The Philosophy of Mind: Zombies, "radical emergence" and evidence of non-experiential

[bennyboy]

As if seeming wasn't the most real and knowable thing in the world... and as if all empirical knowledge didn't depend on it...

That's the rub. Literally everything I know or believe I have done so through the agency of mind. The only true brute fact is consciousness. The rest is all derivative. Watching apples drop from trees-- experience. Listening to physics teacher talk about how wave functions that can't be unambiguously defined in either space or time-- experience. Measuring things with a ruler, looking through microscopes, asking people what they smell when you poke their brain with a needle-- all experience.

As soon as you move to the shorthand version: "The professor said X" rather than "What seemed like a professor seemed to say X," then you are already begging the question without knowing it. That's because there are very many frameworks which could provide a seeming-of-things that don't require a material monopoly.

[Edwardo Piet]

Empathy is about the only useful function of consciousness that I can come up with.  @Hammy, how can we experience empathy without consciousness?

Well, it's like I said to Khem when I pointed out that robots can still behave as if they like stuff without having the qualia we call "liking". The only part that appears to be missing is the actually liking stuff. But the fact that a robot could behave exactly the same or a philosophical zombie could behave exactly the same without liking... just leads back to my same point about qualia being useless.

N.B. The trouble was Khem appeared to be begging the question by merely building liking itself into the definiton of qualia.

So, my point here is it's the same with empathy. If we literally define empathy itself as requiring consciousness then we win immediately and can simply declare victory by building empathy into the definition... which begs the question and goes back to the philosophical zombie argument and only changes from consciousness generally to empathetic conscious states specifically.

If a creature behaved completely empathetic without feeling empathy then you may say "they're not really empathetic because empathy requires feeling empathy", well sure... but then they wouldn't need to be conscious either. The feeling of empathy is a conscious state... so of course consciousness is required for the feeling of it: But then my point about empathy is exactly the same as my point about consciousness. As an experiential state, as qualia, it doesn't appear to actually do anything. All the useful behavior you get from consciousness or empathy... doesn't seem to require the qualia or the feeling. It's back to strawson's point about how a creature could react as if in pain and have alarm systems and sense danger and detect light all without experiencing any of those things subjectively.

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As if seeming wasn't the most real and knowable thing in the world... and as if all empirical knowledge didn't depend on it...

That's the rub.  Literally everything I know or believe I have done so through the agency of mind.  The only true brute fact is consciousness.  The rest is all derivative.  Watching apples drop from trees-- experience.  Listening to physics teacher talk about how wave functions that can't be unambiguously defined in either space or time-- experience.  Measuring things with a ruler, looking through microscopes, asking people what they smell when you poke their brain with a needle-- all experience.

As soon as you move to the shorthand version: "The professor said X" rather than "What seemed like a professor seemed to say X," then you are already begging the question without knowing it.  That's because there are very many frameworks which could provide a seeming-of-things that don't require a material monopoly.

Exactly. That's why I love the concept of the Lebenswelt so much. And why I keep asking Khem to address the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality (he has ignored that crucial point every single time, by the way, and just changes the subject when I say that... as he moves onto the next red herring or false analogy).

The fact existence must exist is the only other absolute truth that I know. And that's just down to the impossibility of nonexistence. All other tautologies seem to be down to semantics that require experience... but that one doesn't. That one's deeper. If no minds existed, something still would have to exist... simply because nothing can't.

I wouldn't call the necessity of existence a brute fact though... consciousness is a brute fact because it requires experience to be known. Existence is a necessarily logical truth because it must be true whether there are any minds around to know it or not.

So yeah, consciousness is the only absolute brute fact. It isn't necessary in all possible worlds though... unlike existence itself (obviously existence is necessary for all possible worlds... the only impossible world is a nonexistent one... and the concept of "a nonexistent world" is an incoherent concept. There's literally no such thing as a nonexistent world. To say "there is a such thing as a nonexistent world" or even that there could be such a thing as nonexistent world would be to say "a nonexistent world could be existent"... which is like saying "a square could be a circle" or "X could be not X"... and is just a logical contradiction).

(If you're interested in more on the matter of the necessity of existence.... check this video out under the hidetag)

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[LadyForCamus]

Empathy is about the only useful function of consciousness that I can come up with.  @Hammy, how can we experience empathy without consciousness?

