has been made with the QM measurement problem.  The Many Worlds Interpretation doesn't solve it - it just shifts the problem from "how does the wavefunction collapse?" to "how do I end up in one of the Worlds and not all of them at once?".  That's an identical problem.

Do you think QM should make efforts to define what a measurement is? Or is that even possible? When you say physicists "punt" the problem, I get the impression you (at least mildly) disapprove of this activity. Should physicists try to take on the problem? Rather than punting?

[Belacqua]

I haven't read much Plato, but the question of how worthless philosophy is may be something I have some thoughts about.  When we're talking about how much something is worth, different standards may be at play, and often people use the most disadvantageous standard when talking about something they don't like.  This leads to rather biased assessments.  An assessment can come from a purely subjective standpoint, as in chocolate ice cream being worthless because I don't like chocolate ice cream.  Alternatively one can try rational justification which ultimately leads to subjective values, but ones which are more universal.  

Commonly, it is compared to the instrumental utility of science.  I think this is a bit misleading as science itself is pretty useless except insofar as its accuracy in describing reality can be instrumentally useful in the development of technology.  Knowing Einstein's theories alone is pretty inutile.  Turning that knowledge into GPS satellites on the other hand, useful.  I think this distinction is overlooked in criticizing philosophy.  By itself, it may also be inutile, but in as much as it accurately describes something real, it can be turned into human technology and thought technology.  Curmudgeons may complain about the uselessness of post-modernism, yet use logic to do it.  Science fans may argue the uselessness of philosophy, yet be the first to turn around and make use of the concept of falsification in their arguments.  And nobody serious would consider the question of a TOE without thinking of Godel being in the background.  And quantum physics is overflowing with philosophical questions.  These indirect uses of philosophy get dismissed by philosophy's critics and overlooked by the ignorant.

But instrumental utility itself is only one of multiple possible standards.  Nobody would complain that because nobody built a boat with them, the Mona Lisa and Tolstoy's War and Peace are worthless.  You'd have to be a boorish Philistine to assert such things.

Yes, I think these are all good points. When we ask "is it useful?", we have to ask "useful for what?" 

Nowadays usefulness is generally interpreted in terms of 1) making money, or 2) increasing efficiency/reducing labor. 

Socrates is aiming at self-knowledge. So when we ask whether his philosophy is useful or not, I think we'd want to ask whether we know ourselves better through his methods or not. If we do, then it's useful. 

And I think the goal of self-knowledge is generally to ask, "Am I a good person or not?" Obviously, the utility of making money or increasing efficiency is no help to the world if the people who are doing those things are bad people.