Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Silver]

This thread has gone completely over my head.

[Sheldon]

Remained subjective in the sense that the conclusion was true only if one accepted another subjective claim. For example, if one (subjectively) accepts that X is immoral, and Y causes X, then it would probably  be true that Y is immoral. 

Lets put this in a utilitarian context, utilitarianism being a popular objectivist theory.  

When we say that crack addiction is bad for us we're not suggesting that a person has to accept this claim is true, or any underlying subjectivist claim as true, in order for the claim to be true.   We're saying there's something about crack which is bad for us regardless of a subjects personal opinion or a groups predispositions.  If a crack addict says "that's just your opinion, I think it's good for me" and his crackhead friends go "yeah, it's good for us!" this is not taken to be a cogent argument against the doctors assertion or advice, or proof that the statement is coming from a fundamentally subjective basis.

They're not equivalent claims though, unless by bad you mean using it is immoral? The word bad here is a little ambiguous perhaps, do we mean bad as in immoral or bad as in bad for our health? The latter I would accept is objectively true, the former I am dubious about. 

Punching someone causes pain, if causing pain is immoral, then punching someone must be immoral. See how the statement is true, but still ultimately based on a subjective opinion? The statement doesn't objectively demonstrate that causing pain is immoral. all the examples were like that. 

Similar to the above - and it's worth noting that not all true claims of pain or harm would qualify as objectivist pains or harms.  We could go back and forth with examples of this one until the end of days but at the bottom of it all there's an accurate answer, which may be truly unsatisfying.  Harm basis spring out at us from every metaethical angle.   Ethicists, psychologists, sociologists, cultural anthropologists,  neurologists and the reporting subjects themselves say that when people talk about morality they are talking about or considering harm - this conclusion is based upon a mountain of evidence.

None of which demonstrates that causing harm is objectively wrong, all we have is a broad consensus based on what appears to be an expedient, but subjective opinion. That there is a broad consensus of opinion, is not objective evidence that the opinion is objectively true of course. 

The whole thing is fascinating. 

I absolutely agree about that. 

What's interesting to harm based objectivism and our convo in specific here is that the part of our brain that lights up when we moralize is associated with regulation and inhibition of the competing metaethical basis in analytic philosophy.

I can see why evolution might have "hardwired" us to view causing unnecessary or excessive harm as bad. If that's what you are implying? 

So, If I'm asked why I think harm is a valid metric in moral consideration, that it belongs in conversations about morality, that we could not fully describe morality without it's reference...I could point to it's manifestly apparent presence in our artifacts and anecdotal reports, I could invite the other person to consider the many ways in which they make such assertions..but I could also point to the the physical structure and function of the brain.  

I usually just accept it as an expedient component of moral discourse, imagine the kind of world where human violence was never checked either by the individual or society, even life in the worst prisons wouldn't compare. Though I am still dubious this makes causing harm objectively immoral, as expedient to avoid something is not quite the same, and of course again I'd say this must be relative. Where harm were considered necessary, to avoid a greater harm for example. 

So, even if we contend that objectivism is metaethically false, harm is still an issue we're talking about or considering..when we discuss or consider morality, right?  I didn't choose to include it.  It's not arbitrarily placed.  It's not unevidenced, and the sorts of evidence available for the assertion or basis not only satisfy our demands of objectivity in most other terms or senses...but can be found in what you or I might consider to be the very pinnacle of human objectivity in practice. 

Well it forms part of my moral worldview, and I'd say this was true for most people, and societies. that they place some sort of limit or moratorium on causing unnecessary harm, though I am not sure what you're claiming is objectively evidenced here, as I said, I see no evidence that causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral, though I can reason that it is expedient to try and avid and prevent it, and so I include it in my subjective moral evaluations. 
How much stems from evolved emotions and instincts, and how much from reason is harder to evaluate, but I suspect they're all at play.

[Sheldon]

This thread has gone completely over my head.

Much of it over mine as well, I feel like I am pushing an old shopping trolley across an icy lake, in the fog, and someone I can't see is shouting instructions. It's still interesting though.

[arewethereyet]

This thread has gone completely over my head.

Yeah, I am hoping for a CliffsNotes version that I can maybe understand as long as it isn't a dissertation by Bel full of quotes by *enter name here*.

[Belacqua]

This thread has gone completely over my head.

Moral realism has its defenders. Their arguments have not been well presented on this thread.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

[arewethereyet]

Exactly as expected.

