The Philosophy of Mind: Zombies, "radical emergence" and evidence of non-experiential

[Edwardo Piet]

I don’t know how you guys discuss this. I read the first 4 paragraphs and then I flew into a lamp and died

I loled.

[bennyboy]

I'm afraid to upset the balance of this thread, since there are two main participants. But anyway, this is my kind of discussion, so forgive me for wading in.

Does consciousness improve evolutionary fitness? It depends on what you mean by "consciousness." If you mean that a system is capable of responding to the environment, then obviously, yes. If you mean that the system is capable of experiencing qualia, then yes IF qualia represents information beyond anything which could be represented physically, or no IF qualia is a mirroring of state.

We can take a speculative look at all the things the body does in arriving at a behavior, and ask-- do ANY of these require us to experience them?
-Trigger neurons in response to physical stimulus. No.
-Cascade a huge number of neurons due to dendrite-cell mappings, release of neurotransmitters, etc? No.
-Affect the likelihood of behaviors based on hormones. No.

It should be immediately obvious that we can go through the whole list of electro-chemical and mechanical processes going on in the body, and determine that none of them require subjective experience.

Nor can simply conflating subjective experience to brain function solve this problem. Can we study the brain directly? Yes. Brain systems? Yes. Neurons? Yes. Specific neural firing patterns? Yes (at least in theory). Obviously, none of these things can be called qualia-- because if we can interact with A directly, and not B, then A is not B.

I'd also say that the use of evolution to justify a view on consciousness is malformed. I could say the existence of a man-loving God would benefit our evolutionary fitness. Then I could, without any justification, conflate any physical properties I observed as correlates of the presence of God. Sun comes up? God! Spooky feeling in church when I'm half asleep from a long sermon? God!

Unless you can show that there's something intrinsically different about a qualia-experiencing system and a non-qualia-experiencing system which can affect behavior, then you are talking about magic, not material.

[The Grand Nudger]

A commonly referenced framework for an evolutionary theory of consciousness is AST.  Attention Schema Theory.  It posits that qualia is a form of internal modeling, and that the benefits of this internal modeling are not only observable in other physical systems...but also, in all likelihood, much farther back down the evolutionary branches than we might expect.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_schema_theory

(you should really browse the publications in reference - particularly the lit review)

[Edwardo Piet]

I'm afraid to upset the balance of this thread, since there are two main participants.  But anyway, this is my kind of discussion, so forgive me for wading in.

Does consciousness improve evolutionary fitness?  It depends on what you mean by "consciousness."

Thank God for that. Someone who realizes that semantics is important. It definitely matters what we mean by consciousness.

 If you mean that a system is capable of responding to the environment, then obviously, yes.

What makes you think consciousness is required for that?

 If you mean that the system is capable of experiencing qualia, then yes IF qualia represents information beyond anything which could be represented physically, or no IF qualia is a mirroring of state.

What do you mean by "a mirroring of a state"?

The consciousness I'm speaking of is qualia. I don't see how qualia is useful. As, for instance, it would be possible in principle for an organism to react to being damaged or attacked without actually experiencing pain.... and I can't think of any kind of senses that are any less evolutionary useful without qualia. Qualia appears to either be some sort of byproduct of brain complexity, or something more fundamental than that, to me.

We can take a speculative look at all the things the body does in arriving at a behavior, and ask-- do ANY of these require us to experience them?
-Trigger neurons in response to physical stimulus.  No.
-Cascade a huge number of neurons due to dendrite-cell mappings, release of neurotransmitters, etc?  No.
-Affect the likelihood of behaviors based on hormones.  No.

It should be immediately obvious that we can go through the whole list of electro-chemical and mechanical processes going on in the body, and determine that none of them require subjective experience.

We agree completely here.

Nor can simply conflating subjective experience to brain function solve this problem.

Agreed.

