The Scripture Is False And The Biblical God Is Dead.

[The Grand Nudger]

PZs and EP are in the same book, for sure. Both are dualist propositions - substance for the pz and property for ep. Perhaps that's why they seem like they could somehow support each other? The pz asks us to consider that nothing going on in our heads is the cause for qualia. EP asks us to consider whether the stuff going on in our heads, which is definitely the explanation for qualia, is in some sort of causal closure. That it's output which has no means of being used as input. All intuitions to that effect being illusory - and here again is a similarity, as the asserted behavior of the pz is likewise, illusory.

I also think that subjectivity is a process, and I'm unaware of any physical process which literally cannot have physical effects. When eps say that fear, for example, isn't what causes our hearts to beat faster - that other physical events cause our heart to beat faster and for us to feel fear - I don't doubt it (though I do think there's at least some wiggle room at the margins - prep response). I do doubt, however, that the experience of fear is absent any causal effects or relationships. One wonders how operant conditioning would work, in that case. Does hearing the sound of the bell make the dog salivate? Would a zombie-dog also salivate? Is a prior experience of pain and terror a completely non-operative item in later pain and terror avoidance?

Maybe so, but if so, biology would appear to have missed one hell of an oppurtunity.

[GrandizerII]

FWIW, what you said was quite clear to me. And I agree, p-zombies could be used as an argument for epiphenomenalism (with some further fleshing out). It doesn't contradict it, in the least.

No worries... I've always figured we're kind of on the same page (or at least within the same book ) in on our thinking on these sorts of things, so I think I know you get it Anyway I may not be the best at articulating my ideas, even to myself, but it doesn't stop them from being genuine philosophical conundrums to me... ie not just wordplay.

Meh, let them say wordplay all they want. I personally find consciousness to be a fascinating topic to explore, and like you, see something "extra" about it that isn't being adequately accounted for in current science.

Funny thing is, when I first joined these forums, I didn't even think there was such a thing as a hard problem (at the time, I thought of consciousness as something that can be entirely described in functionalist terms, and didn't find anything baffling about it).

Also, I find the biggest question for me isn't how/why we exist at all, but rather how/why we are conscious that we exist.

[emjay]

PZs and EP are in the same book, for sure.  Both are dualist propositions - substance for the pz and property for ep.  Perhaps that's why they seem like they could somehow support each other?  The pz asks us to consider that nothing going on in our heads is the cause for qualia.  EP asks us to consider whether the stuff going on in our heads, which is definitely the explanation for qualia, is in some sort of causal closure.  That it's output which has no means of being used as input.  All intuitions to that effect being illusory - and here again is a similarity, as the asserted behavior of the pz is likewise, illusory.

I also think that subjectivity is a process, and I'm unaware of any physical process which literally cannot have physical effects.  When eps say that fear, for example, isn't what causes our hearts to beat faster - that other physical events cause our heart to beat faster and for us to feel fear - I don't doubt it (though I do think there's at least some wiggle room at the margins - prep response).  I do doubt, however, that the experience of fear is absent any causal effects or relationships.  One wonders how operant conditioning would work, in that case.  Does hearing the sound of the bell make the dog salivate?  Would a zombie-dog also salivate?  Is a prior experience of pain and terror a completely non-operative item in later pain and terror avoidance?

Maybe so, but if so, biology would appear to have missed one hell of an oppurtunity.

My zombie-dogs would salivate, yes; I also agree that fear is part of a process, ie conditional on causes and relationships, but just that those causes and relations under epiphenomenalist thinking would be manifested entirely within the physical correlates of consciousness, ie neurons and the brain. Perhaps you could consider them different levels of description; fear is a phenomenal experience, but it's also... or corresponds in some way to... a specific neural state of activity. As does hearing a sound, associating that sound with other neural representations, and triggering other neural events (ie salivating), same for a learned fear response... at either level of description they can be considered the same process, but just with epiphenomenalism asserting that the phenomenal side is causally inert... basically just a representation of the underlying physical processes.

