Interesting statistics about academic philosophy

[Neo-Scholastic]

What's with all the atheits' hand-wringing? If you follow reason then nominalism (and by extension conceptualism) is demonstrably false. It does not matter whether this opens the door to theism or not. That would be an appeal to consequences.

Personally, I find the prominence of non-skeptical and moral realism encouraging.

[Pyrrho]

This reminds me of an idea I encountered long ago (so long ago that it hardly matters now if it was true then) that most mathematicians were platonists with respect to mathematics. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy states "Mathematical platonism enjoys widespread support and is frequently considered the default metaphysical position with respect to mathematics."  But it would be interesting to see a poll of mathematicians.

Thinking back on the expressed attitudes of my mathematics teachers, I do not recall any of them saying they had any other position, though I do not recall all of them talking about this.

My dad bought me a book a while back that was a bunch of short essays from different people about the nature of math, and it's been a bit since I've read it, but I remember seeing a fairly good mix between people that felt it was Platonic and others that weren't really convicned at all.  Maybe that was a purposeful selection by the editor, though.  The biggest impression I got from the book, however, was that no one really knows what math actually is.

I think books like that typically do strive to give representations of a variety of opinions rather than try to represent just what is most popular.

[Faith No More]

It can be.  It can also be about obtuse ways of justifying your views.  Probably the appeal to theists.

Plantinga comes to mind.

(Wooters, too.)

[Faith No More]

I think books like that typically do strive to give representations of a variety of opinions rather than try to represent just what is most popular.

Probably.

[Mudhammam]

This reminds me of an idea I encountered long ago (so long ago that it hardly matters now if it was true then) that most mathematicians were platonists with respect to mathematics. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy states "Mathematical platonism enjoys widespread support and is frequently considered the default metaphysical position with respect to mathematics."  But it would be interesting to see a poll of mathematicians.

Thinking back on the expressed attitudes of my mathematics teachers, I do not recall any of them saying they had any other position, though I do not recall all of them talking about this.

My dad bought me a book a while back that was a bunch of short essays from different people about the nature of math, and it's been a bit since I've read it, but I remember seeing a fairly good mix between people that felt it was Platonic and others that weren't really convicned at all.  Maybe that was a purposeful selection by the editor, though.  The biggest impression I got from the book, however, was that no one really knows what math actually is.

Whoa. I need that book. Do you recall the title?

[Mudhammam]

What's with all the atheits' hand-wringing? If you follow reason then nominalism (and by extension conceptualism) is demonstrably false. It does not matter whether this opens the door to theism or not. That would be an appeal to consequences.

Personally, I find the prominence of non-skeptical and moral realism encouraging.

I'm not that well versed in the technicalities, but why could one not hold to conceptualism while rejecting nominalism? Couldn't one say that certain abstract objects may exist in some fashion and simultaneously believe that universals represent nothing more than terms that the mind applies to similar apprehensions in the way Alex described?

[Neo-Scholastic]

What's with all the atheits' hand-wringing? If you follow reason then nominalism (and by extension conceptualism) is demonstrably false. It does not matter whether this opens the door to theism or not. That would be an appeal to consequences.

Personally, I find the prominence of non-skeptical and moral realism encouraging.

I'm not that well versed in the technicalities, but why could one not hold to conceptualism while rejecting nominalism? Couldn't one say that certain abstract objects may exist in some fashion and simultaneously believe that universals represent nothing more than terms that the mind applies to similar apprehensions in the way Alex described?

In the simplest terms, conceptualism is really just a subset of nominalism.

[Pizza]

The Platonism bit surprises me. Really? Especially combined with a physical mind. Can.anyone who knows the least bit about neurology have good reasons to be a Platonist?

As far as I can conceive it, there are ideas about "non-physical things" and then the non-physical things themselves. Numbers, for example, would be the ideas about NPT. What they represent about the world would be the NPT themselves. Other NPT might fall into those categories too... truth, value, etc. In that regards I don't see a conflict between Platonism and a physical mind.

But I was also surprised about that.

I don't know about this. Platonism is often just used as a synonym for realism. What counts which varies from philosopher to philosopher.

[robvalue]

Nestor: if I interpreted you correctly, you seemed to say that the majority of philophers believe in objective morality (you used another term, realism or something). Is that what you were saying? If so, I'm really surprised. You are literally the first atheist I've heard argue for objective morality, although whether we even agree on what "morality" means is another question.

I would have thought most philosophers would argue for subjective morality. But I haven't done any research on that matter, this is just from my experience.

[Pizza]

Moral realism is the view that there are moral facts. What counts as moral facts is where most of the disagreement is. For example classic utilitarians claim moral facts are facts about what action produces the most pleasure and reduces pain.