Well, it's like I said to Khem when I pointed out that robots can still behave as if they like stuff without having the qualia we call "liking". The only part that appears to be missing is the actually liking stuff. But the fact that a robot could behave exactly the same or a philosophical zombie could behave exactly the same without liking... just leads back to my same point about qualia being useless.

N.B. The trouble was Khem appeared to be begging the question by merely building liking itself into the definiton of qualia.

So, my point here is it's the same with empathy. If we literally define empathy itself as requiring consciousness then we win immediately and can simply declare victory by building empathy into the definition... which begs the question and goes back to the philosophical zombie argument and only changes from consciousness generally to empathetic conscious states specifically.

If a creature behaved completely empathetic without feeling empathy then you may say "they're not really empathetic because empathy requires feeling empathy", well sure... but then they wouldn't need to be conscious either. The feeling of empathy is a conscious state... so of course consciousness is required for the feeling of it: But then my point about empathy is exactly the same as my point about consciousness. As an experiential state, as qualia, it doesn't appear to actually do anything. All the useful behavior you get from consciousness or empathy... doesn't seem to require the qualia or the feeling. It's back to strawson's point about how a creature could react as if in pain and have alarm systems and sense danger and detect light all without experiencing any of those things subjectively.

Hmmm.  I agree with you that consciousness as a whole likely plays little to no role in our decision-making processes, and that most of the information processing that effects behavior occurs absent our awareness.  But, I do think that empathy plays a large role in driving those unconscious decisions, and you can’t experience empathy without consciousness, as empathy, by its definition, is literally the experience of a feeling.  We behave in particular ways toward other humans largely due to empathy.  That is empathy’s evolutionary utility.

Any mental reaction (conscious or unconscious) to an empathetic feeling depends upon the individual’s ability to experience that feeling in the first place.  And so the way I see it, a non-conscious being without the ability to experience empathy would behave exactly like a sociopath. Sure, sociopaths can “fake it”, so to speak, so you could argue that they can model empathy in their behavior even if they don’t experience it, but that would also require consciousness manipulation.  

Maybe this is more an argument for the utility of empathy than it is an argument for the utility of consciousness, but I would say that the utility of empathy is contingent upon the existence of consciousness.

And, holy shit, that was NOT concise, but I don’t have time to edit!  Sorry!

*runs*

[The Grand Nudger]

So this is an admission that you were wrong then? Philosophical zombies could do all the things you previously said required consciousness.

I've repeatedly told you that I don't think consciousness is a requirement for a wide range of things.  The fact remains, however, that it is sufficient for at least some things. Evolution is a process of sufficiency, not necessity. It makes precisely zero sense to approach any selective advantage in this way, or to dismiss them on those grounds.

Um... the entire point of the philosophical zombie argument that you are supposed to be addressing is a matter of that. The point is that there isn't necessarily any reason why consciousness had to evolve along with brains per se... as all behaviors could be achieved without consciousness. You keep failing to demonstrate the undemonstratable and continuing to claim that consciousness has a function without any actual or argument that supports otherwise (not surprised, such a thing isn't possible). Is this the part where you say "But in this case consciousness does perform that function" and simply miss the point and completely beg the question again?

The evolutionary benefit of consciousness in AST is p-zombie neutral.  It doesn't matter...to AST, whether you are a p-zombie or a real boy™.  It posits that consciousness as reported -or- consciousness as reporting are both functionally useful as control models.  It's important to note that it's not a cognitive theory of consciousness, either.  It doesn't posit that the model is in control. Can you see how that bypasses every objection you have personally expressed to the notion of consciousness conferring a selective advantage?

Those things aren't issues for AST any more than necessity is an issue for selective advantage.

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Maybe this is more an argument for the utility of empathy than it is an argument for the utility of consciousness, but I would say that the utility of empathy is contingent upon the existence of consciousness.  

It may not be contingent, we don't know....what we can demonstrate, though, is that attention is less well-controlled in the absence of awareness. In a nutshell, that's what makes AST an evolutionary theory of consciousness.

[bennyboy]

Well, it's like I said to Khem when I pointed out that robots can still behave as if they like stuff without having the qualia we call "liking". The only part that appears to be missing is the actually liking stuff. But the fact that a robot could behave exactly the same or a philosophical zombie could behave exactly the same without liking... just leads back to my same point about qualia being useless.

N.B. The trouble was Khem appeared to be begging the question by merely building liking itself into the definiton of qualia.

So, my point here is it's the same with empathy. If we literally define empathy itself as requiring consciousness then we win immediately and can simply declare victory by building empathy into the definition... which begs the question and goes back to the philosophical zombie argument and only changes from consciousness generally to empathetic conscious states specifically.