[The Grand Nudger]

They're not equivalent claims though, unless by bad you mean using it is immoral? The word bad here is a little ambiguous perhaps, do we mean bad as in immoral or bad as in bad for our health? The latter I would accept is objectively true, the former I am dubious about. 

The claim of metaethical utilitarian realism is that the badfors -are- the moral facts, yes.  

What you're saying here isn't that it's all subjective, in translation.  You're saying that the assertion purports to report a fact, does report a fact, but does not report the fact it purports to report.  Objectivism contextualizes these as invalid moral assertions.  This respects and allows for the expression of their possible truth value in other real or hypothetical contexts.  The fact it does report is (or can be) objectively true, and objectively true as you see it, leaving the translation.   Just doesn't matter, cause that's not what morality is about. Or, that can't be established to some standard.

None of which demonstrates that causing harm is objectively wrong, all we have is a broad consensus based on what appears to be an expedient, but subjective opinion. That there is a broad consensus of opinion, is not objective evidence that the opinion is objectively true of course. 

I can see why evolution might have "hardwired" us to view causing unnecessary or excessive harm as bad. If that's what you are implying? 

This may in the end be an impasse.  I can't write off observational evidence, anecdotal evidence, and scientific evidence all converging on an apparent fact that is itself plainly and openly expressed in direct self reports of the phenomena as mere opinion.  I am satisfied by the mountain of evidence which persuades me of what I feel should be a rather trivial statement of fact.  I include harm in moral consideration because when we moralize we are considering harm.  Harm is one of the things that morality is about.  A brute fact.  If we omitted harm we would not be talking about morality anymore.  As a matter of objectivity, a matter of completeness and accuracy, of a statement purporting to report a fact and reporting that fact, and reporting on that fact accurately, harm cannot be excluded from a consideration of moral basis claims or truth assertions regardless of the metaethical reality in which such moral assertions are made.  

I usually just accept it as an expedient component of moral discourse, imagine the kind of world where human violence was never checked either by the individual or society, even life in the worst prisons wouldn't compare. Though I am still dubious this makes causing harm objectively immoral, as expedient to avoid something is not quite the same, and of course again I'd say this must be relative. Where harm were considered necessary, to avoid a greater harm for example. 

Well it forms part of my moral worldview, and I'd say this was true for most people, and societies. that they place some sort of limit or moratorium on causing unnecessary harm, though I am not sure what you're claiming is objectively evidenced here, as I said, I see no evidence that causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral, though I can reason that it is expedient to try and avid and prevent it, and so I include it in my subjective moral evaluations. 
How much stems from evolved emotions and instincts, and how much from reason is harder to evaluate, but I suspect they're all at play.

You don't tend to hear about necessary evils from people who think they've done nothing objectively wrong.  But, yes, I agree that once we've decided to do evil shit we're going to have a hard time justifying that by any rational or objective thought process.  It's just bang bang time.  That's who we are. In an objectivists understanding, this is moral failure.

[Sheldon]

They're not equivalent claims though, unless by bad you mean using it is immoral? The word bad here is a little ambiguous perhaps, do we mean bad as in immoral or bad as in bad for our health? The latter I would accept is objectively true, the former I am dubious about. 

The claim of metaethical utilitarian realism is that the badfors -are- the moral facts, yes.  

I think for clarity we can say that the assertion that using crack is objectively bad for your health, is a different assertion to using crack is immoral. I see how the first rests on objective evidence, but not the second assertion. 
I also I see harm as an expedient metric for moral discourse, I don't see the  fact that moral discourse among humans, generally uses it, as translating to it is objectively true that causing harm is immoral. Theological and religious arguments claim objective moral absolutes exist, yet set harm aside as a metric, a deity that commits cats of genocide, or tortures a newborn baby to death, or endorses slavery for example, is considered perfectly moral.

I can't write off observational evidence, anecdotal evidence, and scientific evidence all converging on an apparent fact that is itself plainly and openly expressed in direct self reports of the phenomena as mere opinion. 

No more can I, but I don't see those facts as demonstrating the conclusion that causing harm is objectively immoral. Does an objective moral fact exist if no humans exist for example? As I say I think we view harm as a good metric as it is expedient to avoid the consequences of not doing so, and this might well be hardwired in us by evolution. 

 I am satisfied by the mountain of evidence which persuades me of what I feel should be a rather trivial statement of fact.  I include harm in moral consideration because when we moralize we are considering harm.  