 Can we study the brain directly?  Yes.  Brain systems?  Yes.  Neurons?  Yes.  Specific neural firing patterns?  Yes (at least in theory).  Obviously, none of these things can be called qualia-- because if we can interact with A directly, and not B, then A is not B.

True, unless those things are identical to qualia. The identity theory for instance. The idea being that, our first person experience is just those things in first person form. What is your view on that?

That is my view, but I also don't know of any evidence of the non-experiential. So I have this 'crazy' position that perhaps it's consciousness all the way down.

I'd also say that the use of evolution to justify a view on consciousness is malformed.

I agree.

 I could say the existence of a man-loving God would benefit our evolutionary fitness.  Then I could, without any justification, conflate any physical properties I observed as correlates of the presence of God.  Sun comes up?  God!  Spooky feeling in church when I'm half asleep from a long sermon?  God!

Well, I think the point is that consciousness may help creatures reproduce... it may be genetically selected for by natural selection.

I don't think it is. I think it's either part of the intrinsic nature of matter or it's a byproduct. I think perhaps human consciousness on a higher level is a byproduct, of brain complexity, but consciousness itself doesn't appear to have a function... it's just a by product of functioning.

Unless you can show that there's something intrinsically different about a qualia-experiencing system and a non-qualia-experiencing system which can affect behavior, then you are talking about magic, not material.

I'm not sure what you're saying here. Do you mean that the idea of radical emergence is some sort of magical idea? I would agree with that. I don't have any evidence of the non-experiential.

What do you think of my opinion list in the end of the OP?

[bennyboy]

A commonly referenced framework for an evolutionary theory of consciousness is AST.  Attention Schema Theory.  It posits that qualia is a form of internal modeling, and that the benefits of this internal modeling are not only observable in other physical systems...but also, in all likelihood, much farther back down the evolutionary branches than we might expect.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_schema_theory

(you should really browse the publications in reference - particularly the lit review)

Here's the thing, though.  You seem to be giving a final cause, which I'd say is a pretty idealistic view: "Well, consciousness helps an organism to thrive in its environment."  But the point of interest is how or why there can be such a thing as consciousness.

---

What makes you think consciousness is required for that?

I don't think that.  I completely disagree with that definition of consciousness.  To me, consciousness means the experience of qualia, and only that.

What do you mean by "a mirroring of a state"?

Sorry maybe it's a clumsy turn of phrase.  I mean that rather than being a product OF brain function, some conflate the subjective experience and the brain function, saying they are one and the same. To me, this is unacceptable. One property is the experience of what things are like, and one is a collection of neurological processes that you can monitor and manipulate.

The consciousness I'm speaking of is qualia. I don't see how qualia is useful. As, for instance, it would be possible in principle for an organism to react to being damaged or attacked without actually experiencing pain.... and I can't think of any kind of senses that are any less evolutionary useful without qualia. Qualia appears to either be some sort of byproduct of brain complexity, or something more fundamental than that, to me.

Whatever qualia are, I believe that reality itself must have the capacity for experience.  I wouldn't say qualia are useful to a physical system, either-- because without the capacity for qualia, there can be no real use for anything.

True, unless those things are identical to qualia. The identity theory for instance. The idea being that, our first person experience is just those things in first person form. What is your view on that?

My view is that I can observe all the physical properties and functions of the brain, and still not have direct access to a person's qualia.  To me this is obvious: if I'm dreaming about a magic unicorn and want to cut off its horn, you can't hand me a hammer-- you have, perhaps, to stimulate a very particular set of neurons.

Well, I think the point is that consciousness may help creatures reproduce... it may be genetically selected for by natural selection.

I don't think it is. I think it's either part of the intrinsic nature of matter or it's a byproduct. I think perhaps human consciousness on a higher level is a byproduct, of brain complexity, but consciousness itself doesn't appear to have a function... it's just a by product of functioning.

I agree.  It wouldn't be hard to make a mathematical weighting system for robots, for example, which would determine the weighting between "Make new robots" behavior and "go to the repair shop" behaviors.

