Religion is a poor source of morality

[Neo-Scholastic]

I believe I have not been clear enough. In my own case, I do have a slightly different understanding of what it means when we say that something is objective. The objects of knowledge exist apart from any particular subject’s knowledge of them. As such, objects include, but are not limited to, sensible bodies. Facts about triangles are objective, but no one supposes that those facts depend on material examples to be true. Next, someone can attain knowledge about people without having any particular person in mind. Knowledge about humans, their biology, needs, wants, potentials and limits, are objective but the object of that knowledge, technically, is not about any particular material thing; but rather about the concept of what it means to be human, i.e. human nature.

Human nature is where I say people should look for objective moral standards. By studying human nature, people can come to an understanding of virtue in terms of optimal health, emotional stability, rational capacity, etc. I believe the ability to evaluate the moral import of consequences and intentions presupposes knowledge of what is harmful, neutral, or beneficial to people.

This idea has already been proposed as part of the non-theistic solutions. You must have an idea of what a human being is before you can understand what constitutes harm or benefit to one. You must have an idea of what normative and fully functioning human instincts are before you can speak about diminished capacities, like sociopaths with stunted empathy. Implementing some version of the ‘golden rule’ presupposes an essential commonality between otherwise unique individuals. I think theists and atheists could agree with these ideas on a purely pragmatic level.

The disagreement is over the relationship between particulars and universals. Nearly all believers subscribe, either expressly or tacitly, to some form of philosophical realism. For them, to be a human being means that an animal must have specific essential properties that are unique to humans. It also means that virtue and character can be objectively defined with reference to that essential human nature. Those atheists that subscribe to either nominalism or conceptualism view humanity as an abstraction based on the similarities of accidental properties. As such moral reasoning from a nominalist position depends on which arbitrary set of accidental properties is used to define humanity, i.e. whim.

[Edwardo Piet]

@ Esquilax

Fucking amazing post, awesome. I wonder if I even need to bother arguing for Sam Harris anymore, you write so much better than I do.

[Mudhammam]

Then you missed the point:

As philosopher John Searle once pointed out, there are two very different senses of the terms “objective” and “subjective”. The first sense relates to how we know (i.e., epistemology), the second to what there is to know (i.e., ontology). When we say that we are reasoning or speaking “objectively”, we generally mean that we are free of obvious bias, open to counterarguments, cognizant of the relevant facts, and so on. This to make a claim about how we are thinking. In this sense, there is no impediment to our studying the subjective (I.e. first-person) facts “objectively. (Harris, 2010, p. 29)

Source: https://zaknafein81.wordpress.com/2013/0...jectivity/

For Harris to claim that he is *only* pursuing the epistemic content of moral claims is nonsense if at the same time he denies that there is anything to know about the ontology of moral values. It's like saying there is no "what-ness" to be known, but yet one can objectively know "it." Know what? What is conducive to well-being? Well, maybe that's a clue to the ontological status of moral values that he (or you) avoids delineating, but to just throw out such a blanket term and declare it be the locus of moral worth requires more thoughtful consideration if it is to deserve anything other than the charge of begging the question.

His point is never to ground objective moral values ontologically, that would be ridiculous (That is what William Lame Craig repeatedly bangs on about as a misrepresentation of Sam's position). 

Why would that be ridiculous? I don't think Craig misrepresented Harris' position at all. I think he exposed one of its weaknesses, or at least the superficial treatment Harris gives.

His point is to scientifically measure subjective values objectively in an epistemic way.

Right, but that's after merely assuming the premise that the attainment or avoidance of his conceptions of the "good life" and absolute misery is a moral duty shared by each person, not only as it relates to their own being but to others as well. Again, equally important to asking the question of "how we know" is "what there is to know," as the former presumes the latter, and it is the latter that Harris doesn't really seriously consider. That we might have a moral obligation, for example, to risk suffering in order to save the life of a stranger, does not appear to follow on his version of consequentalism. Nor should it unless moral values involve more than the sheer happiness or well-being of one's self.

But of course if good and evil exists at all it is not seperate subjectively. For good and evil boils down to well being and the outside world that has no affect on well being cannot be deemed good and evil at all.

Of course good and evil can't exist separately ontologically from us, that would be as ridiculous as claiming there was a God.

Of course, just because moral values as such do not exist independent of minds with some capacity to discover them by way of reason does not mean that there is nothing objective in whatever ontological status they possess. After all, we may have true or false conceptions of them. The statement "raping children is wrong" may be meaningless absent of beings who can formulate the notion of right and wrong, but that doesn't address the "what-ness" or the question of why there is an objective value that, in such an instance, would be violated.

[robvalue]

I realised I've seen this video before, quite a while ago. But it's very interesting to watch it again.

I think I agree less with Harris than I used to. Of course his overall idea is good, but I feel there's some hand waving going on over the specifics. I'll comment more tomorrow when I've watched the whole of it.

