Religion is a poor source of morality

[robvalue]

I'll surrender this much, for the sake of argument, in an attempt to understand the position.

Given our current knowledge, it's fairly reasonable to assume that, very roughly speaking and making several simplifying assumptions:

Some actions are objectively good for wellbeing.

Some actions are objectively bad for wellbeing.

Some actions are objectively neutral for wellbeing.

However, some actions fall into a grey area where determining their effect on wellbeing is complex because they have both good and bad properties. Also, we often have to make choices between two good options, or two bad options, and determining exactly which is the better option is not clear. This is where morality becomes much more subjective. Especially since an individual's morality is (in my opinion) much more complex than simply analysing the consequences of their actions. If that's all we are doing, I wouldn't even call it morality any more. If we're talking about a society, analysing the consequences as the primary measurement makes more sense.

[Edwardo Piet]

Yeah we can't always work out what effects our actions will have whether it be good, bad, neutral or a mixture or whatever.

But even if we never could work it out it doesn't mean there aren't objective answers.

[robvalue]

I'd still say the answers are subjective to particular goals.

One choice may be better for the survival of the species, one may be better for overall happiness, one may be better for a balance of personal freedom and safety... To try and answer all these questions at once requires weighing each of them as relatively important; or just announcing one as the only important one. To say there is a correct way to weigh each them is problematic.

Maybe we could agree that morality is subjective for all practical purposes, except in trivial scenarios. If there are these amazing answers, we don't have access to them, neither will we probably ever. They would require absolute knowledge of everything, to perfectly maximise even one aspect of wellbeing.

So really, it's a useless concept in practical terms, no better than common sense combined with application of scientific knowledge.

The thing that strikes me the most is the importance of as many true (and as few false) beliefs as possible. The better people's models are of reality, the closer their outcomes will match their intentions. Assuming they intend to do good, of course. If they intend to do bad, a poor understanding may be a good thing.

[Edwardo Piet]

The thing is though we don't have to prove to people which objective goal is the right one for there to be objective goals. Sam Harris' point is that if steering away from the worst possible misery for everyone isn't important to someone then it should be. If good and bad should be about anything at all it should at least be about that. He doesn't need to prove objectively that that is the worthy goal. It is merely that that goal has objective answers in principle.

[robvalue]

I agree that any particular objective goal could have answers, in principle. And of course I agree that the further away we get from suck-ville (it's shorter ) the better.

I just don't agree that it's possible to say which goal(s) are "the best ones" out of all possible good goals. His landscape description seems way too simple, unless it's a hazy metaphor. However; if we fix the goal first(s), and then assess our options, we could in theory draw a landscape of some kind.

Do you think the latter is what he is suggesting? If so, I need to contact agent 47 urgently to call something off.

[Edwardo Piet]

Yeah I don't agree that it's possible to say which goals are the best ones out of all possible good goals either. And neither does Sam Harris say that's necessarily possible. His argument is more fundamental than that. Once again: he claims there are answers in principle and you said you agree that much. So there we go. Job done I guess?

[robvalue]

OK! I think we agree then

I thought he was actually comparing goals, but if he isn't, then I can get on board again. Yes, I think we've come to an understanding! I knew there had to be a missing part.

Thanks for your patience with my numb-nutsery.

I love you again Sam, please take me back.

[Edwardo Piet]

Furthest he really goes is by explaining how Kant's Deontological ethics and Justice Ethics only really matter ultimately for consequentialist reasons.