[The Grand Nudger]

Here's the thing, though.  You seem to be giving a final cause, which I'd say is a pretty idealistic view: "Well, consciousness helps an organism to thrive in its environment."  But the point of interest is how or why there can be such a thing as consciousness.

Answered in ast as a form of internal (and in more elaborate implementations, environmental and projective) modeling.

[bennyboy]

Here's the thing, though.  You seem to be giving a final cause, which I'd say is a pretty idealistic view: "Well, consciousness helps an organism to thrive in its environment."  But the point of interest is how or why there can be such a thing as consciousness.

Answered in ast as a form of internal (and in more elaborate implementations, environmental and projective) modeling.

I seriously doubt that the philosophical question is answered: why is it that any physical system, under any configuration, has the capacity to experience qualia?  Why is there such a thing as subjective experience in a world view which is (at least in theory) modeled purely in objective terms?

I don't want to read your link just yet, because I doubt it answers the philosophical question at hand.  If it does, would you mind giving a short-form version?  If it's compelling at all, then I'll be happy to read up on AST.

--edit--
I think my issue is that qualia isn't considered elemental in a material view. So either there's a critical mass of something (information, electric fields of a certain configuration, whatever) which suddenly spawns a quale, or there's an incremental process by which more complex systems have something more and more like qualia. But qualia-gony (lol) is binary: either something is being experienced, or it isn't. I cannot conceive that there is "more and more experienced."

[The Grand Nudger]

In the theory, the attention schema provides the requisite information that allows the machine to make claims about consciousness. When the machine claims to be conscious of thing X – when it claims that it has a subjective awareness, or a mental possession, of thing X – the machine is using higher cognition to access an attention schema, and reporting the information therein.

---

I think my issue is that qualia isn't considered elemental in a material view.  So either there's a critical mass of something (information, electric fields of a certain configuration, whatever) which suddenly spawns a quale, or there's an incremental process by which more complex systems have something more and more like qualia.

Maybe, yeah..in ast, they'd put the critical mass at the point of the reptilian brain.   

But qualia-gony (lol) is binary: either something is being experienced, or it isn't.  I cannot conceive that there is "more and more experienced."

Well, our own experiences have varying levels of richness; realism, hyper-realism, illusory.  We put this down to the relative amount or quality of sensory experience and in some cases a product of novel chemistry in the brain..but.."more and more experienced" may just be a term for richer and richer experience.  It may be that the comparative richness of one experiences produces distinct behavioral differences in it;s contextually "lesser" peer..even though they both experience.

I'll drop another quote..from the author of that theory...this time writing about it for the atlantic..I think you might enjoy it.

Consider an unlikely thought experiment. If you could somehow attach an external speech mechanism to a crocodile, and the speech mechanism had access to the information in that attention schema in the crocodile’s wulst, that technology-assisted crocodile might report, “I’ve got something intangible inside me. It’s not an eyeball or a head or an arm. It exists without substance. It’s my mental possession of things. It moves around from one set of items to another. When that mysterious process in me grasps hold of something, it allows me to understand, to remember, and to respond.”

The crocodile would be wrong, of course. Covert attention isn’t intangible. It has a physical basis, but that physical basis lies in the microscopic details of neurons, synapses, and signals. The brain has no need to know those details. The attention schema is therefore strategically vague. It depicts covert attention in a physically incoherent way, as a non-physical essence. And this, according to the theory, is the origin of consciousness. We say we have consciousness because deep in the brain, something quite primitive is computing that semi-magical self-description. Alas crocodiles can’t really talk. But in this theory, they’re likely to have at least a simple form of an attention schema.

[Edwardo Piet]

I'm back. Khem is unblocked. Gonna try a different approach.

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I don't think that.  I completely disagree with that definition of consciousness.  To me, consciousness means the experience of qualia, and only that.

Great! We agree on that!