[Fake Messiah]

So let me try to summarize this discussion:

Few people claim that consciousness could not evolve or that there is no explanation for it to evolve and therefore God (which would be an argument from the ignorance fallacy)

But, consciousness is a product of intelligence, the more some animal has intelligence the more conscious it is, and we all know that intelligence can evolve. So those few members introduced the concept of p zombie into the discussion as some sort of evidence that humans can exist without consciousness. But p zombies don't exist so other members are asking "why bother with that?" Indeed, if someone was a zombie he would be a mentally disabled person who could not function. Not just that, but our ancestors were harsh toward mentally disabled people. For example, people who were considered village idiots did not exist until agrarian societies where a surplus of food could be spared to feed them.

[GrandizerII]

So let me try to summarize this discussion:

Few people claim that consciousness could not evolve or that there is no explanation for it to evolve and therefore God (which would be an argument from the ignorance fallacy)

But, consciousness is a product of intelligence, the more some animal has intelligence the more conscious it is, and we all know that intelligence can evolve. So those few members introduced the concept of p zombie into the discussion as some sort of evidence that humans can exist without consciousness. But p zombies don't exist so other members are asking "why bother with that?" Indeed, if someone was a zombie he would be a mentally disabled person who could not function. Not just that, but our ancestors were harsh toward mentally disabled people. For example, people who were considered village idiots did not exist until agrarian societies where a surplus of food could be spared to feed them.

Who are these "few people"?

I'm guessing this post is meant to be a parody?

If not, you didn't do a careful reading at all of what we are saying. And sure, you could make the claim that consciousness is a product of intelligence, but you still run into the problem of accounting for how you could get consciousness out of intelligence (and why we even have it). And what do you mean exactly by intelligence, and consciousness (for that matter)? Your view raises a lot of questions, and it's not even what the relevant experts generally say anyway.

And p-zombies are not meant to be real. They're meant to be a theoretical starting point to show that consciousness is something that is "extra beyond" the physical body/brain (even if linked to the body/brain). Whether that ultimately succeeds or not is a different story.

I don't know what you're going on about "village idiots". That has nothing to do with p-zombies.

[emjay]

No worries... I've always figured we're kind of on the same page (or at least within the same book ) in on our thinking on these sorts of things, so I think I know you get it Anyway I may not be the best at articulating my ideas, even to myself, but it doesn't stop them from being genuine philosophical conundrums to me... ie not just wordplay.

Meh, let them say wordplay all they want. I personally find consciousness to be a fascinating topic to explore, and like you, see something "extra" about it that isn't being adequately accounted for in current science.

Funny thing is, when I first joined these forums, I didn't even think there was such a thing as a hard problem (at the time, I thought of consciousness as something that can be entirely described in functionalist terms, and didn't find anything baffling about it).

Also, I find the biggest question for me isn't how/why we exist at all, but rather how/why we are conscious that we exist.

I find it fascinating too... when I'm in the mood for it; I'm sorry about what I said before - I haven't given up on it completely... and it seems I'm just as opinionated as I've always been ... it's just I've just been in a bit of a mental funk lately... lacking confidence, feeling inadequate, depressed... and probably projecting quite a lot of that... and it's definitely use it or lose it when it comes to something like philosophy I'm finding... ie for example I've paid a price intellectually for not engaging here as much as I used to. But thankfully this new topic of Objectivism has lit a fire under me, and I'm excited about philosophy again.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

No worries... I've always figured we're kind of on the same page (or at least within the same book ) in on our thinking on these sorts of things, so I think I know you get it Anyway I may not be the best at articulating my ideas, even to myself, but it doesn't stop them from being genuine philosophical conundrums to me... ie not just wordplay.

Meh, let them say wordplay all they want. I personally find consciousness to be a fascinating topic to explore, and like you, see something "extra" about it that isn't being adequately accounted for in current science.

Funny thing is, when I first joined these forums, I didn't even think there was such a thing as a hard problem (at the time, I thought of consciousness as something that can be entirely described in functionalist terms, and didn't find anything baffling about it).

Also, I find the biggest question for me isn't how/why we exist at all, but rather how/why we are conscious that we exist.