If a creature behaved completely empathetic without feeling empathy then you may say "they're not really empathetic because empathy requires feeling empathy", well sure... but then they wouldn't need to be conscious either. The feeling of empathy is a conscious state... so of course consciousness is required for the feeling of it: But then my point about empathy is exactly the same as my point about consciousness. As an experiential state, as qualia, it doesn't appear to actually do anything. All the useful behavior you get from consciousness or empathy... doesn't seem to require the qualia or the feeling. It's back to strawson's point about how a creature could react as if in pain and have alarm systems and sense danger and detect light all without experiencing any of those things subjectively.

Hmmm.  I agree with you that consciousness as a whole likely plays little to no role in our decision-making processes, and that most of the information processing that effects behavior occurs absent our awareness.  But, I do think that empathy plays a large role in driving those unconscious decisions, and you can’t experience empathy without consciousness, as empathy, by its definition, is literally the experience of a feeling.  We behave in particular ways toward other humans largely due to empathy.  That is empathy’s evolutionary utility.

Any mental reaction (conscious or unconscious) to an empathetic feeling depends upon the individual’s ability to experience that feeling in the first place.  And so the way I see it, a non-conscious being without the ability to experience empathy would behave exactly like a sociopath. Sure, sociopaths can “fake it”, so to speak, so you could argue that they can model empathy in their behavior even if they don’t experience it, but that would also require consciousness manipulation.  

Maybe this is more an argument for the utility of empathy than it is an argument for the utility of consciousness, but I would say that the utility of empathy is contingent upon the existence of consciousness.  

And, holy shit, that was NOT concise, but I don’t have time to edit!  Sorry!

*runs*

Still the same philosophical problem though.  You could, at least hypothetically, program a robot to act as empathetic as a human does.

Let me cut through some red tape here, and assert (completely without proof or much evidence) that since all behaviors are physical, and since we judge the "mental state" of another agent on those physical behaviors, that at some point a machine should be able to replicate all behaviors, and therefore be taken as alive if judged on that basis.

Consciousness is required to appreciate a sunset.  But a robot could seem  to appreciate a sunset.  Consciousness is required to truly enjoy Beethoven's 5th.  But a robot could seem  to appreciate a sunset.

I think it's very possible that in the not-distant future, AI will be sufficiently convincing that bleeding hearts will start marching for robot rights.  Maybe robots will get the vote, and so on.  Maybe robots will wipe out humanity.

The question is this-- will all that seeming mean that a new species has arisen with a new take on enjoyment?  Or will the beauty of the sunset cease to exist in any meaningful way because there's nobody left with the capacity to actually experience it?  I very strongly suspect the latter to be the case.

[The Grand Nudger]

The question is this-- will all that seeming mean that a new species has arisen with a new take on enjoyment?  Or will the beauty of the sunset cease to exist in any meaningful way because there's nobody left with the capacity to actually experience it?  I very strongly suspect the latter to be the case.

The first part is incoherent.  Machines aren't subject to biological classification.  

The latter part is.....well... the beauty of the sunset either exists or doesn't exist independently of any particular observers appraisal or ability to appraise.  Those observers refer to those things  x about the object in order to establish that beauty..and though they don't all agree on what is (or what makes something) beautiful..if "that particular shade of pastel orange" is the justification for the appraisal.....then..yes, that particular shade of orange exists before and after anyone (or anything) that could appreciate does. Unappreciated beauty isn't exactly controversial, which reduces your conclusion that the beauty ceases to exist fundamentally baseless. It would have to be without referent, not referee....for that terminus to be true in any meaningful sense.

You're imagining a future in which there is no one (or no thing) to see beauty..not a future in which beauty does not exist to be beheld.

[LadyForCamus]

So this is an admission that you were wrong then? Philosophical zombies could do all the things you previously said required consciousness.

I've repeatedly told you that I don't think consciousness is a requirement for a wide range of things.  The fact remains, however, that it is sufficient for at least some things.  Evolution is a process of sufficiency, not necessity.  It makes precisely zero sense to approach any selective advantage in this way, or to dismiss them on those grounds.  

Um... the entire point of the philosophical zombie argument that you are supposed to be addressing is a matter of that. The point is that there isn't necessarily any reason why consciousness had to evolve along with brains per se... as all behaviors could be achieved without consciousness. You keep failing to demonstrate the undemonstratable and continuing to claim that consciousness has a function without any actual or argument that supports otherwise (not surprised, such a thing isn't possible). Is this the part where you say "But in this case consciousness does perform that function" and simply miss the point and completely beg the question again?