This (underlined) is rather circular don't you think? 
I include harm in moral discourse, as the consequences of not doing so seem undesirable. FWIW theists who claim objective moral absolutes exist, don't use harm as a metric, how many religious philosophers are there, is this a mountain of evidence that a deity is an essential or objective part of our moral discourse? Lets test the claim and see:
I include god in moral consideration because when we moralize we are considering god.  
I only hanged one word. 

Harm is one of the things that morality is about.  A brute fact.

I agree, but have to ask myself why? Is there anything beyond subjective assertion, an appeal to subjective consensus, or reasoned consequentialism?

If we omitted harm we would not be talking about morality anymore. 

For me personally yes I'd agree, but even if every person agreed,  all I see here is a universally shared subjective opinion. though of course even among objectivists and those who believe in moral absolutes, this isn't true, theists defer to god before worrying about harm, though one could of course argue that they are simply projecting harm onto anything that doesn't defer to their deity's moral diktat. 

You don't tend to hear about necessary evils from people who think they've done nothing objectively wrong.  But, yes, I agree that once we've decided to do evil shit we're going to have a hard time justifying that by any rational or objective thought process.  It's just bang bang time.  That's who we are. In an objectivists understanding, this is moral failure.

Well is they think they've done nothing morally wrong, then the we here comes to a matter of opinion surely? Not everyone who causes harm is simply content to do wrong, some have formed the opinion their actions are in fact moral. I suspect that you would accept it is not an absolute claim that causing harm is immoral? Just as I do. So who decides when and where and how? What objective facts determine this?

[The Grand Nudger]

The claim of metaethical utilitarian realism is that the badfors -are- the moral facts, yes.  

I think for clarity we can say that the assertion that using crack is objectively bad for your health, is a different assertion to using crack is immoral. I see how the first rests on objective evidence, but not the second assertion. 

I get that you don't think that they're the same claim, but the various objectivist positions refer to systems which explicitly premise them as the same type of of claim, attempt to form their moral assertions in that way, and succeed or fail (in their own estimation) by whether or not they satisfy that criteria.  The evidence their claims rest on can be objective, as we've seen with both harm as an item and harm inclusion as a metric...so it's difficult to come up with some way why or how their moral systems aren't objective that doesn't do damage to other claims we accept as objective.  There are error theories that posit this as where we go wrong.  It doesn't matter whether moral statements actually can be like other objective statements because the whole objective statements thing (or some fundamental component of objectivity) is exactly what we get wrong.  The world isn't like that.  We aren't doing what we think we're doing.  

I also I see harm as an expedient metric for moral discourse, I don't see the  fact that moral discourse among humans, generally uses it, as translating to it is objectively true that causing harm is immoral.  Theological and religious arguments claim objective moral absolutes exist, yet set harm aside as a metric, a deity that commits cats of genocide, or tortures a newborn baby to death, or endorses slavery for example, is considered perfectly moral.

Theological and religious arguments (at least here in the west) generally posit subjectivist moral absolutes.  The opinions of their god as the rules.  How their god feels about a thing.  If it likes torturing babies and the smell of burning flesh.....tough luck suckers.

No more can I, but I don't see those facts as demonstrating the conclusion that causing harm is objectively immoral. Does an objective moral fact exist if no humans exist for example? As I say I think we view harm as a good metric as it is expedient to avoid the consequences of not doing so, and this might well be hardwired in us by evolution. 

They demonstrate that my including harm is objectively premised, not some subjective choice or arbitrary inclusion..which if you'll recall, was where you decided to put subjectivity after you acknowledged that we can make objective claims about harm.   That because I chose or accepted, or so long as we choose or accept a harm basis..that makes it subjective.  But I did not choose or accept it.  It really is one of the things we're talking about.  In translation, subjectivist harms also exist.  A person can refer to things that only harm them..and this is subjectively harmful.  Like all of the ways god gets offended or hurt, for example.

This (underlined) is rather circular don't you think? 

I include blood pressure in consideration of health because blood pressure really is one of the things we're talking about when we discuss health.  Is this circular?

I include harm in moral discourse, as the consequences of not doing so seem undesirable.  FWIW theists who claim objective moral absolutes exist, don't use harm as a metric, how many religious philosophers are there, is this a mountain of evidence that a deity is an essential or objective part of our moral discourse? Lets test the claim and see:
I include god in moral consideration because when we moralize we are considering god.  
I only hanged one word. 

I think that claim is false, there are no gods....but there's no fundamental reason why gods can't be considered in moral discussions.  We have used them as vehicles for moral exploration and moral explication.  For example, the god who makes the moral rules by it's whims and desires isn't an objectivist god, morally speaking.  It may exist, and it may really have a shitlist, but that in and of itself is not relevant to objective moral theories, just like facts and science not being relevant to relativist or subjectivist moral theories.   