Do you think suggesting qualia is an illusion is extremely silly?

Sorry maybe it's a clumsy turn of phrase.  I mean that rather than being a product OF brain function, some conflate the subjective experience and the brain function, saying they are one and the same.  To me, this is unacceptable.  One property is the experience of what things are like, and one is a collection of neurological processes that you can monitor and manipulate.

I accept the identity theory so I think that the brain activity is qualia... but that's because I just think qualia is the same thing from the first person perspective. I don't see a conflict there at all. I don't see any emergence being required.

Where I disagree with Dennett is his silly non-sequitur about consciousness being an "illusion" when it's the one thing in the universe that can't be an illusion including the universe.

Whatever qualia are, I believe that reality itself must have the capacity for experience.

We agree.

 I wouldn't say qualia are useful to a physical system, either-- because without the capacity for qualia, there can be no real use for anything.

Right. It seems silly to say that if physical systems are bundled with (or composed of) qualia then that means qualia must be useful because everything is.

The point is that in human brains' qualia itself doesn't appear to be performing a function precisely because it's the nature of qualia within the brain rather than it being something that does something in addition to the brain's consciousness. Qualia in the brain doesn't perform a function (or have utility) in the sense that if the intrinsic nature wasn't qualia and instead the brain was unconscious as was everything else in the universe... it would seem that nothing changes there would just be no subjective experience. Behaviorally indistinguisable philosophical zombies do seem to be logically coherent and that's simply one way of expressing the hard problem of consciousness. Which is why does the brain have qualia?. Or even why does anything have qualia?. Perhaps instead of the hard problem of consciousness it should be called the impossible problem of consciousness. But that doesn't make it an incoherent question. There are many questions that are totally coherent that ask questions about things that are forever unanswerable. It doesn't mean it's not a proper question.

For example: If something does exist beyond all possible experience does it drive our experience of reality causally or is it fundamentally acausal?

We can ask questions about noumenal reality even though the correct answer to those questions are by definition forever unknowable. There is a right and wrong answer to all these questions whether we can know the answer or not. Truth and knowledge are, of course, different.

My view is that I can observe all the physical properties and functions of the brain, and still not have direct access to a person's qualia.

I share that view.

 To me this is obvious: if I'm dreaming about a magic unicorn and want to cut off its horn, you can't hand me a hammer-- you have, perhaps, to stimulate a very particular set of neurons.

Right.

I agree.  It wouldn't be hard to make a mathematical weighting system for robots, for example, which would determine the weighting between "Make new robots" behavior and "go to the repair shop" behaviors.

Right.

And I think Khem's idea that consciousness is required for civilization and his primary example being art is silly. The phenomenal object of a painting and the noumenal object is separate. A robot civilization that led to robots creating paintings but they don't experience them as what we would call paintings could exist... and yet the noumenal objects still exist and are painted... even though there are no colors to see.... this is all easily conceivable.

And by saying that consciousness is required for creativity he is just begging the question. Like I said, it can easily be conceived that creative behavior could happen without any qualia and I have made it clear repeatedly that "qualia" is the definition of "consciousness" that I'm using.

Next he jumps to saying that just because it's conceivable doesn't mean it's realistic. Which means he's either fundementally missing the point or conceding that philosophical zombies are conceivable which means the hard problem of consciousness is a legitmate problem, however unsolvable. Despite him trying, and failing, to argue otherwise.

Next he'd probably jump to saying something like "unsolvable problems aren't real problems" again missing the point... truth and knowledge are different.

His debates with me are just a long testament to him missing the point and moving the goalposts.

[The Grand Nudger]

The phenomenal object of a painting and the noumenal object is separate. A robot civilization that lead to robots creating paintings but they don't experience them as what we would call paintings... and yet the noumenal objects still exist and are painted... even though there are no colors to see.... this is all easily conceivable.

There may be many ways to achieve the same effect.  Nevertheless, this is how -we- achieved that effect.