The evolutionary benefit of consciousness in AST is p-zombie neutral.  It doesn't matter...to AST, whether you are a p-zombie or a real boy™.  It posits that consciousness as reported -or- consciousness as reporting are both functionally useful as control models.  It's important to note that it's not a cognitive theory of consciousness, either.  It doesn't posit that the model is in control.  Can you see how that bypasses every objection you have personally expressed to the notion of consciousness conferring a selective advantage?

Those things aren't issues for AST any more than necessity is an issue for selective advantage.

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Maybe this is more an argument for the utility of empathy than it is an argument for the utility of consciousness, but I would say that the utility of empathy is contingent upon the existence of consciousness.  

It may not be contingent, we don't know....

You’re saying it might be possible to for a human to experience empathy in the absence of consciousness?  How?

[The Grand Nudger]

This observation isn't strictly limited to humans.  Nor is it the insistence that x beings couldn't be behaviorally empathetic in the absence of awareness*.

It's the acknowledgement that outcomes associated with empathy and awareness might be achieved other ways (and even in us, those behaviors could be achieved other ways). What does empathy do for us? What outcomes does it work to secure? Empathy isn't the only way to secure them..empathy is not -necessary-......though it does seem sufficient.

[LadyForCamus]

Hmmm.  I agree with you that consciousness as a whole likely plays little to no role in our decision-making processes, and that most of the information processing that effects behavior occurs absent our awareness.  But, I do think that empathy plays a large role in driving those unconscious decisions, and you can’t experience empathy without consciousness, as empathy, by its definition, is literally the experience of a feeling.  We behave in particular ways toward other humans largely due to empathy.  That is empathy’s evolutionary utility.

Any mental reaction (conscious or unconscious) to an empathetic feeling depends upon the individual’s ability to experience that feeling in the first place.  And so the way I see it, a non-conscious being without the ability to experience empathy would behave exactly like a sociopath. Sure, sociopaths can “fake it”, so to speak, so you could argue that they can model empathy in their behavior even if they don’t experience it, but that would also require consciousness manipulation.  

Maybe this is more an argument for the utility of empathy than it is an argument for the utility of consciousness, but I would say that the utility of empathy is contingent upon the existence of consciousness.  

And, holy shit, that was NOT concise, but I don’t have time to edit!  Sorry!

*runs*

Still the same philosophical problem though.  You could, at least hypothetically, program a robot to act as empathetic as a human does.

Let me cut through some red tape here, and assert (completely without proof or much evidence) that since all behaviors are physical, and since we judge the "mental state" of another agent on those physical behaviors, that at some point a machine should be able to replicate all behaviors, and therefore be taken as alive if judged on that basis.

Consciousness is required to appreciate a sunset.  But a robot could seem  to appreciate a sunset.  Consciousness is required to truly enjoy Beethoven's 5th.  But a robot could seem  to appreciate a sunset.

I think it's very possible that in the not-distant future, AI will be sufficiently convincing that bleeding hearts will start marching for robot rights.  Maybe robots will get the vote, and so on.  Maybe robots will wipe out humanity.

The question is this-- will all that seeming mean that a new species has arisen with a new take on enjoyment?  Or will the beauty of the sunset cease to exist in any meaningful way because there's nobody left with the capacity to actually experience it?  I very strongly suspect the latter to be the case.

But, a human being without empathy would most likely (and often does) behave differently than humans who do experience empathy, and so my response to Hammy’s idea (that consciousness is not useful to us in any way), is that it’s useful by way of allowing us to experience empathy, which drives outcomes in populations.


That IS how WE do it, isn’t Khem? 😛

As for AI...fuck that shit. I’m running for the hills!

https://youtu.be/rYLm8iMY5io

[The Grand Nudger]

But, a human being without empathy would most likely (and often does) behave differently than humans who do experience empathy, and so my response to Hammy’s idea (that consciousness is not useful to us in any way), is that it’s useful by way of allowing us to experience empathy, which drives outcomes in populations.


That IS how WE do it, isn’t Khem? 😛

As for AI...fuck that shit.  I’m running for the hills!

https://youtu.be/rYLm8iMY5io

Well...if you ask a consciousness realist, yes..ofc, that's how we do it.  If you ask an illusorist...they'll tell you the question is moot.