I still generally agree with the thrust of his argument, don't get me wrong. Informally, he has it right. But he's talking in very hazy, general terms about societies as a whole as if they are a single entity and not concerning himself with individual morality. So really this is more of a scientific analysis in the zoomed out version of things, rather than looking at an individual person's moral choices. Which is fine. But still, I'm not seeing how you can ever objectively assign "correct" relative values to different aspects of wellbeing, where they come into conflict. And other anal objections

I agree that there is a "sort of" overall objective landscape once you've identified the aspects of wellbeing. But I don't believe it is possible to make exact valuations of what are essentially already value judgements of an average member of a society... It's complex. And of course, if Mr. Taliban won't even agree that wellbeing is what is important, then we have no grounds for debate. For him, serving Allah or whatever is the most important thing for example, and everyone's wellbeing comes second. We can't objectively say his "morality" is worse than ours, without defaulting to our own yardstick of wellbeing first. Of course I infinitely prefer our system, but if another society isn't interested in the same goals, or not to the same degree, simple comparisons become pointless.

As I've said before, if we are ever to try and marry two such different cultures, simply announcing our goals to be superior is of no practical use. We must understand why their goals are what they are, and attempt to win them over with reason.

Hey, it's good being an atheist because I'm allowed to openly disagree with my gods.

[Edwardo Piet]

And of course, if Mr. Taliban won't even agree that wellbeing is what is important, then we have no grounds for debate.

Hmm...

If Mr. Taliban doesn't agree that an important criteria for health is to not be constantly bleeding out our eyes, or that an important criteria for food is for it to not be arsenic, do we have no grounds for debate because their definition of "healthy" and "food" is different?

[Angrboda]

Take the trolley problem, for example: there is potentially some combination of objective facts that would make one or the other solution morally preferable (perhaps the one person has a nuclear bomb with him that will detonate if he's hit and kill far more than just one person, or perhaps he's a doctor with knowledge of how to cure cancer on his way to tell other people. Maybe the five people in the other tunnel are convicted murderers, or all hosts to a new, particularly virulent strain of Ebola). The fact that the person attempting to solve the problem may or may not know these facts, or may subjectively have values that would lead him to take the morally sub-optimal choice, does not alter the fact that one choice is objectively better than the other, given what we know about human beings. Our choices are influenced by the facts at our disposal, but that doesn't mean that all other facts cease to exist.

You're overlaying a schema of utilitarianism on the trolley problem, that what is most moral is that which is most useful. Besides the fact that this has nothing to do with what makes the trolley problem morally interesting, you're begging the question about what makes something more moral than another thing. It is not objectively true that what is moral is determined by what is likely to produce the greatest good for the most people. That's an assumption and one which is lacking support. You can't just slip utilitarian ethics into the mix and presume you are talking objectively. You've made a subjective choice about what moral goodness consists of. I might just as well say that what is moral is that which produces the greatest happiness for women and women alone. That's equally subjective a view of what makes something 'moral'. You've committed Moore's naturalistic fallacy by identifying a fellow traveler of moral approval, utility, and relabeled it as your criterion of morality.

[robvalue]

I do make things hard for myself! I get so passionate about subjects like this, that I have trouble shutting them out of my mind. Some evolutionary drive wants me to keep discussing things like this at extreme length! But then it affects my life in other ways, as I find it hard to concentrate on other things or to sleep. So I'll have to leave some thoughts here and come back to read replies since my previous post later. Am I a freak? I don't know. I suppose I see some subjects as so important that I get overcome and lose a sense of proportion, to some degree.

Anyhow! I'm going to have to disagree with Harris quite strongly, in lots of ways. I won't go into it all right now, but I'll just say the idea of a "landscape" of all possible worlds just doesn't work for me. Of course I agree that his "worst possible world" should be avoided, and we should "maximise wellbeing". But to try to reduce the wellbeing of a society to an overall numerical value so that you can objectively compare it to other societies is I think a gross oversimplification. Again, I'm talking about conflicts. This talk of "alternate peaks" is just not doing it for me, because it assumes a correct way to relatively evaluate different aspects of wellbeing. That is essentially playing god, and is my objection to objective morality in the first place.

Let me pose a simple example to try and make my point. Due to obsession issues, I'll be active on the forum probably but will leave it a few days before checking this thread again. So I'm not ignoring replies, I will get back to them in time Freak! I know.

Let's say surveys are taken in a society and everyone rates out of 100 how happy they are. For a society S, let M(S) be the average score recorded for the males, and F(S) be the average score recorded by the females. Assuming all other factors to be roughly equal, write in terms of M(A), M(B), F(A) and F(B) the conditions for which society B has an objectively better wellbeing than society A.