I agree, but have to ask myself why? Is there anything beyond subjective assertion, an appeal to subjective consensus, or reasoned consequentialism?

We can be harmed.  If we couldn't be harmed, maybe we wouldn't - but we would be wrong.  Similar to how we don't include harmful things that we don't know are harmful or refuse to accept are harmful.  

For me personally yes I'd agree, but even if every person agreed,  all I see here is a universally shared subjective opinion. though of course even among objectivists and those who believe in moral absolutes, this isn't true, theists defer to god before worrying about harm, though one could of course argue that they are simply projecting harm onto anything that doesn't defer to their deity's moral diktat. 

Objectivism is not absolutism.  Objectivism is not theological subjectivism.  Absolutism is a further claim that can be made or omitted from any of the cognitivist positions.  IDK if it can be included in emotivism because our emotional states aren't exactly stable.  Your favorite color today may not be your favorite color tomorrow, or twenty years from now.  Doesn't stop people from making claims like that though, lol.

Well is they think they've done nothing morally wrong, then the we here comes to a matter of opinion surely? Not everyone who causes harm is simply content to do wrong, some have formed the opinion their actions are in fact moral. I suspect that you would accept it is not an absolute claim that causing harm is immoral? Just as I do. So who decides when and where and how? What objective facts determine this?

If they think they've done nothing wrong then they've done no evil to be described by and excused by it's alleged necessity.  Anyone who tells you they've done a necessary evil thinks they've done an evil, and that they were committed or compelled to do it.  It's an opinion in the way that everything is an opinion - but they may be right or wrong about it in an objectivists understanding.  Some people torture themselves over things they mistakenly believe to be wrong, or evil.  Some people do evil things because it is expedient and excuse themselves by objectively incorrect necessities.  The objective facts that would determine if their claim were true even just in it's own context would be facts of necessity.  You won't be surprised to find that I think many allegedly necessary evils are no such thing. A pacifist would suggest that killing people is never good or necessary, not even when they're trying to kill you, for example. What do we think about that?

You keep returning to the idea that "who decides" is itself a demonstration of subjectivity.  Not so in analytic philosophy.  It's not who, in cognitivist metaethics (or in general use), it's how and what.  Things aren't subjective merely because a person decides them, they are subjective because a person decides them using explicitly subjective metrics.  There is no fact of the matter beyond those facts of themselves.  Those facts are the statements their moral statements accurately refer to.  That's what makes such moral systems metaethically subjectivist.

It is an item of concern for objectivists though, particularly as things get more complicated and we try to make some full moral statement rather than a basic explanation of what we're talking about...axioms, principles, and referents.  I, for example, don't believe that morality is fundamentally or metaethically subjective - but I do believe that all moral statements are susceptible to subjective error.  Specific ignorance and incompetence, for example.   Where some belief they have x is what it is because they personally do not know or refuse to accept some particular and demonstrably true thing.  Some thing that..if they did know it, or weren't incapable of accepting it, would change their belief x.  

That's why reason and science are important to objectivism, even though they are irrelevant to subjectivism and relativism.  They are truth makers in objectivism because they're successful and productive ways to determine the status of objectivism's truth making properties.  How and what, not who or whom. As far as whether or not harm is absolutely immoral - going beyoind just the fact that objectivism is not absolutism...what are we asking? The claim that something is immoral is generally pregnant. It doesn't refer just to whether or not the thing you did in a vacuum is a bad thing itself. The underlying metaethical reality. We have or can have additional concerns, some of those may or may not be factual, the ones that are factual may have different referents, not all of referents are objective, and within the set of possible objective referents at least half and probably more are false. Let's bring back our pacifist from earlier. Lets suppose that we can accept their claim is meaningfully objectively true. That would suggest, then, that even self defense is immoral. In that case, our hypothetical claim that it isn't immoral and that it is necessary is objectively in error on both counts..standing in for some other (likely many other) ideas about moral warrant and moral desert and exclusively sub optimal decision fields. About intent. About when it is socially permissible to do some bad thing, not about whether or not the thing is bad.

[Sheldon]

This thread has gone completely over my head.

Moral realism has its defenders. Their arguments have not been well presented on this thread.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Wow, a link, how impressive. 

Vague sweeping assertions, and lazy sententious appeals to authority, quelle surprise. 

Your facile arrogant rhetoric, simply screams Dunning-Kruger effect.