(Bold mine)

Qualia are to consciousness as phlogiston is to chemistry.

Boru

[GrandizerII]

Meh, let them say wordplay all they want. I personally find consciousness to be a fascinating topic to explore, and like you, see something "extra" about it that isn't being adequately accounted for in current science.

Funny thing is, when I first joined these forums, I didn't even think there was such a thing as a hard problem (at the time, I thought of consciousness as something that can be entirely described in functionalist terms, and didn't find anything baffling about it).

Also, I find the biggest question for me isn't how/why we exist at all, but rather how/why we are conscious that we exist.

(Bold mine)

Qualia are to consciousness as phlogiston is to chemistry.

Boru

Not really. Qualia are the phenomenal properties experienced through consciousness. For example, pain. Another example, the "redness" color. Another example, the "triangularity" shape. We observe qualia, and we try to account for them.

Phlogiston was something that was postulated by past chemists to try to explain something else that is observable.

Not the same thing.

[GrandizerII]

PZs and EP are in the same book, for sure.  Both are dualist propositions - substance for the pz and property for ep.  Perhaps that's why they seem like they could somehow support each other?  The pz asks us to consider that nothing going on in our heads is the cause for qualia.  EP asks us to consider whether the stuff going on in our heads, which is definitely the explanation for qualia, is in some sort of causal closure.  That it's output which has no means of being used as input.  All intuitions to that effect being illusory - and here again is a similarity, as the asserted behavior of the pz is likewise, illusory.

I also think that subjectivity is a process, and I'm unaware of any physical process which literally cannot have physical effects.  When eps say that fear, for example, isn't what causes our hearts to beat faster - that other physical events cause our heart to beat faster and for us to feel fear - I don't doubt it (though I do think there's at least some wiggle room at the margins - prep response).  I do doubt, however, that the experience of fear is absent any causal effects or relationships.  One wonders how operant conditioning would work, in that case.  Does hearing the sound of the bell make the dog salivate?  Would a zombie-dog also salivate?  Is a prior experience of pain and terror a completely non-operative item in later pain and terror avoidance?

Maybe so, but if so, biology would appear to have missed one hell of an oppurtunity.

My zombie-dogs would salivate, yes; I also agree that fear is part of a process, ie conditional on causes and relationships, but just that those causes and relations under epiphenomenalist thinking would be manifested entirely within the physical correlates of consciousness, ie neurons and the brain. Perhaps you could consider them different levels of description; fear is a phenomenal experience, but it's also... or corresponds in some way to... a specific neural state of activity. As does hearing a sound, associating that sound with other neural representations, and triggering other neural events (ie salivating), same for a learned fear response... at either level of description they can be considered the same process, but just with epiphenomenalism asserting that the phenomenal side is causally inert... basically just a representation of the underlying physical processes.

Speaking of classical conditioning (which is what the example above is about), this is a mindset which was commonly employed by behaviorists in the early/mid-20th century (along with operant conditioning). The interesting thing about behaviorism is that it claimed to provide an adequate account for dogs salivating without referring to inner mental/cognitive states and purely to external stimuli and observable behaviors. Clearly that ended up not working.

Now, we see a view similar to behaviorism in which instead of cognitive states/acts not being real or worth considering, we have qualia/phenomenal consciousness that is being questioned.

[Fake Messiah]

. Qualia are the phenomenal properties experienced through consciousness. For example, pain. Another example, the "redness" color. Another example, the "triangularity" shape. We observe qualia, and we try to account for them.

That is a generous way to put it because there is no evidence it exists.

From wikipedia

"various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Consequently, the nature and existence of qualia under various definitions remain controversial.
While some philosophers of mind like Daniel Dennett argue that qualia do not exist and are incompatible with neuroscience and naturalism, some neuroscientists and neurologists like Gerald Edelman, Antonio Damasio, Vilayanur Ramachandran, Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch and Rodolfo Llinás state that qualia exist and that the desire to eliminate them is based on an erroneous interpretation on the part of some philosophers regarding what constitutes science"

Indeed, this topic has turned into talking about concepts without clear definitions so some people pin whatever they want to "win the argument".