If morality is truly objective, then there must be a correct answer. What is it? It's safe to say that if M(B) > M(A) and F(B) > F(A) then society B has objectively better wellbeing, all other things being equal. But what happens in the grey areas where M(B) > M(A) but F(B) < F(A)? (Or the same deal with M and F reversed.) If the wellbeing of a society can be measured objectively to form a "landscape" then there must be mathematical conditions in this area which tell you when society B is "higher" than A on the landscape. In my opinion, if you write that condition and you claim it is objectively correct, you are playing god.

I don't argue that you could come up with a very rough formula that takes into account different aspects of wellbeing of a society. But this idea that science can tell you which is "better" when various factors are competing is I think totally wrong. It should always be a matter for discussion.

Am I the only one who sees a danger in an objective formula for wellbeing? Again, I'm talking about conflicts. If you can improve one area without detriment to others, that's just fine. Great! Go for it. But life is rarely that simple, and compromises are inevitable.

[robvalue]

OK I've caught up on the replies, thanks guys

Esq: I think your objection is covered by my example above. I'd say, simply put, no one has the authority to say how much a life is "worth" or how much pain is "worth" or disease is "worth". I don't accept that there is a "correct" way to rate everything in a moral way. We have to evaluate what the whole point of morality is. Happiness? Survival of the species? What if it's the most moral thing to wipe out all life altogether? If there is some "objective" way to measure good versus bad, what if the calculation comes up that we're all better off dead? Basically, once someone makes a formula and starts putting fixed, numerical values on lives and aspects of lives, we have been dehumanised. I understand it may be necessary in certain situations to estimate potential outcomes, but I don't accept it can be anything more than a guide and is certainly subjective.

I mean, what is "best" for humanity? What is "best" for life on the planet in general? I'm quite strongly of the opinion that every other animal would be better off without us, so morally we should stop breeding. But even if I proved that scientifically, no one is going to care. This is the "no practical use" problem.

What if I told someone I'd done the calculations and morally we should kill their child for the general wellbeing of society? Do we do it by force?

This is all my opinion anyhow I may be wrong. I'm picking it up as I go. I'd be very interested to see anyone even attempt to "evaluate" me, to see how many points my life is worth. And then, why I or anyone else should care about that evaluation.

The other problem is that Sam is kind of treating each society as a single person, with a set of morals. At best he's only talking about an average, or societal norms. So where exactly you get your data or how you average it is also somewhat subjective.

If the point of all this is just to be able to say scientifically "we're better than you", then what has it achieved? If even I'm not interested in someone evaluation of myself in points, I doubt raging barbarians are going to give a toss. To be fair, I need to watch the rest of the video. I've watched the first half or something, and really a lot of what Sam says is troubling me. It doesn't seem quite logical, and relies on "appeals to common sense" in the middle of what is meant to be a scientific discourse. I still don't agree science can tell you what moral decisions to make. It provides neutral information. Something is not right.

[robvalue]

Additional thoughts:

Imagine if scientists do "discover" this magical way of measuring the wellbeing of a society. If morality is simply about maximizing wellbeing and nothing more, that has some troubling implications.

Say it is found that society's wellbeing would be significantly improved by killing everyone in a certain category, say people like me who can't hardly work. What do we do with that information? Do we round people like me up and kill them? Why not, if all we're concerned with is this wellbeing figure?

It brings into question everything from aborting children because they're not good enough, or influencing them in the womb, killing old people, anything. Once you've got a system where "computer says X is moral", what have we become? Are we going to blindly follow the computer's readout, which we have confirmed is objectively correct? If we do, we're now amoral ourselves and we've made science our god. If we don't, what's the point of doing it in the first place? "Hmm, that's interesting. Kill all oddly shaped babies. Yeah, we're not going to do that. Next... Ah, same again. It really doesn't like those babies. Maybe we should...?"

I don't feel ready to accept that in any given situation there is always a most moral action. I used to say that, but I have retracted it. I believe morality is subjective and relative, and some actions are clearly better than others. But when several competing factors are in the balance, allowing science to decide how to rate these is dangerous. There have always been moral quandaries, and there should be. I'd be really scared if people started saying science has "solved" them. If science's readout is considered as just another opinion, we're straight back to subjective morality.

Of course, in everyday life, decisions are not usually that complex. Do I hit this guy for no reason as I walk past him? No. Do I help this person through the door? Yes. Do I steal this bike? No. There's no real conflict, so science is not needed. The "trapped in burning building" scenarios happen so rarely that setting up a science based way to assess them if you discovered them personally seems... creepy and unhelpful.

If we're just trying to say morality(west) > morality(crazy country) then sure, there's so much common sense injected into the science so far that I don't see the need to invoke science at all. Just say it. It won't achieve anything, either way.

[Edwardo Piet]

If scientists could never ever discover any way of measuring well being at all in practice - and no one else could either, it still doesn't imply that there are no objective answers to moral questions in principle.